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Preston J. Werner 
Seeing What’s Right and Wrong: A Defense of A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism 
Dissertation Abstract 
 
 This dissertation develops and defends A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism, the view 
that our epistemic access to moral properties is grounded in perceptual experience. It 
contains two parts. In part I, I present the epistemic access problem for realist moral 
epistemology and argue against several a priori attempts to resolve it. In part II, I defend 
A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and its ability to resolve the epistemic access problem.   
Part I begins by arguing that evolutionary debunking arguments are best 
understood as claiming that we lack epistemic access to mind-independent moral facts. 
The remainder of part I rejects several attempts to respond to this challenge. I first argue 
that even sophisticated versions of reflective equilibrium, as coherentist theories, fall 
victim to a “garbage in, garbage out” objection. I conclude that a proper solution to the 
epistemic access problem must be foundationalist. I then survey other influential a priori 
approaches to epistemic access. I conclude that each either fails to ensure epistemic 
access, or succeeds by providing epistemic access to the wrong properties—viz. not the 
robustly normative ones. 
 Part II begins with an argument that we can have perceptual experiences of 
moral properties by making use of a “method of contrast” argument of the sort found in 
the philosophy of perception literature. Next, I defend the foundationalist credentials of 
a posteriori ethical intuitionism against the objection that moral experiences are 
 
 
epistemically dependent on (moral) beliefs. I then discuss the role of emotions in 
generating moral perceptions. If emotions are themselves perceptual, their role in 
producing moral perceptual experiences is not problematic. Some have argued that 
emotions cannot be perceptual since we can be morally responsible for having (or 
failing to have) certain emotional experiences. I argue against this claim, and in favor of 
a perceptualist conception of emotions. Finally, I return to the issue of epistemic access. 
I argue that the perceptual view provides an explanation of our epistemic access to the 
moral properties, and that such a view is compatible with the non-causal nature of 
those properties. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seeing Right From Wrong: A Defense of A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Preston John Werner 
 
 
 
B.A. University of Iowa, 2007 
M.A. University of Nebraska, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             Dissertation     
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        Syracuse University     
  July 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Preston John Werner. 2016. 
Seeing Right from Wrong: A Defense of A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism by Preston 
John Werner is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. 
v 
 
Acknowledgments: You’ll have to humor me, as this is the first, and may very well be 
the last, time that I’ll be able to acknowledge how much of me is just an amalgamation 
of the people I’ve been lucky enough to have been surrounded by the last several years.  
 First, my committee—David Sobel, Hille Paakkunainen, Ben Bradley, Russ 
Shafer-Landau, and Andre Gallois—have helped me immensely in thinking through 
these issues, and perhaps most importantly, have encouraged me despite the initial 
questionable plausibility of the view I defend here. I also think it would be negligent to 
not also include here Mark van Roojen, who, although is not an official committee 
member, helped me more than he knows at the initial stages of my project. My thoughts 
about moral epistemology and much else have been deeply influenced by all six of 
these people.  
 My dissertation was written in two very geographically distinct places—half at 
the University of Nebraska and half at Syracuse University. But both places are packed 
with brilliant and hardworking faculty and graduate students. Interesting and 
insightful philosophical conversation fills the air like snow on any given Syracuse 
winter day. I want to thank all of the faculty and graduate students at both of these 
schools, but especially the following for helping to clear my head on various issues in 
the dissertation that follows: Patrick Arnold, Aaron Bronfman, Gabe Bruguier, Arturo 
Castellanos, David Chavez, Çağla Çimendereli, Lorenza D’Angelo, Dante Dauksz, 
Naomi Dershowitz, Maddie Eller, Aaron Elliott, Luke Elwonger, Kendall Fisher, Allison 
vi 
Fritz, Carolyn Garland, Shane George, C.J.K. Gibilisco, Reina Hayaki, Landon Hedrick, 
David Henderson, Ben Henke, Cliff Hill, Isaiah Lin, Scott Looney, Yaojun Lu, Tim 
Loughrist, Jennifer McKitrick, Joseph Mendola, Justin Moss, Chris Richards, Byron 
Simmons, Steve Steward, Andrew Spaid, Brian Tackett, Travis Timmerman, Adam 
Thompson, Kaz Watanabe, Sam Wolf, and Seiichi Yasuda.  
I want to particularly thank Teresa Bruno and Nicole Dular, my fellow graduate 
students and advisee siblings. With how much they influenced my thinking, and how 
much they read of my dissertation, they might as well also be honorary committee 
members. And finally, my mother and father, Nancy and Bruce, and Ted Towner, 
roommate, friend, and confidant.  
 
This dissertation is for Steve Swartzer and Clare LaFrance, for teaching me how to see, 
and to Nikki Fortier, Emily Garton, and Mose, for teaching me how to feel. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PART I 1 
CHAPTER 1. HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE EPISTEMIC ACCESS PROBLEM 1 
CHAPTER 2. SCANLON’S REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 31 
CHAPTER 3. WHY CONCEPTUAL COMPETENCE WON’T HELP THE NON-NATURALIST 52 
PART II 89 
CHAPTER 4. MORAL PERCEPTION AND THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCE 89 
CHAPTER 5. A POSTERIORI ETHICAL INTUITIONISM AND COGNITIVE PENETRATION 118 
CHAPTER 6. PERCEPTUALISM ABOUT EMOTIONS AND RATIONAL CRITICIZABILITY 149 
CHAPTER 7. TOWARD A PERCEPTUAL SOLUTION TO EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS 170 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 203 
Chapter 1 
How to Understand the Epistemic Access Problem for Non-Naturalist Moral Realism 
Introduction 
A longstanding objection to non-naturalist moral realism (henceforth “non-
naturalism”) is that it is incompatible with any plausible explanation of how we can 
come to have knowledge of moral truths.1 As most non-naturalists accept, our beliefs 
about these entities could not be caused by them.2 It is mysterious, the objection goes, 
how we could have epistemic access to these non-causal entities in order to form 
justified beliefs about them. I call this kind of epistemological objection the access 
objection.3 Though the objection is frequently gestured at, it is not often developed in 
much detail. Nevertheless, it is an objection generally taken seriously (and rightly so).  
 The purpose of this paper is to clarify and develop the various forms of the 
access objection and propose a unique formulation that I believe is superior to those 
currently found in the literature. The key in developing a proper understanding of the 
access objection is to do so in a way that is charitable both to the proponent of the 
objection as well as the non-naturalist. This means that the objection should neither be 
                                                          
1 Arguably, this objection goes at least back to Mackie (1977), Ch. 1. Harman (1977), Ch.1 presses an arguably 
similar worry, though it is in terms of explanation rather than causation. Two more recent versions of this 
objection, which emphasize evolution as particularly damning for non-naturalist epistemology are Joyce (2001) and 
Street (2006).  
2 Huemer (2008), Ch.5, Scanlon (forthcoming), Lectures 1-2, Dworkin (2011), Ch.4, and Ridge (2008), Section 3.  
3 As will become clear below, there is no single access objection, but many substantively different ways of pressing 
a general epistemological concern about our access to objective moral truths. So I mean “access objection” to 
apply to a range of epistemological objections to non-naturalism.  
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formulated in a way that is clearly misguided, nor in a way that begs the question 
against the non-naturalist. I develop my formulation of the objection by taking a step 
back from metaethics to epistemology more generally. I do this in order to motivate a 
general epistemological principle I call the access requirement, which requires that an 
adequate epistemology for a given domain explain how our justified beliefs can be in 
some way responsive to the facts of that domain.4 The access requirement is closely 
related to the fact that, as Lawrence BonJour says, “one crucial part of the task of an 
adequate epistemological theory is to show that there is an appropriate connection 
between its proposed account of epistemic justification and the cognitive goal of truth.”5 
If this is right, then a theory of justification for any given domain, ethics included, must 
meet the access requirement.  
1. Benacerraf’s Problem  
 What I am calling the access objection to moral realism can be traced back to Paul 
Benacerraf’s (1973) “Mathematical Truth”. As its title suggests, Benacerraf was worried 
about the epistemology of mathematics for a Platonist conception of mathematical 
objects. David Liggins (2010) helpfully reconstructs Benacerraf’s argument as follows: 
(B1) If mathematical platonism is true, then we have knowledge of abstract 
mathematical entities. 
(B2)  If we have knowledge of abstract mathematical entities, then we are 
causally related to them. 
(B3)   We are not causally related to abstract mathematical entities. 
                                                          
4 For the more precise formulation, see section 5 below.  
5 BonJour (1985), pp.108-109. 
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Therefore: 
(B4)   Mathematical platonism is not true.6 
 
The corresponding argument against non-naturalism is straightforward: 
(M1) If non-naturalism is true, then we have knowledge of non-natural 
properties. 7 
(M2) If we have knowledge of non-natural properties, then we are causally 
related to them. 
(M3) We are not causally related to non-natural properties. 
Therefore: 
(M4) Non-naturalism is not true. 
 
Each premise of both arguments can be questioned. I’ll focus on the moral case since 
that is the focus of this paper. While (M1) is denied by skeptical non-naturalists, and 
(M3) is denied by at least some naturalist moral realists,8 most non-naturalists deny 
(M2). As a result, the focus of this paper is on (M2) and variations of it. When 
Benacerraf formulated his argument against Platonism, the causal theory of knowledge 
was in vogue.9 If the causal theory of knowledge were true, (B2) and (M2) would be true 
as well. However, it’s now widely accepted that the causal theory of knowledge is 
                                                          
6 Liggins 2010, p.68.  
7 I refer to non-natural properties throughout my formulations of Benacerraf-style arguments. The argument could 
also be run in terms of moral facts, moral truths, moral entities, etc. I stick to “properties” throughout for easier 
bookkeeping, but nothing I say should turn on this.   
8 E.g. Boyd (1988), Sturgeon (1985), Railton (1986). Oddie (2005/2009) is a self-proclaimed non-naturalist who 
denies (M3), but he is an exceptional case among non-naturalists. Shafer-Landau (2003/2005) believes that moral 
properties are constituted out of, but not reducible to, natural properties. Whether someone with this view would 
deny (M3) depends on whether she thinks that an object inherits its causal properties from the parts that 
constitute it. As far as I know, Shafer-Landau takes no stand on this question.  
9 The locus classicus is Goldman (1967, 1976), though he now rejects the view. See Ichikawa &Steup (2012), 
Section 6.2 for the analysis and its historical development.  
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inadequate.10 As a result, Benacerraf’s argument and its moral counterpart are 
unsuccessful as they stand as arguments against Platonism and moral realism.  
 Despite the rejection of Benacerraf’s assumed theory of knowledge, Benacerraf-
style arguments have remained influential. Many have thought that Benacerraf was on 
to something when he formulated his argument, even if he was wrong about accepting 
the causal theory of knowledge. I agree with this sentiment. The challenge, then, is to 
articulate a Benacerraf-style argument which neither relies on a contentious theory of 
knowledge nor begs the question against the non-naturalist. I will discuss three such 
attempts, explaining why I think each of them is inadequate. Then I will present and 
defend my own version of the problem with an emphasis on the premise I use to 
replace (M2), which I call the access requirement.  
2. Restricting the Causal Requirement to Existential Claims 
 Colin Cheyne (1998, 2001) offers a first attempt at refining Benacerraf’s 
argument. Cheyne agrees that the causal theory of knowledge, as it stands, is too 
strong—unless we are willing to significantly weaken what counts as a cause.11 Instead, 
he argues that the causal requirement only applies to knowledge of a given entity’s 
existence, not for any of its particular properties. More formally, his condition is: 
(CE) “We cannot know that F’s exist unless our belief in their existence is caused 
by at least one event in which an F participates.”12 
                                                          
10 See, e.g. Ichikawa & Steup (2012), Section 6.2 and Cheyne (2001).  
11 See Cheyne (2001), Chs. 5 and 7.  
12 Cheyne (2001), 99.  
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This would lead us of the following understanding of (M2): 
(M2a) If we have knowledge of the existence of non-naturalist properties, then 
our belief in their existence is caused by at least one event in which they 
participate.13  
 
Cheyne motivates (CE), and therefore indirectly (M2a), by providing examples from the 
history of science in which scientists intuitively did not have knowledge of a theoretical 
posit until they causally interacted with it. One such example is the discovery of 
germanium. Dmitri Mendeleev predicted the existence of germanium before he had had 
causal interaction with it. This is because he had a relatively well-confirmed chemical 
theory that, given a “gap” in his periodic table, predicted that there was an as-yet-to-be-
seen element with the properties that germanium has. However, Cheyne argues that, 
intuitively, Mendeleev did not know of the existence of germanium given his theory 
alone:  
Mendelee[v] may have believed on the basis of the gap in his periodic table that 
germanium might exist and we may even agree that it was a reasonable 
assumption, but it still remained for the element to be discovered. Knowledge 
that germanium exists required causal contact, however remote, with atoms of 
germanium.14 
 
Given that Mendeleev’s theory was relatively well-confirmed, Cheyne seems to 
acknowledge here that Mendeleev had some evidence that germanium existed, by way 
                                                          
13 Cheyne (2001), 99.  
14 Cheyne (2001), 100.  
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of an inference to the best explanation. However, he claims that Mendeleev cannot be 
credited with full-blown knowledge until he has causally interacted with germanium.  
 I don’t believe that plugging (M2a) into our Benacerraf-style argument will result 
in the strongest version of the argument, for two reasons. First, in order for (M2a) to 
play a role in a Benacerraf-style argument against non-naturalism, we would need to 
change the other premises of the argument, lest we end up with a much weaker 
conclusion. (M2a) is only a claim about the knowledge of the existence of non-natural 
properties, not about their nature. This is an important difference, since Cheyne 
acknowledges that (CE) is compatible with knowledge of the nature of an entity that we 
don’t yet know to exist. So, even if (M2a) is correct, we may still have knowledge of 
many first-order normative claims, even if those claims are about non-natural 
properties. In order for the argument to succeed with its intended strength, we would 
have to change (M1) to: 
(M1a) If non-naturalism is true, then we have knowledge of the existence of non-
natural properties. 
 
Unlike (M1), rejecting (M1a) is consistent with the rejection of skepticism about first-
order normative claims. This makes the rejection of (M1a) much easier for the non-
skeptical non-naturalist. So one important reason why (M2a) is not the best way to 
reformulate (M2) is that it won’t result in a skeptical argument with nearly as wide a 
scope as Benacerraf-style arguments are supposed to have.  
6
Secondly, there are good reasons to believe that (CE) is false. Since (M2a) is a 
corollary of (CE), this should cast doubt on (M2a) as well. Cheyne grants that a well-
confirmed theory can provide some evidence of the existence of a particular entity in 
order for his theory to be at all plausible, as for example when he agrees that it is 
reasonable for scientists to search for entities predicted by their theories. However, once 
it is granted that we can have evidence for the existence of Fs before we have causally 
interacted with Fs, it is hard to see how it couldn’t be possible to have knowledge of the 
existence of Fs before we have causally interacted with them: All we have to do is 
sufficiently ratchet up the evidence. Perhaps Mendeleev in particular didn’t have a 
sufficiently well-confirmed theory in hand to count as knowing that germanium existed 
before causally interacting with it. But suppose we gave Mendeleev all other non-
germanium evidence involving experimental results and theory in modern chemistry. 
Wouldn’t he then be able to infer the existence of germanium via an inference to the 
best explanation?15 The conclusion to draw here seems to be that, at the very least, best 
explanation arguments can in principle give us knowledge of the existence of 
something, even when we have not causally interacted with it. (M2a) is not an 
acceptable premise to replace (M2) in a Benacerraf-style argument. 
3. Non-Accidentality 
                                                          
15 I thank Luke Elwonger, Adam Thompson, and Mark van Roojen for helpful discussion on this point.  
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 A second way to revise Benacerraf’s argument is to speak in terms of a more 
epistemically ecumenical notion, that of non-accidentality. It’s widely accepted that if it 
is merely an accident that a belief is true, then such a belief cannot be justified. If I 
believe on a whim that there is an even number of stars in the milky way, I wouldn’t be 
justified even if my belief turned out to be true. This is because it would be sheer luck 
that I formed a belief that turned out to be true. More generally, the argument goes, if 
we can’t explain why our beliefs about a particular domain of facts, such as moral 
truths, are non-accidentally true, then we should throw out all of our beliefs about that 
domain as unjustified (or at least be agnostic about their justificatory status). This 
provides us with a second attempt at revising premise two in our Benacerraf style 
argument: 
(M2b) If we have knowledge of non-natural properties, then it is not a mere 
accident that (at least some of) our beliefs are true. 
 
(M2b) seems to be defended by many philosophers who discuss Benacerraf-style 
objections. Michael Huemer, for example, after commenting on the flaws with 
Benacerraf’s original argument, notes that  
[t]here is a more general condition on knowledge that everyone in epistemology 
accepts: I know p only if it is not a mere accident (not a matter of chance) that I 
am right about whether p. The challenge for the moral realist, then, is to explain 
how it would be anything more than chance if my moral beliefs were true, given 
that I do not interact with moral properties.16 
                                                          
16 Huemer (2005), 123. Bedke (2009, forthcoming) prefers to understand some kinds of arguments for moral 
skepticism in this way as well. Enoch (2011, Ch. 7 Sect. 2) talks in terms of establishing correlations between beliefs 
and facts, but as I understand him he is presenting the non-accidentality reading using different terminology.  
8
  
(M2b) is superior to (M2a) in that it doesn’t beg the question against non-naturalists 
who believe moral properties are causally inert. Nor does it rely on a contentious 
epistemological claim. However, though this non-accidentality condition on knowledge 
is probably necessary for meeting a Benacerraf type worry, it is too weak to provide as 
strong of an argument as possible on the part of the moral skeptic. To see why, consider 
one thing David Lewis says in response to the Benacerraf worry in On the Plurality of 
Worlds: “[I]f it is a necessary truth that so-and-so, then believing that so-and-so is an 
infallible method of being right. If what I believe is a necessary truth, then there is no 
possibility of being wrong. That is so whatever the subject matter of the necessary truth, 
and no matter how it came to be believed.”17 
 If, as is widely believed, the moral truths are necessary, then any moral belief 
falls under this class of beliefs that Lewis points out has “no possibility of being 
wrong”, in some sense. But a proposition’s modal status shouldn’t make justified beliefs 
about that proposition so trivial. I hope this is intuitive enough, but I’ll say a little bit by 
way of defending it. For one thing, this would multiply knowledge beyond what is 
plausible—seemingly all true metaphysical beliefs would count as justified on this 
view. Imagine the theist defending her belief in God as justified given that if God exists, 
                                                          
17 Lewis (1986), pp.114-115. For what it’s worth, even Lewis himself seems ambivalent with this response.  
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God exists necessarily. This would not be a satisfactory justification for a theistic belief.18 
Secondly, we want our theory of justification to be able to carve up good reasons from 
believing a proposition from bad ways of believing a proposition. If any reason 
whatsoever is at worst an epistemically neutral reason to believe a necessary 
proposition, it will be hard to make such distinctions. The non-accidentality that we 
want for justification is not just any non-accidentality, but one that ties the believer’s 
reasons for believing with the fact in question. This epistemology of necessary truths 
on-the-cheap will not get us the right relationship of non-accidentality. 
 However, maybe this is an uncharitable reading of (M2b). Maybe we should 
understand the non-accidentality condition as applying to the outputs of the methods 
we use to form the beliefs. So, for example, if I decide whether a given action is wrong 
by flipping a coin, my belief won’t be justified even if it turns out to be true, since the 
coin could have just as easily landed differently.19 Understanding “not a mere accident” 
in (M2b) in this different way is a slight improvement. But in the end, this won’t 
provide an adequate fix. This is because some methods will non-accidentally give the 
same results every time, whether or not they are at all related to the domain in question. 
If I have some complicated way of inferring moral claims from purely mathematical 
claims, my beliefs in those moral claims will not be knowledge, even the ones that are 
                                                          
18 A point made by Field (1991), 236. Similar points are made with respect to Safety and Sensitivity conditions on 
knowledge by Manley (2007, Sections 1-2) and DeRose (2004, Section 7). 
19 See Manley (2007, Sections 1-2).  
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true,  and even though it is no accident that, given my method, I deduced those 
conclusions. Now let’s suppose that, as is plausible, my math-to-morals deductions are 
no better than chance at resulting in true beliefs. This might suggest that if we were to 
bulk up the non-accidentality condition in the most charitable way, we would end up 
with a non-accidentality condition not on particular beliefs, but on the methods used to 
form those beliefs. In other words, general reliability is the important epistemic feature 
that non-accidentality is trying to capture. I consider this possibility presently.  
4. Reliability 
 The third way of formulating the Benacerraf-style worry that I will consider 
before giving my preferred understanding is to state the second premise in terms of 
reliability. If our beliefs about a particular domain are to count as knowledge, an 
adequate epistemology of that domain must be able to explain the reliability of the 
belief forming processes or methods that we use. For example, an adequate 
epistemology for the Platonist about mathematics must be able to explain the reliability 
of mathematicians’ beliefs about mathematical claims. With all of this in mind, here is a 
third try at revising premise two of the (moral) Benacerraf argument: 
(M2c) If we have knowledge of non-natural properties, then there is some 
explanation of why most of our moral beliefs are formed reliably.  
 
11
Hartry Field, who provides one of the most widely cited Benacerraf-style arguments in 
the philosophy of math literature, states his argument both in terms of reliability20 as 
well as the related but non-modal notion of actual accuracy.21 On the moral side, in a 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry Michael Ridge states Benacerraf style worries in 
terms of reliability, suggesting that this is at least one standard way of understanding 
the argument.22 
 I think (M2c) is on the right track, but I don’t believe that it is the best way to 
formulate a Benacerraf-style argument. (M2c) makes the argument too strong and is 
thus unfair to the non-skeptical non-naturalist.23  To see why, it will be helpful to notice 
a disanalogy between the case of mathematics and the case of morality. Consider the 
mathematical version of (M2c): 
(B2c)  If we have knowledge of mathematical properties, then there is some 
explanation of why most of our mathematical beliefs are formed reliably. 
 
(B2c) is a plausible demand on an epistemology for Platonists in math because it’s 
uncontroversial that people generally do a pretty good job at forming true mathematical 
beliefs. Even if this is doubted, the neo-Benacerrafian can at least demand that the 
Platonist provide an explanation of why most of the mathematical beliefs of 
professional mathematicians are formed reliably. There is a clear and very serious cost 
                                                          
20 Field (1989), 233-238.  
21 Field (1989, 238).  
22 Ridge (2008), Sect. 3.  
23 As we’ll see below, I also think (M2C) is too weak in a way that helps to motivate my preferred Benacerraf type 
argument. 
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to the Platonist who would deny (B2c), but if the Platonist is forced to claim that even 
mathematicians fail to form mathematical beliefs reliably, they might as well embrace 
skepticism. In short, (B2c), or perhaps something slightly weaker, is a fair demand to 
make of the mathematical Platonist since it is a datum that mathematicians are 
generally very good at reliably forming true mathematical beliefs. 
 However, unlike in the case of mathematics, there is no consensus even amongst 
non-skeptical moral realists that people are generally reliable when forming moral 
beliefs. Huemer, who is a non-naturalist, explains moral disagreement by pointing to 
14(!) widespread sources of erroneous judgments.24 He is happy to accept that the 
majority of our moral beliefs may be false, compatible with his non-skeptical realism. 
More generally, it has been shown that moral judgments (at least about particular cases) 
are susceptible to bias, framing, and responsive to other seemingly non-normative 
features of cases.25 It’s difficult to see how realists would respond to this challenge 
without admitting that people are prone to unreliability when forming moral beliefs. 
But this is perfectly compatible with the rejection of skepticism.26 The upshot here is that 
                                                          
24 Huemer lists bias, miscalculation, confusion, misunderstanding, oversight, hasty judgments, incomplete 
information, unarticulated assumptions, stubbornness, fallacies, forgetfulness, the intrinsic difficulty of issues, 
inarticulate evidence, and mental defects as just some common sources of error.  See Huemer (2005), pp.137-139. 
See also Huemer (2008).  
25 Cushman et. al. (2008), Sinnott-Armstrong (2006), Ahlenius and Tánnsjó (2012) are three such examples.  
26 As Mark van Roojen points out in a similar context, “[a] somewhat unreliable process can be part of a more 
reliable overall process, and the overall process might be less reliable if it lacked the only somewhat reliable sub-
part.” (van Roojen, forthcoming, 12) Van Roojen develops a non-skeptic friendly explanation of these empirical 
results by limiting the epistemic force that intuitions have. On his view, intuitions have some positive epistemic 
status, but not enough to generate full blown justification without relations of coherence to further support their 
reliability. I take it that his view is compatible with many non-skeptical versions of moral realism.  
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unlike the mathematical case, there is no need to salvage the overall reliability of moral 
beliefs, since even non-skeptical realists can admit that many run-of-the-mill moral 
beliefs are unreliably formed. (M2c) places an unfair epistemological demand on the 
non-naturalist.  
 Would a more restricted version of (M2c) lower the epistemological demand on 
the non-naturalist to a more reasonable requirement? Consider something like (M2c*): 
(M2c*) If we (human beings) have knowledge of non-naturalist properties, then 
there is some explanation of why most of the moral beliefs of moral experts 
are formed reliably. 
 
However, even this more restricted reading is too strong of a demand to place on the 
moral realist, for similar reasons. Unlike in the mathematics case, there is no obvious 
need to accommodate the existence of moral experts. Professional ethicists may not 
provide an adequate counterpart to professional mathematicians.27 And the existence of 
moral experts outside of the philosophical community is highly disputed.28 Appealing 
to hypothetical moral experts would not help either, since that would only show that 
justified moral beliefs are possible for beings that don’t in fact exist. We are looking for 
a moral epistemology for creatures like us. So at best, (M2c*) is only a demand on a 
realist who does accept the existence of moral experts. Since the existence of moral 
experts is not a requirement on a non-skeptical realism, (M2c*) remains too strong.  
                                                          
27 Though for one interesting argument that professional ethicists are the relevant moral experts, see Sharvy 
(2007).  
28 See, e.g. Tobia et. al. (2012), Cholbi (2007), and Driver (2006).  
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 The considerations just provided are reason enough to reject (M2c) (or M2c*) as 
the best way to formulate a Benacerraf-style moral argument. However, I want to talk 
about a different way in which I think (M2c) is a non-ideal premise, in that it is in 
another way too weak of a condition on moral knowledge. If I am correct about the 
above considerations, then this further argument is inessential to my case against (M2c) 
as a premise. However, I want to discuss why I believe (M2c) is also too weak, not only 
because I think it is an important point, but also because it will help to motivate the key 
premise in the version of the argument that I defend below.  
A reliability condition on knowledge is similar to a non-accidentality condition 
on knowledge in that it is (at least partially) modal. Plausibly, when our belief forming 
practices for a given domain are reliable, it means that, at least with respect to many of 
those beliefs, if the truths that actually hold were false, we wouldn’t have come to 
believe them. This condition has come to be called sensitivity in the epistemology 
literature.29  It might be claimed that this aspect of reliability is irrelevant for moral 
beliefs since they are necessarily true if true at all. However, as Matthew Bedke argues:  
Quite generally, independent evidence that a target domain of fact holds 
necessarily does not insulate the particular beliefs in that domain from 
sensitivity-type tests. To think otherwise is to believe that justifying testimony to 
the effect that some domain’s basic facts hold necessarily insulates those beliefs 
from insensitivity tests.30 
 
                                                          
29 It originates with Nozick (1981), though he does not call it sensitivity.  
30 Bedke (forthcoming), 25. Manley (2007, Sections 1-2) makes a similar point with respect to Safety, an 
epistemological principle that is related to Sensitivity. 
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Bedke denies that sensitivity conditions are trivially met for our beliefs of necessary 
truths.31 So on a Bedkean understanding, some of our tests for reliability will stretch 
beyond counterfactual claims to counter-possible claims.32 33  
 I’m sympathetic to the spirit of Bedke’s claim, but I think that the non-skeptical 
non-naturalist could reasonably balk at the suggestion that moral beliefs must meet 
some counter-possibility test in order to count as sensitive or reliable. For one thing, she 
could claim that this condition is an unreasonably high epistemic standard to require 
beliefs to meet, whether moral or not. But even if it is a reasonable epistemic condition, 
it’s just hard to assess the truth or falsity of counter-possible claims. Even the non-
naturalist, who doesn’t identify moral properties with any natural properties, can 
plausibly claim that, e.g., suffering is essentially bad (though badness isn’t essentially 
suffering).34 So in order to assess the Bedkean reliability of our belief that suffering is 
bad, are we required to go not just counter-possible but counter-essential? If Bedkean 
reliability requires our ability to track truths even in counter-essential possibilities, it 
seems clear that it places too strong of a burden on the non-skeptical non-naturalist.35 In 
                                                          
31 This isn’t quite right. Bedke seems to be willing to concede that sensitivity as an epistemic concept is trivially met 
for necessary truths. The more important point is that the relevant sensitivity-type epistemic condition on 
justification/knowledge is not trivially met for necessary truths. He calls any belief that doesn’t meet this extended 
sense of sensitivity “oblivious”. See Bedke (forthcoming), especially sections 4 and 5.  
32 Bedke talks of “allodoxic possibilities” instead of counter-possibles, but since I’m not worried about the details of 
his view here, I skip over this complication.  
33 Bedke’s argument doesn’t actually assume a reliability requirement. Instead, he just focuses on his sensitivity-
type condition of “obliviousness”. Nevertheless, I take it that if he were convinced that reliability was the 
important condition, he would want a belief’s being oblivious (in his sense) to undermine its claim to reliability.  
34 FitzPatrick (2008) seems to have something like this view.  
35 I thank Mark van Roojen for pressing me on this point.  
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short, it will be very difficult to test for a belief’s Bedkean reliability. So the non-
skeptical realist can reasonably read reliability in (M2c) in the traditional way and rest 
easy, at least with respect to the sensitivity aspect of reliability.  
 I certainly don’t think that meeting a Benacerraf-style argument with (M2c) 
instead of (M2) is a walk in the park for the non-skeptical moral realist. However, I 
think that Bedke is right that something is missing. (M2c) is a too weak. Suppose Steve 
is born with the unshakeable belief that water is H2O. He has no independent evidence 
for the belief’s truth. Steve’s belief is not the result of some evolutionary adaptation; it is 
nothing but a random mutation in his DNA.36 If the belief is essential to Steve (after all, 
it is directly genetically caused), then it is a necessary truth that he believes water is 
H2O. And suppose that this is the only belief Steve has which is caused by this hyper-
modulated genetic mechanism. Furthermore, it is necessarily true that water is H2O. So 
Steve believes water is H2O at all and only the worlds in which water is H2O. I’m 
inclined to think that despite this fact, Steve’s belief that water is H2O is not an 
upstanding epistemic denizen. But doesn’t Steve’s belief count as reliably formed, if we 
understand reliability in the traditional way? Part of the problem here is that reliability 
is subject to a generality problem, such that it is unclear what range of actual and 
counterfactual beliefs that reliability must range over.37 Even setting this complication 
                                                          
36 My sincere apologies for the blatantly unrealistic pseudo-science involved in the case.  
37 See Goldman (2008), Sections 3 and 4 for a discussion of the generality problem for reliabilism as an analysis of 
knowledge, and some responses to it (with references).  
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aside, it’s unclear how to test reliability in a case like this—and yet it is something like 
this kind of explanation of the reliability of our moral beliefs that some non-skeptical 
realists appeal to in responding to Benacerraf-style arguments.38 If Steve’s belief about 
water is not in good epistemic standing, we shouldn’t accept these kinds of responses as 
being enough to show that our moral beliefs are in good epistemic standing either. In 
short, there is no non-contentious way of spelling out the reliability condition that 
provides a strong enough condition on the non-skeptical moral realist.39 
5. The Access Requirement: A Benacerraf Inspired Epistemic Requirement for Moral 
Realism 
5a. Formulating the Access Requirement 
We have now seen some attempts to formulate a Benacerraf-type argument 
against non-skeptical non-naturalism. I have argued that all are inadequate in at least 
one way. What we are looking for is a formulation of an epistemic demand that avoids 
the kinds of problems that beset the other attempts above. Two issues stand out as 
especially important. First, the argument can’t be formulated in a way such that it leads 
to independently epistemologically implausible consequences by granting 
justification/knowledge to those that clearly don’t have it, such as the case of Steve 
given above. Second, the argument can’t be formulated in a way that is question 
                                                          
38 See Enoch (2011), Ch. 7, Wielenberg (2010), pp.447-452, and Skarsaune (2011), pp.233-236, for examples of 
arguments with this structure.  
39 Setiya (2012), pp.89-92 makes a similar point about reliability.  
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begging against the non-naturalist, such as by claiming that knowledge of a property 
requires a causal connection to that property. In this section, I begin by proposing and 
explaining my preferred alternative, what I call the access requirement (AR). Then I 
explain why AR can capture the virtues of the alternative approaches without the vices. 
In particular, I think that AR can help to explain why the challenge is often understood 
in terms of reliability while neither relying on the controversial epistemological 
problems with reliability, nor (falsely) committing the realist to explaining how most of 
our moral beliefs are true.  
 Without further ado, here is my proposed access requirement: 
(AR) Any complete non-skeptical epistemology for a particular domain d must 
explain how we have epistemic access to the d-facts such that we are able to 
form beliefs that are responsive to those facts. 
 
Three clarifications: First, (AR) is a general epistemic requirement.40 This is an 
advantage, since it helps to illustrate that the demand on moral epistemology is no 
different from that of any other domain. Second, (AR) is meant to be a necessary 
condition on justification/knowledge of a particular domain, not a sufficient condition. 
Epistemic access is relatively cheap—we could in principle have epistemic access to a 
domain and yet be pervasively mistaken about the truths of that domain. It thus avoids 
                                                          
40 One general epistemological statement of something in the spirit of (AR) is found in Sosa (1985): “[J]ustification 
could not possibly turn out to be a property that a belief might possess in complete independence of the truth of 
its object.” (1985, p.13).  
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committing the non-skeptical realist to reliability amongst normal human beings.41 
Third, (AR) is an explanatory demand to be met by the moral epistemologist, not a first-
order demand to be met by moral agents.42 It asks how, given some particular ontology 
of moral facts, our first-order moral beliefs could in any way be responsive to the truths 
that they purport to be about.  
5b. Is (AR) just the causal requirement in disguise?  
  With its language of “epistemic access” and beliefs’ being “responsive” to facts, 
the moral realist may be concerned that I have merely rephrased Benacerraf’s causal 
requirement on knowledge in (slightly) less causal language. If the only way in 
principle to have “epistemic access” to the facts of a given domain is via being causally 
related to it, then (AR) provides nothing but a more sophisticated way of begging the 
question against the non-skeptical moral realist. I certainly don’t intend access or 
responsiveness to be understood merely causally. Unfortunately, I am unable to spell 
out precisely what epistemic access and responsiveness are, for two reasons. First, any 
further explication would continue to look misleadingly causal or spatio-temporal in a 
                                                          
41 Recall from above that there is an important difference between the possibility of knowledge in some domain 
and actual reliability in that domain. The non-naturalist arguably must only show the former to respond to 
Benacerraf-style objections.  
42 It is important to stress this point, since “access” is a term used a lot in the epistemological literature concerning 
internalism vs. externalism about justification/knowledge. The internalist about justification accepts, while the 
externalist rejects, that whenever a believer is justified in believing something, the basis of that justification is 
accessible upon reflection to her.  (AR) is silent on the dispute between internalists and externalists about 
justification. In other words, it is a meta-justificatory requirement rather than a justificatory requirement. For the 
importance giving a meta-justification for the epistemology of a given domain, even for an internalist about 
justification, see BonJour (1985), pp.8-15. 
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way I don’t intend. I could say that access is about “being in contact with” the truths in 
question, or that responsiveness is about forming our beliefs in light of the facts they are 
about, rather than in light of something unrelated.  But I’m pretty sure anyone worried 
about the language of “access” and “responsiveness” will not be any less worried about 
the “being in contact with” or “in light of” relations. Second, “epistemic access” and 
“responsiveness” should be understood very widely, and any further precisification of 
these notions may rule out ways of meeting (AR) which are in principle possible.  
 Readers so far unconvinced would be right to be unsatisfied by these remarks. So 
instead of leaving my explanation of epistemic access with potentially unhelpful 
metaphors about being in contact with truths or truthmakers, I want to try to make it 
more clear that (AR) is more than just a re-statement of a causal requirement by going 
through several different kinds of access that meet the (AR) for a given domain of facts: 
1. Causal access. This is perhaps the most widespread and uncontroversial kind of 
access to the external world. Beliefs with this sort of access are responsive to the 
facts they are about via a causal relationship, for example perceptual beliefs.  
2. Introspective access. Though the reliability of introspection has been 
questioned,43 it’s plausible that we have some special access to our own mental 
states, however fallible it may be. I take it that even though introspection 
involves underlying causal brain processes, it is from an epistemic standpoint a 
different kind of access than causal access.44 On a traditional sort of model of 
introspection, our introspective beliefs are responsive to the facts they are about 
via a relationship of direct acquaintance. 
                                                          
43 See, e.g. Schwitzgebel (2010), Section 4.  
44 I don’t want to take a stand on whether, or to what extent, introspection should be subsumed under the 
category of causal access. I include it in the list because it seems to have been thought to be epistemically distinct 
in some special way by many philosophers, and my intention here is only to give a list of possibly different forms of 
epistemic access. See Schwitzgebel (2010).   
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3. Constitutive access. We have constitutive access to a truth t when something 
about our coming to believe t is partially constitutive or provides evidence for 
what is partially constitutive of its being the case that t. Arguably, many beliefs 
about response-dependent properties involve constitutive access.45 Suppose that 
something is beautiful iff it is believed to be beautiful by all/many/some normal 
adult human beings.46 A normal adult human being comes across a Chuck Close 
painting and comes to believe that it is beautiful. She has constitutive access to 
the fact that the painting is beautiful insofar as her belief is partially constitutive 
of that fact.  
4. Conceptual access. A certain philosophical school of thought claims that we can 
learn a lot about the concepts we possess competently by conceptual analysis, 
which may involve reflecting on how we would apply them in various 
scenarios.47 This is one potential explanation and defense of analytic knowledge 
(assuming that there are analytic truths).48  Again, though this kind of a priori 
reflection would be underwritten by causal (and possibly also introspective) 
processes, the access in question is not causal or introspective, because of the 
nature of the truths in question. On this view, analytic truths are not causally 
related to us, nor are they merely facts about our own mental states.49  
5. Intuitive access. On a recalcitrant but controversial view, intuitions provide a 
source of justification in a wide variety of philosophical disputes.50 Intuitions 
have been defended as a source of justification for beliefs about modality, 
metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics. Even amongst those that accept 
that intuitions justify, the question of how intuitions can provide justification is a 
matter of dispute. But any such account would have to explain how intuitions 
provide access to the truths that they are about, in accordance with (AR). Here 
are two such (oversimplified) stories that, if they can be made to work, would 
meet the (AR):      
1. Intuitions involve direct, de re acquaintance with properties (usually 
conceived as Platonic universals). Via de re acquaintance with the property 
greenness, and de re acquaintance with the property redness, we can come 
to know that nothing can be both green and red all over. In at least some 
                                                          
45 As with introspection, I don’t intend to take a stand on the epistemology of response-dependent properties. My 
intention here is only to give a list of possibly different forms of epistemic access. 
46 There are many complications I am ignoring here, not the least of which is how to define “normal” in a non-
circular way.  
47 Jackson (1998, 2001), Audi (2008b), Russell (2011).  
48 Robert Audi (2005, 2008a), for example, believes that at least some substantive moral knowledge is conceptual, 
in the sense that the wrongness of certain actions is “contained in” the moral concepts alone.   
49 For a book length defense of analyticity, see Russell (2011).  
50 For an overview with an extensive bibliography, see Pust (2012).  
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cases, perceptual experience may ground our grasp of the relevant 
properties, but perceptual experience alone cannot justify the synthetic 
truth in question. Our access to these truths is met through our de re 
acquaintance with the properties.51 
2. On a related view, intuitions involve grasping relationships between 
our concepts. However, according to such a view, this grasping can 
provide us with more than mere conceptual knowledge. The grasping of 
our concepts can (indirectly) provide us with knowledge of the relations 
between properties (again, usually conceived as Platonic universals). It 
provides us with this knowledge not through some de re acquaintance 
relationship, as in (1), but through the fact that our concepts can’t help but 
pick out some property, since there are properties for any consistent 
concept. We might call this Description-Constituting Access (not to be 
confused with constitutive access), since how we construct our concepts 
determines which (mind-independent) property we are picking out.52 
(This view has the upside of avoiding the mystery of (1), but the downside 
of relying on a controversial metaphysical commitment to the abundant 
theory of properties.) 
 
Two important caveats about this list: First, I don’t intend it to be exhaustive. There may 
very well be other kinds of access that I am overlooking. My intention here is only to 
provide ample evidence that (AR) isn’t smuggling in the causal assumptions of some 
Benacerraf-type arguments. Second, I don’t want to take a stand here on which of these 
kinds of access can in fact provide justification for some subset of beliefs. This is 
compatible with (AR), since (AR) is only a necessary condition on justification, not a 
sufficient one. There may be no such thing as an analytic truth, in which case there will 
                                                          
51 I think this view is more widely held than it is explicitly endorsed, though it is not a popular view. It is most 
strongly endorsed by Russell (1912), but something like it seems also to be held by Bealer (1998), Bonjour (1998), 
and Chudnoff (2011, forthcoming).  
52 “Description-Constituting Access” is my phrase. This is the view that Huemer (2005, Ch.5) seems to endorse. 
Balaguer (1998) uses this abundant view of properties in an attempt to solve the Benacerraf problem for 
mathematics: Roughly, since there are so many mathematical objects, any consistent mathematical practice will 
pick out some of them, and so our mathematical practices determine which mathematical objects to which we are 
referring; so we can’t but have knowledge about some mathematical objects or others..  
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be no instances of conceptual access. Introspection may be altogether too unreliable to 
provide justification, despite the possibility of introspective access. Many philosophers 
are skeptical that any account of intuitions could avoid serious metaphysical and (non-
Benacerraf) epistemological objections. Again, the point here is only to illustrate that 
there is nothing essentially causal about (AR), so it is not begging the question against 
the non-skeptical non-naturalist in the way that Benacerraf’s original argument is. 
Interestingly, all five of these forms of access could plausibly be appealed to as part of a 
moral epistemology, though perhaps not all as part of a realist moral epistemology.53 
5c. (AR) in relation to the non-accidentality (M2b) and reliability conditions (M2c) 
 I have tried to show that “access” and “responsiveness” need not be understood 
in a causal way. Instead, access is about bearing some kind of positive epistemic relation 
to the domain of truths (or truthmakers) that our beliefs are about. I hope it is clear 
enough given the above discussion that (AR) is more epistemically ecumenical than 
some kind of causal requirement on justification/knowledge, and thus is superior to the 
traditional Benacerraf argument (or Cheyne’s related causal version of the argument). 
                                                          
53 Causal access is most obviously compatible with naturalist realism, but Oddie (2005/2009), who is a non-
naturalist, also argues that our access is (at least partially) causal. Presumably, introspective access best fits with 
some form of subjectivism. (What about a view that proposed that we are all born with innate knowledge of the 
moral truths, because, e.g. God placed them in us upon birth? A view like this would offer an introspective 
methodology, but our access would be causal, not introspective, since our connection to the moral truths would be 
through God, not through introspection directly.) I believe we would have constitutive access to the moral truths 
on some versions of metaethical constructivism and some response-dependent accounts. Conceptual access may 
not seem like a plausible way of getting access to substantive normative truths, but on one reading this is what 
Audi (2008a) has in mind by his containment relation. Intuitive access is probably the most common answer to 
Benacerraf-type worries given by non-naturalists—see Huemer (2005), Parfit (20 11), Vol. II Ch. 32.  
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Now I want to show how (AR) is a superior alternative to non-accidentality (M2b) and 
reliability (M2c) in formulating a Benacerraf argument that both (a) provides a real (and 
legitimate) challenge to the realist moral epistemologist while (b) not simply begging 
the question against her. I’ll focus my discussion on reliability, but I will try to make 
clear how I think what I say about (AR)’s improvements over reliability extend to non-
accidentality as well.  
 Recall from above that the biggest problem with the reliability premise is that it is 
too strong, in that it demands the non-skeptical realist to defend what she need not be 
committed to: That the moral beliefs of most people, or at least serious ethicists, are 
reliably formed. Certainly the non-skeptical realist could accept this, and these so-called 
“preservationists” about morality may have to meet this stronger reliability premise in 
order to defend a fully adequate moral epistemology.54 But we are looking for a fully 
general Benacerraf-style argument, so this won’t do.  
 (AR) avoids this weakness, since access doesn’t imply reliability—in fact, it is 
compatible with pervasive error about a given domain. For example, psychological 
research has provided much evidence that memories can be influenced and altered in 
many epistemically unsavory ways.55 If this evidence isn’t enough to convince you that 
we should consider memory unreliable, just suppose that erroneous memories were 
                                                          
54 The term “preservationist” is Unger’s (1996, p.11).  
55 For just a few examples, see Loftus and Greene (1980), Powers et. al. (1979), and Loftus et. al. (1978).  
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even more widespread than they in fact are. Still, and whether or not in such a situation 
we would want to count memories as justifying, they would meet the (AR), since at 
least some memorial beliefs would bear a causal relation to the truths they are about 
(namely, past events). It’s conceivable that intuitions are pervasively erroneous, perhaps 
due to the many kinds of errors that intuitionists like Huemer mention. For example, 
suppose that people are pervasively overconfident that their concepts are determinate 
and complete, and thus form all kinds of (false) beliefs about the relations between the 
properties that their concepts purport to represent. Nevertheless, so long as the 
intuitionists’ epistemic story about intuitions and their responsiveness to (mind-
independent) properties is correct, intuitions would meet the (AR).56  
 The inference from the rejection of skepticism to the acceptance of general 
reliability is easy to make, but it should be resisted, both by non-skeptical realists and 
by those interested in pressing a charitable epistemic objection to realism. The rejection 
of skepticism is compatible with openness for massive revision of our moral beliefs. 
(AR) is capable of avoiding this illicit inference, since (to speak metaphorically,) foggy 
access is still access.  
 On the other hand, I argued above that reliability is also too weak, at least when 
it is understood modally. Some beliefs may meet the reliability test simply because their 
                                                          
56 This is not to endorse the intuitionists’ epistemic story, of course. The claim is only that, if those stories could be 
made sense of, then the intuitionists will meet (AR). The devil is in the details of demonstrating a relationship 
between intuitions and mind-independent properties. 
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contents are necessary, which is not (directly) epistemically relevant. Non-accidentality 
conditions suffer a similar problem. And if we read reliability as Bedkean reliability, the 
non-naturalist can plausibly point out that it is very difficult to make sense of counter-
possible claims. (AR) avoids these problems. Though certain modal conditions can 
presumably provide evidence for access (for most cases, reliability and access will go 
together), (AR) itself is not a modal condition. (AR) only depends on some relationship 
being met in the actual world.57  
 For similar reasons, (AR) is an improvement over the non-accidentality condition 
(M2b). Recall that the problem with the non-accidentality condition is that lucky beliefs 
can meet the condition merely as a result of the metaphysical nature of the facts in 
question. Since moral (and mathematical) facts are necessary truths, any method 
whatsoever that results in true moral beliefs will count as non-accidental, since there is 
no way those beliefs could be false—there is no possible world in which the moral 
truths are different, so the beliefs are non-accidentally true. Non-accidentality alone, I 
concluded, is too weak. Since (AR) is not modal, the modal status of the facts in 
question won’t unacceptably affect whether beliefs about a given domain will meet the 
condition. Whether (AR) is met for a given set of beliefs about a particular domain rests 
exclusively with the epistemic relations that the beliefs have, which is just what we 
                                                          
57 This also makes the epistemic demand of (AR) weaker, though compatible with, Manley’s (2007, Section 2) 
Revised Safety.  
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should want.58 (Recall that something like this is what motivated the move from 
reliability to Bedkean reliability.) 
6. Conclusion 
 It’s widely thought, amongst both moral realists and antirealists, that there is 
something worrisome in the spirit of Benacerraf’s argument, even if his statement of it 
relied on a contentious epistemological claim. Several philosophers have attempted a 
better restatement of the argument. Crucially, an adequate formulation of the argument 
depends on how to properly characterize the epistemological requirement we place on 
the justification of beliefs in a particular domain. Ideally, we want a formulation of the 
epistemological argument that lies between two extremes. At one extreme, the 
argument must be formulated in such a way as to avoid begging the question against 
non-naturalists of a certain sort. At the other extreme, the argument must not be 
formulated in such a way as to be too easily met, granting justification where it 
intuitively should not be granted. I have argued that, though the literature on 
Benacerraf-style arguments in ethics contains several ways of articulating the argument, 
each articulation is too extreme in at least one of the above ways. On the other hand, 
(AR) provides us with an expression of the epistemological requirement which does not 
lie at either extreme. Plugging (AR) into a Benacerraf-style argument provides us with 
                                                          
58 This is not to say that the metaphysical status of the truths in a given domain are irrelevant to whether (AR) is 
met, since the metaphysical status will constrain the possible epistemic relations a believer can have to the domain 
in question. For example, if moral properties are causally inert, causal access is not an epistemic relation that can 
possibly be met.  
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an argument that is a legitimate challenge to the (non-skeptical) non-naturalist without 
being a dialectical non-starter: 
(M1) If non-naturalism is true, then we have knowledge of non-naturalist 
properties. 
(M2) If we have knowledge of non-naturalist properties, then our moral beliefs 
have epistemic access to the non-natural properties in the sense given in 
(AR). 
(M3) Our moral beliefs do not have epistemic access to the non-natural 
properties in the sense given in (AR).59 
Therefore: 
(M4) Non-naturalism is not true. 
 
 Opponents of realism should endorse this argument as stated since it provides a 
serious challenge to the non-naturalist moral epistemologist. Proponents of non-
naturalism should endorse this statement of the argument because refuting it instead of 
a weaker statement of the argument ensures that their epistemic toil is as fruitful as 
possible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59 How can the anti-non-naturalist support (M3)? She could argue that no forms of access so far given can work, 
and then give an inductive argument to support (M3). Most of the debate over (M3) centers on some particular 
alleged form of epistemic access. I know of no “master” argument in favor of all possible forms of epistemic access 
that does not beg the question against the non-naturalist.  
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Chapter 2: Scanlon’s Reflective Equilibrium and the Epistemic Access Problem 
Introduction 
 A non-skeptical moral epistemology must tell us how we can be in principle 
justified in some of our moral beliefs. Call this the Justificatory Requirement, or JR. 
Depending on one’s metaethical views, meeting JR could involve an appeal to 
intuitions,1 narrow or wide reflective equilibrium,2 claims of entitlement,3 moral 
perception,4 or some combination.  But this is not the only condition that a theory of 
moral justification must meet. The moral epistemologist must also explain how it is that 
her preferred route(s) of justification ensures some non-accidental connection between 
justified moral beliefs and the moral truths. Call this the Meta-Justificatory Requirement, 
or MJR.5  
Placing MJR as a condition on an adequate non-skeptical moral epistemology is 
not to single out morality as specifically epistemically dubitable. Rather, it is an 
adequacy condition on a theory of justification for any domain. The challenge that MJR 
presents for moral epistemology is especially salient for non-naturalist moral realists.6 
This is because according to non-naturalists, moral facts are not identical to any natural 
                                                          
1 Audi (2005, 2008a), Huemer (2005, 2008, 2009) Shafer-Landau (2005).  
2 Daniels (1996), Scanlon (2014). 
3 I know of no one who defends entitlement specifically with respect to moral epistemology, but it has been used 
elsewhere. See, e.g. Boghossian (2000), Burge (2003), and Silins (2012).  
4 Audi (2013), Cullison (2010), Jacobson (2005), McBrayer (2010), and McGrath (2004).  
5 See, most famously, Street (2006) for a worry in this area. How best to characterize the meta-justificatory 
requirement is a question which has sprouted a small literature in itself. How the requirement is framed is 
important, since some meta-justifications will meet MJR only when formulated in certain ways. The arguments of 
this paper will not presuppose any particular way of framing MJR. 
6 Huemer (2000) disputes this claim. I cannot address those arguments here.  
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facts. Furthermore, for many non-naturalists, the moral properties are causally inert.7 
Non-naturalists cannot easily extend their meta-justificatory explanation of our beliefs 
about the natural world to our moral beliefs. Non-naturalists, then, must provide a way 
of meeting MJR that is unique to moral facts, or at least unique to morality as well as a 
few other (alleged) a priori domains such as mathematics and metaphysics. 
In Being Realistic about Reasons, Thomas Scanlon attempts to meet MJR by 
appealing to his particular conception of Reflective Equilibrium (RE).8 Though reflective 
equilibrium (RE) is widely endorsed as a methodology in ethics, it is infrequently 
appealed to as a way to meet MJR.9 Many who endorse RE as a normative methodology 
nevertheless appeal to one of the other approaches above in order to meet MJR. In this 
chapter, I argue that Scanlon’s explication of RE does not provide the resources to meet 
MJR. Since RE cannot meet MJR, it cannot provide a wholly adequate moral 
epistemology on a realist understanding of moral facts.  
 I begin by discussing Scanlon’s conception of RE and its use in meeting MJR. I 
then consider whether any of the individual steps in RE could provide us with non-
accidental epistemic access to the moral facts, concluding that we should be skeptical 
that they could. Next, I consider the possibility that the process of RE as a whole can 
explain how MJR is met, even if none of its components can. I argue that this is also 
                                                          
7 Oddie (2005/2009) is an exception here.  
8 Scanlon (2014), Lecture 4.  
9 Two notable exceptions are Daniels (1979) and Lillehammer (2011).  
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unsuccessful. Finally, I consider whether Scanlon’s domain-relative minimalist 
metaphysics of moral facts can help to explain how RE could meet MJR. I again 
conclude that the answer is negative. In short, Scanlon has not shown that RE can meet 
MJR, whether we are minimalists or not about moral facts.  
1. Scanlon’s Defense of Reflective Equilibrium  
 In Being Realistic about Reasons, Thomas Scanlon addresses MJR directly. His 
response is two-pronged: First, Scanlon argues that it is mistaken to require some kind 
of causal or perceptual access to the moral realm in order to meet MJR. Second, he 
argues that we can provide a full epistemological story with a realist-friendly 
development of Rawls’ notion of reflective equilibrium. I do not dispute Scanlon’s first 
prong. I focus instead on his second claim, arguing that he is mistaken that reflective 
equilibrium can sufficiently meet MJR. 
 Since Scanlon and I agree about the first prong, I can be brief. Scanlon argues that 
the requirement of some causal relation to the moral facts relies on an illicit extension of 
the epistemology of spatiotemporally located objects into the non-spatiotemporal realm. 
As he says, in the case of spatiotemporally located objects, “If information is to get from 
them to us, how is this to happen except by their having a causal impact on our sensory 
surfaces?”10  However, in the case of moral and mathematical facts, which are (on his 
view) not spatiotemporally located, this story is implausible: “if these [moral and 
                                                          
10 Scanlon (2014), 70.  
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mathematical] facts are ‘outside of space and time’ the problem of explaining how 
information could get from them to us seems even greater than in the case of empirical 
truths. No causal link can bridge the gap”.11 The mistake is in thinking that the causal 
epistemology of spatiotemporal objects should extend to the epistemology of morality 
and mathematics.  
 However, Scanlon admits, even once we’ve rejected this illicit maneuver, “we are 
still left with the question of how we discover truths about [moral] matters.”12 To 
answer this question, we turn to the second prong of Scanlon’s moral epistemology: 
reflective equilibrium (RE). For Scanlon, reflective equilibrium proceeds as follows. 
First, we formulate considered judgments, “judgments that seem clearly to be correct 
and seem so under conditions that are conducive to making good judgments of the 
relevant kind.”13 These considered judgments can be conceptual truths as well as 
substantive claims that “seem obviously true” and are “clear and apparently 
unproblematic.”14 Second, we attempt to “formulate general principles that would 
‘account for’ these judgments.”15 A good general principle is one that has great 
explanatory power without “generating any implausible conclusions, let alone 
contradictions.”16 Third, if no consistent and intrinsically plausible set of general 
                                                          
11 Scanlon (2014), 70. 
12 Scanlon (2014), 70. 
13 Scanlon (2014), 77. 
14 Scanlon (2014), 73. 
15 Scanlon (2014), 77. 
16 Scanlon (2014), 73. 
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principles can be found to match the considered judgments, “one must decide how to 
respond to the divergence between these principles and considered judgments”.17  
 It’s worth noting that Scanlon argues that RE also provides an adequate 
epistemology for mathematics, and he seems to believe that this provides some further 
support for the use of RE in ethics. The thought seems to be that, since it is relatively 
non-contentious that we have mathematical knowledge, showing that the epistemology 
of morality works in the same way provides some support that such an epistemology is 
acceptable and not mysterious. Without getting too sidetracked, I want to briefly 
explain why this shouldn’t provide comfort to the non-naturalist moral realist. First of 
all, the epistemology of math is not nearly as uncontroversial as Scanlon implies. 
Benacerraf’s epistemological worry originally applied to mathematical Platonism, and 
Benacerraf-style worries are alive and well amongst philosophers of math.18 Second, 
even if RE is an adequate epistemology for the domain of mathematical truths, this is of 
no help to the normative realist addressing MJR unless mathematical Platonism is also 
true. Scanlon’s mathematical analogy only provides support for his moral epistemology 
if RE gives an adequate epistemology of math for the mathematical Platonist. Just pointing 
to the way that mathematicians get knowledge of mathematical facts does nothing to 
establish mathematical Platonism. The proponent of the Benacerraf-style argument 
                                                          
17 Scanlon (2014), 77.  
18 Field (1989) is still the most widely cited argument in the literature. For some recent discussions of the problem, 
see Kasa (2010), Liggins (2010), and Linnebo (2006).  
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could accept that RE provides an adequate mathematical epistemology given some 
constructivist, formalist, or error theoretic ontology of math. So Scanlon’s mathematical 
analogy can only provide support for moral epistemology assuming mathematical 
Platonism and RE in mathematical epistemology. Neither are safe assumptions to make.  
 Of course, showing that the mathematical analogy does not help Scanlon is not to 
show that RE cannot meet MJR. So let’s turn directly to that question. Scanlon’s 
conception of RE is a (recursive) three step process: 
Process  Epistemic Inputs 
1. Formulate considered judgments 
“under conditions that are conducive to 
making good judgments of the relevant 
kind.” 
(a) Epistemologically basic.  
2. Formulate general principles that would 
“account for” considered judgments  
(b) Considered judgments 
3. Are general principles intrinsically 
plausible and consistent with all 
considered judgments? If no, balance and 
unify conflicting judgments, and repeat 
step 2.  
(c) Considered judgments, general 
principles (from step 2), and general 
coherence constraints.  
 
There are two ways that this conception of RE could get us epistemic access to the moral 
facts. First, one of the steps in the process could alone give us access to the moral facts.19 
Second, there could be some way in which, although none of the steps by itself 
provided access, when the steps are combined properly, MJR is met. I consider each 
approach in turn.  
                                                          
19 It is also possible that more than one of the steps gives us access, though in different ways.  
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 Begin with the first approach—can any of the steps themselves meet MJR? I think 
it’s relatively straightforward that steps 2 and 3 can’t by themselves meet MJR. To see 
why, assume for the moment that considered judgments do not meet MJR—they are 
nothing but arbitrary biases, a result of cultural indoctrination, evolution, and/or caused 
by something else equally epistemically unsavory. According to step 2, we would take 
these epistemically arbitrary biases and try to formulate inductive generalizations and 
general principles. But the general principles we formulate are completely based on the 
considered judgments, which are ex hypothesi nothing more than biases. Generalizing 
from hopelessly bad data does not get us access to the correct data.  
 Step 3 is of no help fixing the bad data. Step 3 only pressures us to place our 
considered judgments and generalized principles into a fully coherent set of principles 
and considered judgments. This procedure can result in a more coherent set of moral 
beliefs, but coherence alone does not provide access.20 If the considered judgments do 
not meet MJR, step 3 will only result in an arbitrary coherent set of beliefs, unresponsive 
to the domain of facts in question.  
None of this is to discount steps 2 or 3 of Scanlon’s conception of RE. They are 
plausible parts of a moral epistemology. But unless we have epistemic access prior to 
steps 2 and 3, they will be of no assistance. Garbage in, garbage out. 
                                                          
20 BonJour (1985), Ch. 6 is helpful on this point.  
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All of the weight of meeting MJR, then, is on the formation of considered 
judgments in step 1. Scanlon actually agrees with this point, pointing out that it is 
nothing “that a defender of the method of reflective equilibrium should deny, or be 
embarrassed by.”21 So by Scanlon’s own lights, if MJR is a legitimate requirement on 
moral epistemology, it must be met by the considered judgments. How, then, do 
considered judgments meet MJR? The Benacerraf-style skeptic objects that considered 
judgments can’t provide us with epistemic access to the non-naturalist moral facts. 
Responding to an objection along these lines,22 Scanlon says that the objection rests on: 
[A] misunderstanding of what it is for something to be a considered judgment. In 
order for something to count as a considered judgment about some subject 
matter it is not enough that that judgment be very confidently held. It is 
necessary also that it should be something that seems to me to be clearly true 
when I am thinking about the matter under good conditions for arriving at judgments of 
the kind in question. My belief, sitting in my armchair with no information about 
the conditions on the moon, that there is a rock there with my name on it, does 
not count as a considered judgment in the required sense, no matter how certain 
I may be that it is true.23 (emphasis Scanlon’s) 
 
Considered judgments are not merely strongly held opinions. In order for a judgment 
to count as considered, it must be a judgment made under certain epistemically 
favorable conditions. What conditions, the skeptic asks? Scanlon’s reply is that the 
conditions must be “good conditions for arriving at judgments of the kind in question.” 
                                                          
21 Scanlon (2014), 82.   
22 Scanlon is responding to the objection as presented by Kelly and McGrath (2010), Williamson (2007), pp.244-
246, and Rippon (2010).  
23 Scanlon (2014), 82.   
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 On a first pass, the Benacerraf-style skeptic may appear to be embarrassed. She 
demands that Scanlon give an explanation of how considered judgments provide 
epistemic access to moral facts. Scanlon replies that it is built into the nature of a 
considered judgment that it is made in the kinds of conditions that are “good” for 
arriving at judgments of the kind in question. And presumably, when we arrive at 
judgments about some domain as a result of good epistemic conditions, we’ll be in a 
position of having epistemic access to the facts in question. Take, for example, what I’ll 
call a “considered visual judgment”. A visual judgment counts as considered just in 
case it is a judgment made in good conditions for arriving at visual judgments. Good 
conditions for making a visual judgment will involve proper lighting, being wide-
awake, having one’s eyes open, etc. In these conditions, I look at my desk and come to 
judge, based on visual experience, that there is a pencil on my desk. Since I’ve met the 
relevant conditions, my visual judgment counts as considered. Furthermore, considered 
visual judgments will meet MJR since the conditions on a considered visual judgment 
ensure that I’ll have (causal) access to visible objects in my immediate environment.  
 Scanlon’s idea, then, seems to be that when the Benacerraf-style skeptic asks how 
considered judgments can meet MJR, she is asking a confused question, since it’s 
constitutive of a considered judgment that they provide epistemic access to the moral facts. 
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This is why Scanlon says that the objection rests on a “misunderstanding of what it is 
for something to be a considered judgment.”24  
 The Benacerraf-style skeptic should be suspicious. Scanlon’s response raises an 
immediate question: Just what are the good conditions for making a moral judgment, 
and how do these conditions ensure epistemic access? Without an answer to this 
question, Scanlon’s response is stipulative rather than substantive. The skeptic can just 
ask a further question which is in the spirit of the Benacerraf-style challenge, namely: 
What reason do we have to believe that there are any considered judgments, or at least 
that human beings have them, if they are stipulated to be just those judgments that 
meet MJR?  
 Scanlon explicitly rejects as mysterious the thought that a quasi-perceptual idea 
of intuitions can provide us with a source for considered judgments. He also rejects any 
purported causal connection with the moral facts.25 While these are helpful at 
explaining what the conditions for a considered (moral) judgment are not, Scanlon does 
not say very much about what conditions are good ones for making judgments about 
the domain of morality. But there are two suggestions worth discussing.  
The first positive thing that Scanlon says in this context is that “one thing one 
needs to ask, in deciding whether something that seems true should be treated as a 
considered judgment, is whether it has any implausible implications or 
                                                          
24 Scanlon (2014), 82. 
25 Scanlon (2014), 70.  
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presuppositions. Identifying something as a considered judgment involves reaching a 
preliminary conclusion that this is not the case.”26 This is presumably not the only 
condition on what makes a given judgment a considered judgment, but it’s a start. 
However, even if it is an acceptable condition on a considered judgment, it is not the 
kind of condition that gets Scanlon any closer to meeting MJR. For this condition is 
merely one of coherence—it only says that one necessary condition on a judgment’s 
counting as considered is that it doesn’t conflict with other (considered?) judgments. In 
order to know whether a particular judgment had any “implausible implications or 
presuppositions”, we would already need some idea of what moral claims or 
presuppositions are implausible.27  
Secondly, Scanlon says that a judgment can be rejected as not considered when the 
general principles that would account for it are implausible. Even if correct, this 
condition does not come any closer to explaining how judgments could meet MJR and 
thus count as considered. It is merely a coherence condition, albeit one that applies to 
judgments of a different level of generality.28  
This encompasses all of Scanlon’s positive comments about the conditions which 
render a judgment considered (in the normative case). I don’t think Scanlon takes himself 
to have provided a complete characterization of the conditions that need to be met for a 
                                                          
26 Scanlon (2014), 84.  
27 One exception may be judgments which lead to strict contradictions, but presumably this condition alone is not 
nearly strong enough to ensure a judgment counts as considered.  
28 Scanlon (2014), 84. 
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judgment to count as considered. But I’m not sure about this, since he does clearly take 
himself to have resolved any concerns about epistemic access.29 In some sense he is right 
about this, since considered judgments will, by definition, meet MJR. But if this is all that 
Scanlon can show, it is a hollow victory, since given this conception of a considered 
judgment, it is an open and difficult question whether or not human beings ever do have 
such things.  
2. Is Reflective Equilibrium Greater Than the Sum of its Parts? 
 By Scanlon’s lights, in RE, the weight of epistemic access is placed primarily on 
the considered judgments. I’ve argued that either (a) considered judgments can’t do the 
work required of them, or (b) human beings may never have considered judgments. But 
even if none of the three steps that make up Scanlon’s conception of RE can themselves 
meet MJR, the defender of RE could still argue that when all of the steps are combined 
together, epistemic access is achieved. In other words, the whole of RE is epistemically 
greater than the sum of its parts. This alternative is worth briefly considering, even 
though I don’t think it is one that Scanlon endorses.  
 It is relatively easy to see how RE as a whole could be in certain respects 
epistemically superior to any of its parts. For example, suppose that considered 
judgments are highly fallible, only correct 51% of the time. If this were the success rate 
of considered judgments, they would not by themselves be on very good epistemic 
                                                          
29 See, e.g. Scanlon (2014), Lecture 4, Section 4.  
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standing—surely not enough to themselves be justified. However, even if having a 
considered judgment alone is not enough to be justified in a particular moral belief, it 
could turn out that considered judgments provide “justification enough”. What I mean 
by this is that they may provide enough justification on their own such that the extra 
epistemic boost from applying the second and third coherence steps of RE may be 
enough, when coupled with their minimal level of justification, to provide justification 
full stop. This is because it is reasonable to expect the coherence steps of RE to weed out 
at least some of the outlier intuitions while systematizing the accurate ones, thus 
providing further inferential support for the (foundational) considered judgments.30  
 This is all right, so far as it goes. But even though it is possible (perhaps even 
common) for the entirety of a process to be epistemically superior to its parts in certain 
ways, it is more difficult to see how the entirety of a process could be superior to any of 
its parts at meeting MJR. Coherence measures alone can in some circumstances improve 
the epistemic standing of a set of beliefs, but they cannot alone provide us with 
epistemic access to mind-independent facts. The mind-independent qualification is 
important here, for there is one way that the process of RE could as a whole meet MJR 
without any of its parts doing so. It could do so if the truth-makers for moral claims was 
constitutively tied to the results of RE, properly applied. This is, in fact, the metaphysics 
of moral facts that some proponents of RE could give, and in such cases, I agree that 
                                                          
30 This isn’t exactly the picture developed in Mark van Roojen’s (forthcoming) response to skeptical worries about 
intuitions, but I owe a direct debt to that paper for helping me to see this point.  
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MJR is met. In fact, this is how I understand Rawls to construe the relationship between 
RE and the moral facts, at least in some moods.31 Rawls interpretation aside, this is the 
limiting case in which RE in its entirety can meet MJR without any of its parts 
individually doing so—call such accounts constructivist.32 
 Scanlon once endorsed constructivism.33 But he now explicitly rejects it, at least 
as a global thesis about reasons in general.34 When Scanlon considers the constructivist 
view that for something to be a reason is for it to remain at the end of the process of RE, 
he says: 
“[T]he normative status conferred on a judgment by its being in a set that is in 
reflective equilibrium depends on the quality of the decisions that are made in 
arriving at that equilibrium—decisions about what to count as a considered 
judgment at the outset and about what to modify in situations of conflict. So the 
most that could be said is that p is a reason for x to do a if the judgment that it is 
such a reason would be among x’s evaluative judgments in reflective equilibrium 
if the judgments x made in arriving at this equilibrium were sound. So understood, 
however, this is not a constructivist account of reasons…The process of seeking 
reflective equilibrium in one’s beliefs about a subject matter is therefore not a 
characterization of the facts about that subject matter but rather a method for 
arriving at conclusions about that subject matter”.35 
 
Scanlon is clear, then, that he does not intend to be a constructivist, even of the sort 
which constitutively ties the reason-facts to his favored method of RE. Now, of course, 
one could just depart from Scanlon on this point and embrace constructivism. And, as I 
                                                          
31 On this, see Kelly and McGrath (2010), Section 4 and Bagnoli (2011), Section 1.  
32 See Bagnoli (2011).  
33 Scanlon (1998), though Aaron Elliott has convinced me that given his other commitments in that work, he was 
already committed to some form of mind-independent realism. See Elliott’s (ms) “Realist Contractualism”.  
34 See Scanlon (2014), Lecture 4 for his extensive discussion of various kinds of constructivist theories. There may, 
however, be locally constructed sets of reasons, e.g. if justice-reasons are constructed out of the reasons of agents 
in Rawls’ Original Position. 
35 Scanlon (2014), 103. 
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noted above, I think this would provide a way of meeting MJR. However, embracing 
constructivism would be to give up stance-independence, a crucial feature of what makes 
a particular metaethical view realist. A view counts as stance-independent when “the 
moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from 
within any given actual or hypothetical perspective.”36  Though Scanlon doesn’t use the term 
“stance-independence”, he does endorse it.37 Since Scanlon’s concern, and the concern 
of this paper, is how the realist can meet MJR, this would be to concede the argument in 
question.  
3. Metaphysical and Epistemological Minimalism?38 
 Although the MJR is an epistemological requirement, its relationship to the 
metaphysics of moral properties/facts should by this point be clear. The available 
strategies open for a moral epistemologist to meet the MJR are highly contingent on the 
particular commitments to the nature of moral properties/facts that she has. With this in 
mind, I think it’s important to address the particular conception of moral facts that 
Scanlon proposes in the earlier lectures of Being Realistic about Reasons. Since Scanlon’s 
metaphysical commitments are somewhat unique, it’s worth assessing whether there 
may be epistemological strategies open to him that may not be open to more 
                                                          
36 Shafer-Landau (2003/2005), 15, emphasis his.  
37 Scanlon (2014), 52. 
38 Scanlon disavows the labels “quietist” and “minimalist”, but I’m not sure what he would prefer to have his view 
called instead. Wright, who Scanlon sees himself as heavily influenced by, calls himself an anti-realist about ethics. 
But presumably Scanlon would also disavow this label as well.  
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metaphysically “robust” realists.39 I’ll first give a brief overview of Scanlon’s 
metaphysical quietism. Then, I will argue that quietism will not be of assistance with 
meeting MJR, at least if we are to understand RE in the way that Scanlon does.  
Scanlon’s moral metaphysics resembles in certain respects the domain-relative 
metaphysics of Carnap, Wright, and Tait.40 Scanlon argues that common metaphysical 
objections to moral realism rest on the mistake of assuming that the metaphysical 
standards of science should apply to all domains of inquiry. The objector claims that if 
non-natural moral facts don’t figure in the best scientific explanations, then they are 
metaphysically superfluous, and thus should be cut from our metaphysical 
commitments. This is a mistake, Scanlon argues. Instead, we should take domains of 
inquiry as basic. The claims of a particular domain,  
…insofar as they do not conflict with the statements of some other domain, are 
properly settled by the standards of the domain that they are about. 
Mathematical questions, including questions about the existence of numbers and 
sets are settled by mathematical reasoning, scientific questions, including 
questions about the existence of bosons, by scientific reasoning, normative 
questions by normative reasoning, and so on.41 
 
Given this domain-relativism about metaphysical questions, we shouldn’t demand that 
moral properties/facts figure in causal explanations, and we shouldn’t be concerned 
that moral properties/facts are causally inert. Instead, the standards of a particular 
                                                          
39 Scanlon’s view shares some affinities with Parfit (2011) and Skorupski (2013). By more “robust” here, I mean 
non-naturalist moral realists who take their commitment to moral realism to be more metaphysically weighty and 
in need of defense. (I hope it is clear that I don’t intend to be making anything but a fast and loose distinction 
here.)  
40 Scanlon (2014) 19, 25, and Carnap (1950), Wright (1992, 2003), Tait (1986).  
41 Scanlon (2014), 19.  
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domain “typically consist, in part, of substantive principles about the domain, such as 
mathematical axioms, moral principles, and scientific generalizations…this reasoning is 
itself internal to the domains in question.”42 
 Take mathematics, for example. Mathematical entities are arguably causally 
inert. This is a cause for concern amongst metaphysicians that Scanlon believes 
mistakenly hold the domain of mathematics up to the standards of science instead of 
the standards of mathematics. Instead, the relevant standards for good reasoning in the 
case of mathematics are the method of proof. If a statement in the domain of 
mathematics is provable (from obviously true axioms), then it is true simpliciter. There 
are no external questions to ask about the existence of mathematical objects, at least so 
long as the claims of the domain of math do not conflict with the claims of some other 
domain.  
 Turning now to the moral case, it appears that RE is supposed to play the role in 
normative reasoning that proof (along with RE) does in mathematical reasoning. (The 
distinctive entities that make up the normative domain are reasons or things reducible 
to reasons.) So the natural analogy with the mathematical domain here is that a claim 
about reasons is true iff it survives the completed process of reflective equilibrium. But 
this account conflicts with two related things that Scanlon explicitly says about the 
normative domain. First, he says that the truths of the normative domain are not 
                                                          
42 Scanlon (2014), 20. 
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reducible to the truths of any other domain, as they would be on this account.43 He 
stresses that the difference between his view and that of sophisticated expressivists such 
as Gibbard and Blackburn is that for him, the correctness of the normative truths are 
independent of those commitments themselves.44 Second, Scanlon explicitly denies this 
specific account, since the process of RE can only justify if done correctly. He says that the 
only way to fix this reductionist account of reasons is to add that x’s performing RE will 
only lead to true beliefs “if the judgments x made in arriving at this equilibrium were 
sound.”45 And, as Scanlon himself points out, adding this “soundness” condition is to 
give up the reductionism.  
 So unlike the standard minimalist account of the mathematical domain, Scanlon 
does not want to identify truth in ethics with the results of any particular method, at 
least without adding substantive constraints on that method to ensure truth. It might be 
claimed that proof in mathematics also has substantive constraints, so there is no 
important difference here. For example, mathematical proofs must obey certain rules of 
what counts as deductively valid. But for one thing, it is unclear that these standards 
are more than merely formal rules. But secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the 
rules in the domain of mathematics are well-defined and uniform across cases. The 
process of RE, if it is to be plausible at all, is all but well-defined and uniform across 
                                                          
43 Scanlon (2014), 2.  
44 Scanlon (2014), 52.  
45 Scanlon (2014), 103.  
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cases. Any conflict resolution done in the process of RE is done on a piecemeal basis—
any such general rule that said we must always reject high-level/mid-level principles or 
particular cases would result in a process of RE that is both implausible and in conflict 
with Scanlon’s own account of it.  
 Scanlon must constrain the formal process of RE in order to ensure that the 
process has both plausible results and at least relatively widespread convergence. 
However, the only way to do this is with substantive restrictions on the kinds of 
judgments and refinements that are acceptable within the process. We saw above that a 
judgment only counts as considered, and thus only justified, insofar as it is made under 
conditions likely to result in true beliefs. But there is no internal method for assessing 
the truth of a particular judgment—a judgment’s merely seeming true on reflection is 
not proof of its being true or counting as considered. Similar restrictions apply to the 
process of refining our considered judgments to eliminate conflict. Those refinements 
only count as justified insofar as they are done correctly, where correctness is a 
substantive claim, rather than one that can be determined by engaging in some internal 
procedure. When I am worried that a particular mathematical proof is fallacious, there 
is a formal procedure to determine whether or not I am correct. Not so in the moral 
case.  
 Once we have opened up this gap between the methods of reasoning in the 
normative domain and the truths of that domain, the skeptic now has an opening to 
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press for some explanation of how RE alone can meet the MJR. Of course, meeting the 
MJR doesn’t require a guarantee that the methods of a particular domain must lead to 
truth in that particular domain. It only requires some account of how a method is 
responsive at all to the truths in question. If the reasons-facts are identified with the 
conclusion of the process of RE, it is easy to see how pursuing RE could be responsive 
to the reasons-truths. But once Scanlon is committed to substantive claims about how 
best to pursue RE, claims which are not formally discoverable from within the process 
of RE, we have a metaphysical gap between the reasons-facts and the process of RE 
which is epistemically inexplicable. What Scanlon owes us is a reason to believe that the 
judgments we do form on reflection are likely to be considered judgments more often than 
not and a reason to believe the refinements we make in the process of RE will by and 
large be the substantively correct refinements to make. He has offered us no such 
reasons. 
4. Conclusion 
 Non-naturalist moral realists have long had to contend with an epistemological 
objection presented against their view: If the moral facts are non-natural and causally 
inert, then it is mysterious how we could come to have access in order to form non-
accidentally true beliefs about them. Thomas Scanlon, in his recent Locke Lectures Being 
Realistic about Reasons, addresses the Meta-Justificatory Requirement (MJR) head-on. 
Scanlon believes that, when coupled with the right metaphysical picture of normative 
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facts, the method of reflective equilibrium can provide a moral epistemology which 
adequately meets MJR. I have argued that Scanlon is mistaken on this account. While 
RE may be enough for constructivists or anti-realists of a certain sort to meet MJR, it 
does not do the work that it needs to for a non-naturalist moral realist such as Scanlon 
in meeting MJR. Once we have substantive and stance-independent normative truths, 
we need some substantive story about how RE could make us responsive to those truths 
in the proper way. Scanlon has provided us with no such account. 
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Chapter 3: Why Conceptual Competence Won’t Help the Non-Naturalist 
Epistemologist 
 
Introduction 
 We have seen that an adequate non-skeptical moral epistemology must not only 
tell us how we can have justification, in principle, for moral beliefs. We’ve also seen that 
the moral epistemologist must further explain how her preferred route(s) of justification 
ensures, in at least some cases, a non-accidental connection between justified moral 
beliefs and the moral truths. Call this the Meta-Justificatory Requirement, or MJR.1  
MJR is widely accepted as a burden for the non-naturalist—though of course 
there is also widespread disagreement about whether that burden can be met.2 But there 
is a wrinkle in this challenge that is not widely recognized: Non-naturalists must 
explain not just how our moral beliefs are non-accidentally connected to some facts or 
other, but how our moral beliefs are connected to the robustly normative facts—that is, 
those facts that have genuine normative authority. Non-naturalists, or at least those I 
will be concerned with here, believe that there is a unique (or nearly unique) set of 
robustly normative properties that constitute or ground the robustly normative facts.3 
                                                          
1 How best to characterize the meta-justificatory requirement is a question which has sprouted a small literature in 
itself. How the requirement is framed is important, since some meta-justifications will meet MJR only when 
formulated in certain ways. The arguments of this paper will not presuppose any particular way of framing MJR 
(though see “How to Understand the Epistemic Access Problem for Non-Naturalist Moral Realism” for my view on 
the issue).  
2 For arguments that it can’t be met, see e.g. Street (2006), Fraser (2014), and Bedke (2014). For attempts to meet 
it, see e.g. Enoch (2011, Ch.7), Parfit (2011), and Vavova (2014).  
3 A small plurality of true (robustly) normative systems may be compatible with the spirit of non-naturalist realism, 
but there must at least be a very wide swath of candidate moral systems that do not fall into this category. From 
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So non-naturalists must not only ensure that we have non-accidentally true moral 
beliefs; they also must ensure that the content of these beliefs are robustly normative. 
This wrinkle is non-trivial. As I argue below, at least three recent attempts to meet MJR 
fail because they overlook this fact. As a result, these three moral epistemologies are 
inadequate, because they provide no explanation of how the epistemic relations that 
they propose hold between moral beliefs and facts connect us to the robustly normative 
properties. The lesson is clear. Non-naturalists must keep in mind their commitment to 
a unique set of robustly normative facts when providing an explanation of how MJR is 
met. They must do this not only to ensure that their account of the epistemic relation 
between moral beliefs and moral facts is of the right kind, but also to ensure that the 
relation features the right kind of relata: robustly normative facts.  
I begin in section 1 by reviewing a distinction between robust and formal 
normativity originally found in Copp (2005) and McPherson (2011).4 In section 2, I 
explain why this distinction is of importance to all non-naturalists worried about moral 
epistemology, regardless of the robustness of their metaphysics. In particular, they must 
ensure that the concepts or properties that figure in our beliefs are the robustly 
                                                          
here on out, I ignore this qualification and just refer to the “uniquely” correct moral system. I don’t believe this 
affects the arguments given.  
4 McPherson uses the distinction en route to a metaphysical argument against quietist non-naturalism. My 
argument differs in being (a) epistemological, and (b) intended to be of relevance to all non-naturalists, quietist or 
not.  
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normative ones.5 In sections 3-5, I argue that three recent attempts to meet MJR fail 
because they overlook the considerations adduced in section 2. In section 3, I discuss 
Huemer’s (2005) a priori moral epistemology. In section 4, I discuss Schroeter (ms), who 
provides a metasemantics for moral terms which ensures that MJR is met. In section 5, I 
discuss Cuneo & Shafer-Landau’s (2014) moral epistemology, which hinges on the 
claim that some substantive first-order moral truths are conceptual truths. I draw some 
general conclusions in section 6. 
1. Robust and Formal Normativity: A Distinction 
In chess, certain moves are forbidden. For example, when you’re playing chess, 
there’s a real sense in which you (normatively) can’t move your pawns backward. 
Insofar as there is a set of rules, chess is formally normative. All it means to say that 
chess is formally normative is to say that it’s “possible to play an incorrect chess 
move.”6 Similarly with other activities: They are formally normative insofar as it is 
possible to perform those activities incorrectly. Formal normativity isn’t that interesting 
or mysterious. There is nothing special about chess, for example. “Schmess” is a game 
which is “identical to chess except that in schmess one is permitted to move one’s 
Knight diagonally.”7 Schmess is every bit as formally normative as chess, since it is 
                                                          
5 I don’t mean here to be committing to any particular view of propositions—I use the language of a structured 
proposition theory (see King 2011), but only because it is most convenient in this context. I take my arguments to 
be compatible with any view of the nature of propositions.  
6 McPherson (2011), 232.  
7 McPherson (2011), 232.  
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possible to incorrectly play schmess as well. And we could indefinitely multiply 
examples of chess-like games which are formally normative.  
 Within a given formally normative activity, we can make mistakes. But what is 
crucial (at least for present purposes) about formal normativity is that formally 
normative activities exhibit normative symmetry amongst each other. Though chess 
players and schmess players may run into practical difficulties when they play each 
other, there shouldn’t be any serious concerns about who is playing the “right” game, 
and who is failing to do so. It is in an important sense arbitrary whether people decide 
to play chess or schmess. They can make appeals to which game is more fun or fair, but 
these are practical questions, not questions about the single “true” way to play chess. 
There is nothing intrinsically authoritative about formally normative properties.  
 On the other hand, for the non-naturalists that I’ll be concerned with here, moral 
properties are supposed to have some distinctive authority that (merely) formally 
normative properties do not.8 One way of bringing this out is to consider how we might 
respond to someone who was analogous to the schmess player above. If someone 
claimed that there was no sense obeying the rules of morality when we could just as 
easily obey the rules of “schmorality”, we would see her as making some kind of 
                                                          
8 Derek Parfit puts the non-naturalist’s point concisely when he claims that reductive views of reasons “claim to be 
describing normative reasons. But on such views…there aren’t really any normative reasons…Things matter only in 
the sense that some people care about these things, and these concerns move people to act.” Parfit (2011), Vol. I, 
110.  (Though Parfit talks in terms of normative reasons rather than normative properties, I take it the 
robust/formal distinction remains the same.)  
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serious mistake, or at least as engaging in a non-terminological disagreement. Morality 
is, for the non-naturalist, intrinsically binding in a way that merely formally normative 
activities are not. There is what we might call a normative asymmetry between morality 
and schmorality that does not exist between chess and schmess (or other merely 
formally normative properties). This normative asymmetry illustrates that morality 
exhibits something more than merely formally normative activities: It is robustly 
normative.9   
 We can make use of the robust/formal normativity distinction with respect to 
different kinds of entities. Robustly normative properties are those properties (such as 
being-morally-wrong) which are intrinsically binding and authoritative in the way that 
merely formally normative properties (such as being-a-legal-chess-move) are not. Robustly 
normative concepts are those concepts that are either intrinsically binding or those that 
refer to robustly normative properties. Robustly normative propositions are those that 
have robust properties or concepts as one or more of their constituents. Robustly 
                                                          
9 Something’s being robustly normative does not mean that it is completely normatively overriding. The robust 
normativity of morality is compatible with other robustly normative properties, e.g. standards of rationality, 
outweighing their force. The relevant difference here is that we cannot create robust normativity out of thin air in 
the way we can with formal normativity.  
It’s also worth noting that robustness is not synonymous with categoricity on at least some understandings of the 
latter, as the case of etiquette (see Foot 1972) shows. Etiquette, for Foot, is categorical in the sense that agents are 
criticizable from the standpoint of etiquette regardless of their desires. This is compatible with the criticism in 
question’s being merely formal criticism. However, on a more Kantian understanding of categoricity, where a fact 
is categorically binding just in case it applies to rational agents as such, is even more difficult to tease apart from 
robustness. I stick to the language of robustness throughout as to not assume any particular understanding of 
categoricity is correct.  
 On a common conception, reasons are taken to be robustly normative considerations. On this understanding, we 
could say that a property/concept/standard is robustly normative just in case it generates or grounds genuine 
reasons. (Thanks to Nicole Dular and Hille Paakkunainen for discussion here.)  
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normative standards are those that are either intrinsically binding or those that inherit 
their robustness via a relation between them and some robust entity. In short, we might 
say that  
An entity is robustly normative iff it is either fundamentally intrinsically binding 
(in the way that formally normative entities are not), or not fully explicable 
without appeal to some fundamentally intrinsically binding entity.  
 
Since I don’t want to assume a particular view of which non-natural entity is 
fundamental, I stick where possible to the distinction between robustly and formally 
normative truths. However, when discussing the moral epistemologies of some 
philosophers below, I apply the robust and formal distinction to concepts, moral terms 
and properties as well. I hope that the fact that the distinction is applicable to all of 
these entities is relatively clear.  
2. Robust and Formal Normativity: A Lesson 
The formal/robust normativity distinction is not my creation.10 However, what 
has not been pointed out is its relevance to moral epistemology. I now illustrate the 
significance of the distinction for non-naturalists attempts to meet MJR. 
Suppose that the following two claims are true: 
Metaphysical Non-Naturalism. There are irreducible robustly normative truths.11 
                                                          
10 As noted above, it has been codified from Copp (2005) and McPherson (2011), though I am sure it has been 
around much longer. (See, e.g. Foot (1972).)  
11 Sometimes “robust” non-naturalism is used in opposition to “quietist” non-naturalism, where the former but not 
the latter are committed to some metaphysically weighty conception of moral properties or concepts. I am using 
“robust” in this context in a way that is compatible with quietism: “Robust” in this context only refers to the 
normative asymmetry between, e.g. morality and schmorality, as discussed above. Quietists such as Scanlon (2014) 
and Parfit (2011) are committed to Metaphysical Non-Naturalism since they do accept that there are robustly 
normative truths, though they don’t think such truths carry any domain-independent metaphysical commitments.  
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 Formal Realism. There are (merely) formally normative truths.12  
I assume that Metaphysical Non-Naturalism is one of the core commitments of non-
naturalism. Furthermore, setting perhaps some unorthodox views aside, most everyone, 
non-naturalist or not, accepts Formal Realism. So Metaphysical Non-Naturalism and 
Formal Realism seem like relatively safe assumptions to make within the context of 
doing non-naturalist epistemology.  
 As it’s been traditionally understood, the epistemological objection to non-
naturalism requires that the non-naturalist explain how the following can be true: 
Non-Accidentality: At least some of our justified, first-order,13 and 
paradigmatically normative beliefs are non-accidentally true.  
 
So understood, if non-naturalists can explain how Non-Accidentality is true, they have 
made some important epistemological progress. However, the robust/formal 
normativity distinction can help to illustrate why the truth of Non-Accidentality alone is 
not enough to vindicate a non-naturalist epistemology. Even if Metaphysical Non-
Naturalism and Non-Accidentality are both established, it remains an open question 
whether our paradigmatically normative beliefs contain robustly normative contents. In 
order to vindicate an anti-skeptical non-naturalism, we need our paradigmatically 
                                                          
12 Note that Formal Realism is neutral with respect to the nature of the formally normative truths, or their 
reducibility to other truths.  
13 By first-order I mean that the justified and paradigmatic beliefs in question are about the extension of the 
normative property or concept, such as that expressed by “Lying is morally wrong,” or “Actions are good insofar as 
they increase happiness” (where this is the ‘is’ of predication). This is contrasted with metaconceptual beliefs such 
as that expressed by “Wrongness is a robustly normative property.” 
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normative beliefs to be beliefs containing robustly normative propositions. An 
epistemological story that only shows us how we can have non-accidentally true beliefs 
of formally normative propositions would show that Non-Accidentality is true, but it 
would not vindicate non-naturalism. This illustrates that Non-Accidentality isn’t the full 
story about what a non-naturalist epistemology requires.  
 Instead, in order to defuse epistemological objections, non-naturalists must also 
meet: 
Content Success At least some of our justified, first-order, and paradigmatically 
normative beliefs contain robustly normative contents. 
 
The need for the non-naturalist to meet Content Success falls out of the discussion above. 
Explaining how some of our first order normative beliefs could be non-accidentally 
true—that is, meeting Non-Accidentality—involves illustrating some positive epistemic 
relation between our normative beliefs and some stance-independent facts.14 But this is 
not enough for a wholly adequate non-naturalist epistemology. For all that’s been said, 
Non-Accidentality can be met even while a subject’s normative beliefs contain merely 
formally normative concepts or properties. Non-accidentally true normative beliefs are 
a necessary component of a non-skeptical non-naturalist epistemology, but they are not 
sufficient. What is also required is that our non-accidentally true normative beliefs are 
of robustly normative propositions. In other words, Content Success, along with Non-
                                                          
14 Shafer-Landau (2005), 15. 
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Accidentality, is required for the non-skeptical non-naturalist to fully discharge her 
epistemological burden.  
Non-Accidentality and Content Success are distinct conditions on an adequate 
moral epistemology. But it is important to keep in mind that the non-naturalist must 
explain how both can be met with respect to many of the very same beliefs. Showing 
how some paradigmatically normative beliefs of type A are non-accidentally true and 
showing how some paradigmatically normative beliefs of type B are of robustly 
normative propositions is not enough. It must further be shown that there is some 
overlap between A and B. In other words: 
Overlap. At least some of our justified, first-order, and paradigmatically 
normative beliefs are both non-accidentally true and contain robustly normative 
contents. 
 
As I argue below, I think Content Success, and its relationship to Overlap, have been 
overlooked. Both are crucial to a proper understanding of how non-naturalists must 
respond to the epistemological objection. This interplay between Non-Accidentality and 
Content Success, as spelled out in Overlap, is an important one to keep in mind. 
 The robust/formal distinction, then, is important for non-naturalist 
epistemologists to keep in mind, regardless of their metaphysical commitments. This is 
because Content Success must be met by anyone committed to Metaphysical Non-
Naturalism, which is a core commitment of non-naturalists, quietist and non-quietist 
alike. I don’t mean to claim that no non-naturalist epistemologies on offer can 
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adequately meet Content Success; rather, I mean only to claim that Content Success is a 
largely overlooked requirement on a non-naturalist moral epistemology. I turn now to 
illustrating, by way of some examples, the importance of recognizing Content Success as 
a crucial non-naturalist epistemological claim to be met. 
3. Huemer’s A Priori Moral Epistemology 
 Michael Huemer (2005) has recently attempted to explain our epistemic access to 
non-natural moral facts via a general theory of a priori knowledge. Huemer identifies 
properties with universals, sometimes aligning himself with Armstrong’s (1980) 
immanent realism.15 Furthermore, as with most non-naturalists, he accepts that “the 
moral realm is causally inert.”16 And though he admits that moral properties, if they 
exist, would be metaphysically strange, he doesn’t see this as evidence against their 
existence.17 Finally, he accepts the received view that moral properties supervene on 
natural properties, though they do so in a non-reductive way.18 An evaluative belief that 
p, on Huemer’s view, has some initial positive epistemic status so long as it is grounded 
in an intellectual seeming that p.19  
                                                          
15 Huemer (2005) 124-125 contains an argument for realism about universals. Huemer (ms., Sect. 4.2) endorses 
immanent realism, citing Armstrong 1980. As we’ll see below, Huemer accepts (what I call) Plenitude, the view that 
there is a universal for every possible consistent and determinate concept. This is puzzling, since there can 
plausibly be concepts for non-instantiated properties, which immanent realists by and large are forced to deny. It 
is unclear what Huemer would say about this potential inconsistency, but this issue will not be relevant for the 
arguments below, so I set it aside.  
16 Huemer (2005), 122. 
17 Huemer (2005), 200-201. 
18 Huemer (2005), Ch. 8. 
19 Of course, Huemer also allows for inferentially justified evaluative beliefs, e.g. an evaluative belief that q based 
off of an intellectual seeming that p and a prior belief that if p, then q. I stick to the more straightforward case in 
the text to avoid unnecessary complications.  
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Huemer’s explanation of a priori knowledge involves four important claims: 
(U) (Mind-independent) universals exist necessarily.  
(C) Having an adequate (consistent, clear, determinate) concept constitutes the 
grasping of a (mind-independent) universal. 
(R) “Having an adequate grasp of a universal puts one in a position to see that it 
has certain properties and/or relationships to other universals that you 
adequately grasp.”20 
(A) “All a priori knowledge is, or derives from, knowledge of the properties and 
relations of universals.”21 
 
Taken together, these claims can explain how moral beliefs meet Non-Accidentality. Here 
is how Huemer explains it: 
Notice…that the defining characteristics of an adequate grasp are intrinsic—
consistency, clarity, and determinacy belong to the nature of the concept in itself, 
as opposed to depending on the relationships between the concept and 
something else. So the intrinsic characteristics of a concept sometimes are 
sufficient for its constituting an adequate understanding of the nature of a 
universal…Therefore, in some cases—namely, when one’s intuitions are caused 
(only) by clear, consistent, and determinate understanding—the internal process 
by which one forms beliefs guarantees their truth.22 
 
Since forming an adequate23 concept involves meeting purely intrinsic criteria, and 
meeting those very criteria constitutes adequately grasping a (mind-independent, 
causally inert) universal, Huemer has given us an explanation for how we can form 
non-accidentally true beliefs about universals without standing in some causal or quasi-
perceptual relation to them: All we need to do is assess whether the concepts which 
                                                          
20 Huemer (2005), 125. 
21 Huemer (2005), 126. 
22 Huemer (2005), 126. 
23 Note that “adequacy” here is a technical term in Huemer’s system. 
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constitute the belief in question meet the (reflectively accessible) conditions, and we’ve 
got non-accidental truth.  
 An immediate question arises with respect to (C). Even if my concept C is 
consistent, clear, and determinate, that doesn’t yet explain how C is guaranteed to have 
a corresponding (mind-independent) universal. Isn’t it possible that C just doesn’t track 
any real mind-independent property? As it turns out, for Huemer, the answer is no. 
This is because “[t]here is no possibility of one’s [concept] failing to refer to anything 
(universals are plentiful in this sense, and their existence is necessary).”24 As long as our 
concept is adequate,25 we can be sure that it refers to a real mind-independent universal. 
Huemer’s way of meeting the MJR, then, relies on a fifth important claim, which I’ll call 
Plenitude: 
Plenitude: For every possible adequate (consistent, clear, and determinate) concept, 
there is a corresponding mind-independent universal.  
 
With this explicit statement of Plenitude, we have a complete story about how a priori 
moral beliefs can explain Non-Accidentality.26 Since we are capable of reflecting on our 
moral concepts, adjusting them to become more adequate, and since we know that these 
moral concepts have corresponding mind-independent universals (of which our 
                                                          
24 Huemer (2005), 126.  
25 Note that “adequacy” here is a technical term in Huemer’s theory, described above.  
26 Assuming, at least, that some of these beliefs based on an adequate understanding are first order normative 
beliefs. I grant Huemer this point in what follows. (Thanks to Hille Paakkunainen for pointing this out to me.)  
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adequate concepts constitute the grasping of them), we can have non-accidental a priori 
beliefs about at least some of the truths in which our moral concepts feature.27 
 We’ve seen Huemer’s general story about how Non-Accidentality will be met. 
With an eye to Content Success, let’s turn to a particular case of how epistemic access to 
moral facts works on Huemer’s account. Consider a straightforwardly “good” case of 
how a particular ethical intuition can guarantee the truth of its contents. Suppose Lucy 
is reflecting on her concepts of BADNESS and LYING, and on that basis it seems to her 
that: 
 (L) LYING is intrinsically BAD. 
Furthermore, let’s assume that her concepts of LYING and BADNESS are consistent, 
clear, and determinate.28 Then, by Plenitude, they both refer to mind-independent 
universals. Let’s call the universals they refer to being-a-lie and badness, respectively. 
Since Lucy’s concepts are consistent, clear, and determinate, and she formed an 
intuition based on reflecting on those concepts, the following is guaranteed to be true: 
 (L*) Lying is intrinsically bad. 
So we have gone from a claim about Lucy’s mind-dependent concepts to a mind-
independent fact about universals. And presumably, since she has met the conditions 
                                                          
27 Interestingly, a similar Plenitude-based strategy has been advanced as a way for the mathematical Platonist to 
meet MJR, developed independently by Balaguer (1998) and Linsky & Zalta (1995). 
28 It should be noted that the conditions on an adequate grasp of a universal are pretty difficult to meet. But I aim 
to grant Huemer as much as possible here.  
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that guarantee the truth of my belief that (L*), she knows it, or at least is justified in 
believing it.  
 So far, so good. But now consider Carol. Carol is also engaged in ethical inquiry, 
and also reflects on her concepts of BADNESS and LYING. Carol’s concepts are also 
clear, consistent, and determinate. But reflecting on these concepts, she has the intuition 
that: 
 (-L) LYING is not intrinsically BAD.  
By Plenitude, then, for similar reasons, the following is guaranteed to be true: 
 (-L*) Lying is not intrinsically bad.  
Since (-L*) is guaranteed to be true, and Carol has formed her belief in a way that 
guarantees it to be true, she also knows it, or at least is justified in believing it.  
 It should be obvious at this point that something has gone wrong. (L*) and (-L*) 
are incompatible with each other, so they can’t both be “guaranteed” to be true—at least 
one of them has to be false. And I certainly don’t mean to suggest that Huemer is 
unwittingly committed to contradictory ethical claims both being true. Rather, there is a 
subtle but informative mistake in the reasoning given above. Lucy and Carol both grasp 
their respective concepts clearly, consistently, and determinately. This means that, so 
long as they are being careful, they won’t misapply those concepts. Their concepts have 
a clear and determinate extension, and they will both be able to classify things as picked 
out by their concepts or not. But, by Plenitude, so long as their concepts have clear and 
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determinate extensions, there will be properties that their concepts track. So they do 
both form true beliefs about the extension of their concepts. However, as the difference 
between (L) and (-L) shows, the extension of their concepts of LYING and BADNESS 
differ. And this doesn’t show us that one of them is mistaken—after all, their respective 
concepts are all fully adequate—rather, it shows us that they have different concepts 
altogether.  
 The right way to classify the case, then, is to distinguish Lucy’s concepts from 
Carol’s concepts. Call Lucy’s concept BADNESSL and Carol’s concept BADNESSC.29 
With this distinction in mind, we can more precisely characterize their respective ethical 
intuitions: 
 (LL) LYING is intrinsically BADL.  
 (-LC) LYING is not intrinsically BADC. 
Given Plenitude, both Lucy’s and Carol’s concepts correspond to mind-independent 
properties. And since their concepts are adequately grasped, they will both have 
knowledge of the corresponding mind-independent facts. However, since their 
concepts differ, the corresponding properties will differ as well. The knowledge that 
Lucy has gained from her ethical intuition is not best characterized as (L*), but as: 
 (LL*) Lying is intrinsically badL. 
                                                          
29 It may also turn out that Carol and Lucy have subtly different concepts of LYING, as well. I set this aside for 
simplicity, as it doesn’t affect the strength of the argument. 
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Furthermore, the knowledge that Carol has gained from her ethical intuition is not best 
characterized as (-L*), but as: 
 (-LC*) Lying is not intrinsically badC.  
Once we get clear about what Lucy and Carol believe based on their intuitions, then, we 
see that they do not contradict each other after all. This is analogous to the merely 
formally normative chess case discussed above. The schmess players truly believe that 
knights can move diagonally, while chess players do not. But this is because the 
schmess players have beliefs about being-forbidden-in-schmess, while chess players have 
beliefs about being-forbidden-in-chess. If the schmess players and the chess players were 
in an argument about this, they would be merely talking past each other.30  
We can multiply cases like Lucy and Carol’s indefinitely. There are many 
different fully adequate possible moral concepts, each of which differs about the 
extension of “bad”. These concepts are all compatible with one another, so long as we 
are clear about whether we are talking about bad1, bad2, etc. However, unlike in the chess 
case, or the case of any formally normative concept, there is a further question in the 
moral case: Which concepts adequately characterize the robustly normative properties? 
By Plenitude, any adequate moral concept will correspond to some mind-independent 
                                                          
30 What if the chess and schmess players had some higher-order agreement that there is a unique fact about the 
single right way to play a chess-like game? Analogously, what if Lucy and Carol has some higher-order agreement 
that, whatever the case may be, their concepts aimed at the robustly normative, and thus their disagreement is 
not merely terminological? Because Schroeter (ms) clearly has machinery available to her to make this move, I 
address this kind of response below, in section 4. But I think what I say there would apply, mutadis mutandis to a 
similar response made in Huemer’s defense.   
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property or other. Huemer has shown that (e.g.) Lucy’s beliefs meet Non-Accidentality. 
Her belief (LL*) is a non-accidentally true first order normative belief. But he has 
provided no reason to accept that Lucy’s normative concepts actually refer to the 
robustly normative properties, and thus no reason to accept that her normative beliefs 
were of the robustly normative facts. In other words, though Huemer has shown how 
Non-Accidentality can be met, he has not shown how Content Success can be explained, 
and so has not provided a wholly adequate non-naturalist epistemology. To paraphrase 
Street, so long as it hasn’t been shown that there is a relation between the moral 
concepts we happen to have and the normative facts, the appeal to conceptual 
competency offers no way, in the absence of an incredible coincidence, of showing how 
our moral beliefs could meet Content Success.31,32 
 Notice that the success of the objection does not rest on the possibility of 
divergence between two agents such as Lucy and Carol. The case of Lucy and Carol is 
merely meant to help illustrate the problem. The problem is that a wholly adequate 
non-naturalist epistemology requires more than the mere having of normative beliefs 
that track some facts non-accidentally. It must be that those beliefs track the robustly 
normative facts non-accidentally. Even convergence amongst agents would not be 
enough to explain how our normative beliefs are responsive to the robustly normative 
                                                          
31 Paraphrasing Street (2006), 124-125. 
32 Couldn’t it also be part of Lucy’s consistent, clear, and determinate concept of BADNESS that it refers to a 
robustly normative property? For reasons given in section 4, I think the answer is no.  
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facts. For all that’s been said, and for all we know, our beliefs in such a situation would 
be converging on some merely formally normative facts.33   
4. Schroeter’s Metasemantic Solution 
Laura Schroeter (ms) suggests that the non-naturalist can meet Non-Accidentality 
by appeal to a Chalmersian metasemantics for normative terms. To understand how 
metasemantics are supposed to assist in resolving epistemological worries for non-
naturalist realism, it’s first important to remind ourselves what it is that a metasemantic 
theory is supposed to do. In Schroeter’s words, the job of metasemantics is to “specify 
what it is about someone’s psychological states that determines which objects, kinds, or 
properties her representational states pick out—or more generally, their semantic 
contents.”34 Such a theory, Schroeter contends, must be able to play “two central 
theoretical roles”.35 First, the theory must be able to ascribe contents to subjects’ beliefs, 
so that we can assess the success and accuracy of subjects’ beliefs and reasoning. 
Second, the theory should ascribe semantic contents that provide us with the ability to 
predict and explain subjects’ behaviors.  
 Schroeter uses these two desiderata to provide support for the first of two crucial 
principles in her overall metasemantic solution: 
                                                          
33 The objection is also not that the privileging of some properties over any others as robustly normative is 
incompatible with Plenitude. There is no reason the Plenitudinous realist couldn’t privilege some properties as 
robustly normative. Rather, the problem is an epistemic one.  
34 Schroeter (ms), 7.  
35 Schroeter (ms), 8. 
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Minimal Charity (MC) The correct semantic interpretation of the concept 
expressed by a term must make at least some of the beliefs involving that concept 
come out true.36 
 
MC won’t alone provide much by way of a response to epistemological objections to 
non-naturalism. However, it can at least explain why our moral concepts don’t refer to 
properties like being-a-triangle or being-red-or-green. MC doesn’t yet establish that our 
moral concepts refer to non-natural properties, since MC is compatible with moral 
concepts’ referring to natural properties such as those to which Cornell Realists or other 
naturalists would have them refer.37 As Schroeter herself emphasizes, MC can only 
ensure that “if reference to Realist [Non-Naturalist] moral properties succeeds, then 
some of our moral beliefs must be true.”38 
 A second principle that Schroeter appeals to, both more controversial and able to 
do more work, involves an idea originally found in Chalmers and Jackson (2001): 
Ideal Accessibility (IA) The correct semantic interpretation of the concept 
expressed by a term ‘X’ must make the subject’s ideal, empirically-informed 
beliefs about what it takes to be X in any possible world come out true.39 
 
The empirical information must be given in an “ideal base-level descriptive 
vocabulary”, rather than in natural language, on pain of circularity. I’ll grant for the 
                                                          
36 Schroeter (ms), 7.  
37 Boyd (1988), Brink (1989).  
38 Schroeter (ms), 9.  
39 The wording is Schroeter’s (ms, 10). She credits Chalmers (2004) with the revision of Chalmers & Jackson’s 
(2001) original proposal. A further minor complication is whether or not to include phenomenal information—the 
question turns on whether or not one thinks the phenomenal facts are reducible to the empirical—but settling this 
dispute is not important for present purposes.  
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purposes of this paper that such a vocabulary is in principle possible.40 The basic idea 
behind (IA) is that “the reference of a subject’s concepts is determined by the subject’s 
own fully informed, ideally reflective verdicts about the reference.”41 
 For present purposes, we need not worry whether IA is a correct metasemantic 
principle for all terms. In order to resolve epistemological objections to non-naturalism, 
it only need be true of normative terms. Suppose, as Schroeter argues, that it is. Recall 
that Non-Accidentality, the epistemological challenge to non-naturalism, demands some 
explanation as to how our actual normative beliefs can track the moral properties, given 
that those properties are causally inert.  IA tells us that a subject’s moral beliefs under 
ideal conditions are guaranteed to be true, given that those beliefs themselves 
determine the referent properties of the moral concepts that figure in them.42 So our 
ideal selves’ moral beliefs can straightforwardly explain Non-Accidentality. However, 
this also means that our actual moral beliefs, or at least some subset of them, are non-
accidentally true as well. This is because  
[I]deal beliefs about X have to be justifiable on the basis of the subject’s actual 
beliefs about X—on pain of changing the topic. So Ideal Accessibility constrains 
the subject’s actual beliefs indirectly: all of the subject’s actual beliefs that would 
figure in justifying her ideal, fully-informed verdicts about what it takes to be X 
must come out true.43 
 
                                                          
40 For much more discussion on such a vocabulary, see Chalmers (2012).  
41 Schroeter (ms), 11, emphasis mine.  
42 I harbor some doubts about whether our ideal beliefs will be guaranteed to be true given IA, but Schroeter 
makes this claim (ms, 13), and I grant it for the sake of argument.  
43 Schroeter (ms), 11. 
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Some of our actual moral beliefs must survive the idealization process, lest those beliefs 
not really be our ideal moral beliefs. But this means that some of our actual moral beliefs 
are non-accidentally guaranteed to be true, though we may not know which ones.44 Not 
only that, but we also have reason to believe, given IA, that further reflection and 
information will help weed out more and more false beliefs. Our giving beliefs up on 
receiving more information is very good evidence that they wouldn’t survive ideal 
reflection, and thus are not true. IA helps establish that some of our actual moral beliefs 
must be true, and also that further reflection and information is likely to result in more 
true moral beliefs. These results are enough to meet any reasonable meta-justificatory 
demand on the non-naturalist, and thus the non-naturalist who endorses IA can meet 
Non-Accidentality.  
 However, once we keep in mind the distinction between formal and robust 
normativity, Schroeter’s view faces a dilemma, each horn of which is incompatible with 
the truth of either Non-Accidentality or Content Success. Recall that in order for Non-
Accidentality, Content Success, and Overlap to be met, it must turn out that (a) at least 
some of our substantive first-order normative beliefs are true, (b) the properties picked 
out by our moral terms are the robustly normative properties, and (c), both (a) and (b) 
are met with respect to at least some of the very same beliefs. We’ve seen above how IA 
                                                          
44 I harbor some doubts about this claim. What if all of our moral beliefs are based in false empirical beliefs? But 
Schroeter may say that even in this case we have true moral beliefs that survive idealization—they just turn out to 
be conditional beliefs like “If the empirical facts are such-and-such, then the moral facts are such-and-such.” This 
may be correct, but it’s not obvious. Nevertheless, I grant Schroeter this point for the sake of argument.  
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could ensure that the first condition is met: Since our ideal beliefs are a result of some 
function on our actual beliefs coupled with empirical information, there is some quasi-
constitutive connection between our first order normative beliefs and the properties 
that figure in them.  
 Return to Lucy’s judgment that: 
 (L) Lying is intrinsically bad. 
Suppose for the sake of argument that (L) is one of Lucy’s beliefs that would survive 
idealization.45 Call the property that figures in Lucy’s “bad” thoughts badnessL. Recall 
that Carol believes that: 
 (-L)  Lying is not intrinsically bad. 
And suppose for the sake of argument that (-L) is one of Carol’s beliefs that would 
survive her own idealization.46 Call the property that figures in Carol’s “bad” thoughts 
badnessC.  
 As with Huemer, Schroeter ascribes to something like Plenitude, so there is no 
worry about whether Lucy or Carol’s terms fail to refer.47 However, it should be clear 
that the same problem arises here for Schroeter’s view that arose for Huemer’s view. 
                                                          
45 Recall that on Huemer’s view, so long as Lucy’s belief meet his internalistically specified conditions, then her 
belief is guaranteed to be correct. On Schroeter’s view, Lucy’s first order normative judgment may yet be 
mistaken, since there may be some empirical information currently unbeknownst to her that would lead to her 
denying (L).  
46 Schroeter may deny that this divergence under idealization between Lucy and Carol can occur, as least so long as 
they are members of the same community. I return to this point shortly.  
47 Schroeter (ms), 12.  
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Schroeter has given a metasemantic story which can explain how to avoid a skeptical 
moral epistemology, but she has done so in a way which makes meeting Content Success 
extremely difficult. Lucy and Carol both meet Non-Accidentality with respect to each of 
their sets of normative beliefs. Some set of Lucy’s actual normative beliefs S figures in 
(partially) determining her idealized normative beliefs. By IA, the members of S will be 
non-accidentally true. However, if the normative beliefs that make up S don’t match the 
first order robust normative truths, Lucy’s normative beliefs won’t meet Content Success. 
In other words, while some of Lucy’s normative beliefs would be non-accidentally true, 
it would be extremely unlikely for those beliefs to be of the robustly normative facts. 
But Carol’s epistemic situation, and our own, is identical to Lucy’s. Schroeter has 
provided an epistemology that can explain Non-Accidentality but not Content Success. 
 However, the argument provided so far against Schroeter’s view is incomplete. 
This is because IA actually does provide a way for our normative terms to pick out the 
robustly normative properties (thus meeting Content Success): 
David Kaplan could fix the reference of the name ‘Newman1’ by stipulating that 
it refers to the first child born in the 22nd Century: if the world cooperates by 
producing exactly one child who fits the description, then the name rigidly 
designates the child. No causal interaction with the child is required in order to 
fix reference…And of course, the child in question is not metaphysically 
constituted by Kaplan’s beliefs about it. Similarly, we can stipulatively fix 
reference to a Realist property with an appropriate definite description.48 
 
                                                          
48 Schroeter (ms), 10. Reference to Kaplan (1967) omitted.  
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The idea here is that moral terms may contain, as part of their metasemantics, a 
reference-fixing description that they pick out the robustly normative properties, 
whatever they turn out to be. If I stipulate that my term “wrong” picks out a robustly 
normative ‘not-to-be-doneness’ property if it refers at all, then, so long as there is some 
such property that fits the description, “wrong” will refer to that property. (Compare 
stipulating that “Julius” refers to the inventor of the zip, if it refers at all.49 In the moral 
case the stipulation is that “wrong” refers to the robustly normative not-to-be-doneness 
property, if it refers at all.)  
Now Schroeter does not actually believe that normative terms have explicitly 
stipulated referents, but the semantics of normative terms may nevertheless contain 
implicit reference-fixing descriptions which do similar work. Whether this is so 
depends on whether a subject would consider robust normativity an essential feature of 
“what it takes to be”, e.g., “wrong”, after the idealization procedure given in IA. And 
it’s at least plausible that such a judgment would survive the idealization procedure. 
This would ensure that our normative terms did pick out the robustly normative 
properties, thus meeting Content Success. 
 So far so good. But remember that what is crucial is for Non-Accidentality and 
Content Success to be met with respect to the very same set of beliefs (Overlap). I claim 
                                                          
49 Evans (1982), 25. 
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that the explanation just given of how Content Success is met undermines the account’s 
ability to explain Non-Accidentality.  
Return to Lucy and Carol. “Badness” refers to a different property for Lucy and 
Carol, as their idealized divergence about lying shows.50 Suppose that Lucy and Carol 
realize this. There are two ways they might react: 
Relativity: Lucy and Carol accept that “badness” is not univocal, that they refer to 
different properties, and that this is an acceptable end to normative inquiry.  
 
Univocal Robustness: Lucy and Carol both take “badness” to refer to a robustly 
normative property. Since they accept that there is only one robustly normative 
‘not-to-be-doneness’-type property (if any), they take their dispute about lying to 
be a genuine disagreement not settled by empirical information alone (otherwise 
idealization would have resolved the dispute).  
 
Suppose that Relativity occurs. In that case, Non-Accidentality is met, since Lucy and 
Carol both have beliefs which are non-accidentally true. However, it is met at the cost of 
giving up on meeting Content Success, assuming that there is a unique set of robustly 
normative moral properties. By the non-naturalist’s lights, there is a unique robustly 
normative property of badness. But since we could multiply cases like Lucy and Carol’s 
indefinitely, if we accept relativity then we can’t preserve this fundamental 
commitment of non-naturalists. So Relativity would result in an explanation of how our 
normative beliefs could be non-accidentally true, but it would fail to explain how our 
moral beliefs were of robustly normative facts—in fact, it would give us positive reason 
                                                          
50 Of course it is also possible that the divergence is a result of their notions of “lying”, but I set this possibility aside 
for simplicity.  
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to believe that most of our moral terms do not refer to the robustly normative 
properties, since the possibility that our terms picked them out would be no better than 
chance, for all Schroeter has said.  
Alternatively, suppose Univocal Robustness occurs. Then it looks like moral terms, 
at least for Lucy and Carol, operate more like “Newman1”, picking out the robustly 
normative properties via something like an implicit reference-fixing description. Unique 
Robustness, then, is a situation in which Content Success is clearly met. However, notice 
that this comes at the cost of undermining any reason to believe Non-Accidentality. If 
picking out the robustly normative properties is a non-negotiable feature of the 
semantics of our moral terms, then we’d need some independent reason for accepting 
that our first-order normative beliefs—idealized or not—were true, just as Kaplan 
would need some further evidence before accepting any first-order beliefs about 
Newman1. For example, Kaplan might believe that Newman1 will become a 
philosopher, that he will have black hair, and that he will be an excellent knitter. These 
beliefs do no work toward fixing the content of “Newman1”, and none of them could be 
non-accidentally correct (unless Kaplan has some special prescience of the distant 
future). They may, for all that we know, all be false and thus rejected under 
idealization. Now these rejected beliefs will, in the case of Newman1, be replaced by 
true beliefs under idealization, because part of the idealization process will involve 
giving Kaplan all the base level descriptive information about the world he needs to 
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deduce all the facts about Newman1. However, in the normative case, base level 
descriptive information will not correct for fundamentally mistaken normative beliefs.  
By the non-naturalist’s lights, non-normative information alone won’t entail robustly 
normative facts (in any non-trivial way). Non-normative information alone, for the 
same reason, won’t help correct an agent’s wildly mistaken first order normative 
beliefs.  
To illustrate this, notice again that we could multiply cases like Lucy and Carol’s 
indefinitely. Take any first-order normative belief that you have, B, which would 
survive idealization. There’s no principled reason why there couldn’t be some other 
English speaker who denied B, and whose denial of B survived idealization as well.51 
However, suppose both of you accept that moral terms, first and foremost, refer to the 
robustly normative properties, whatever they might be. When faced with this 
disagreement, then, there’s no way to adjudicate the dispute, because neither party has 
any reason to believe that it is their first-order belief that is true. But B is an arbitrary 
moral belief, so this argument generalizes. 
Notice, as above, that although instances of idealized disagreement help to 
illustrate the problem, the objection is not an argument from disagreement, nor does it 
                                                          
51 Why couldn’t speakers pack more into their (implicit) reference fixing description? For example, perhaps 
“wrong” refers, if it refers at all, to the robustly normative ‘not-to-be-done’ property that forbids lying, murder, 
etc.? The problem here is that once we pack in more information about the referent into the reference fixing 
description, we have less and less reason to think that any such referent exists. Even if there is some sound 
argument for non-naturalism, this wouldn’t guarantee the existence of robustly normative properties with 
particular first-order recommendations. (Thanks to David Sobel for pressing me on this issue.) 
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require any disagreement, actual or possible, to succeed. The problem is that if our 
actual normative beliefs do not latch onto the robustly normative facts, then no amount 
of non-normative idealization will help to meet Content Success. And alternatively, if 
Content Success is met via building robust normativity into the semantics of normative 
terms, then no amount of non-normative idealization will help to meet Non-Accidentality 
with respect to our first order normative beliefs. The lesson, then, is that no 
metasemantic view alone can tell us what actions, states of affairs, or persons to which 
the robustly normative properties apply. At best, it could tell us the referents of our 
normative terms.   
5. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau on “Moral Fixed Points” 
 In an ambitious and exceptional recent paper, Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-
Landau’s crucial claim is that “there is a battery of substantive moral propositions…that 
are also nonnaturalistic conceptual truths.”52 They go on to argue that if this claim is 
accepted, it can do a wide-ranging amount of metaphysical and epistemological work 
for the non-naturalist. (Here I am only worried about the alleged epistemological work 
that can be done. I remain agnostic on their claim that the view can do metaphysical 
work.) For example, the following claims are, they argue, excellent candidates for being 
non-naturalistic conceptual truths: 
It is pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person. 
It is pro tanto wrong to humiliate others simply for pleasure. 
                                                          
52 Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014, 2).  
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If acting justly is costless, then, ceteris paribus, one should act justly.53 
 
First-order non-naturalistic conceptual truths such as these they call the moral fixed 
points. Any normative system which failed to endorse the moral fixed points would 
thereby not count as morality. This plausible idea can be seen as an extension of 
Philippa Foot’s point that ‘it is wrong to run around trees right handed’ isn’t just false, 
but nonsensical.54 Cuneo & Shafer-Landau argue that the moral concepts can provide 
substantive constraints on moral theorizing. These constraints arise from the moral 
fixed points. 
 So far so good. But in light of the arguments I’ve given above, a natural question 
arises: What reason do we have to believe that our moral concepts pick out anything 
mind-independent? Cuneo & Shafer-Landau’s answer to this question involves 
appealing to what they call the “traditional view” of concepts.55 According to the 
traditional view, concepts have three important features. First, concepts—rather than 
the objects or propositions themselves—are the constituents of propositions.56 Second, 
concepts serve as the referential devices that “enable thinkers to refer to things such as 
objects and properties.”57 Finally, according to the traditional view, concepts are 
                                                          
53 Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014, 7). They are explicit that, while these are excellent candidates for being 
conceptual truths, the specific examples they choose are irrelevant to the more general claim that some 
substantive first order normative claims are conceptual truths.  
54 See Foot (2001, 7).  
55 Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014, 11). As they freely admit, the traditional view is heavily indebted to Frege.  
56 Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014, 11).  
57 Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014, 12).  
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“abstract, sharable, mind-independent ways of thinking about objects and their 
properties. As such, they are very much objective, ‘out there’ sorts of things, extra-
mental items whose existence does not depend on our employing them in thought or 
language.”58 Furthermore, as mind-independent entities, concepts have essences which 
underlie conceptual truths such as the moral fixed points.59 It is this last feature of the 
traditional view that is crucial for answering the question given above. Our question 
was how our individual moral representations can pick out anything mind-
independent. And the answer, once the traditional view is granted, is simple: The 
concepts themselves are mind-independent, so once we have a competent grasp of a 
concept (through a mental representation), we already have a competent grasp of the 
essence of a mind independent entity. 
We are now in a position to see how Cuneo & Shafer-Landau can use the 
traditional view along with the moral fixed points to explain Non-Accidentality.60 Take 
some moral fixed point m. Now suppose I am conceptually competent with respect to 
the concepts (normative and otherwise) that figure in the proposition m. Suppose, 
furthermore, that upon reflection I accept m. My belief will be non-accidentally true: I 
formed it in light of my conceptual competence, and my conceptual competence 
                                                          
58 Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014, 11).  
59 Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014, 13).  
60 I should be clear that this is my best reconstruction of what I think they would say. They don’t directly address 
Non-Accidentality in their paper, but they address enough related epistemic issues that I am confident that 
something like this is what they would say. (See Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014), esp. Sections 3 and 4.) 
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ensures that, if I don’t make some mental mistake, my belief is true.61 So my belief that 
m is not just true, but will be true non-accidentally. And such an explanation will extend 
to the beliefs of all conceptually competent agents when their beliefs are of moral fixed 
points.  
Cuneo & Shafer-Landau’s view can explain Non-Accidentality, at least with 
respect to the moral fixed points. But can these beliefs simultaneously explain Content 
Success? In other words, is it the case that our moral conceptual competency is 
competency of the robustly normative concepts? This could occur in one of two ways, 
depending on the rest of the details of one’s normative metaphysics. First, it could be 
that concepts, as mind-independent entities, can themselves be robustly normative. 
Second, it could be that our moral concepts are robustly normative in that their 
referents are robustly normative properties.  Both seem to be viable options given 
Cuneo & Shafer-Landau’s metaphysical claims about the moral fixed points. The 
argument I give below does not depend on settling this question, but I will assume the 
first approach in what follows. The first approach strikes me as the more epistemically 
promising, because separating the robustly normative property from the essence of the 
concepts themselves only opens up another potential epistemic gap between the 
                                                          
61 Notice that the epistemological explanation of the moral fixed points will closely resemble the epistemology of 
conceptual truths more generally.  
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believer and the fact (about the robust normativity of her concepts) at issue. However, 
everything said in what follows will apply to either approach one favors. 
As we’ve seen above, on Cuneo & Shafer-Landau’s view, the truth-makers for a 
moral fixed point are the essences of the concepts that make up the fixed point in 
question. No further “worldly fact” is needed to ground its truth. This is what 
constitutes the fact that the moral fixed points are conceptual truths. But, importantly, 
neither are conceptual truths merely analytic truths. Analytic truths are sentences which 
are true in virtue of the meaning of the words that compose them. Analyticity, as Cuneo 
& Shafer-Landau understand it, is a linguistic phenomenon, not a metaphysical one. 
Conceptual truths, on the other hand, are more metaphysically robust in that they 
involve mind-independent essences.62 Since concepts have essences, and, as in the moral 
fixed points, concepts’ essences bear relations to each other, it seems like a genuine 
possibility that moral concepts could themselves be robustly normative, on Cuneo & 
Shafer-Landau’s view. If this were correct, then no further relation between the moral 
concepts and any non-natural properties would need to hold for robust normativity to 
get in the picture. The moral concepts would just have robust normativity built into 
their essences. 
                                                          
62 Plausibly, if words have their meaning essentially, then analyticity may be metaphysically robust. Though they 
don’t say this explicitly, I suspect that Cuneo & Shafer-Landau would claim that words do not have essential 
meanings, and that any intuition that they do is based in conflating words with the concepts that words refer to. I 
assume they are correct about this for the purposes of the paper. 
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We can grant that the traditional view of concepts is correct and that moral fixed 
points are true in virtue of the essences of the concepts that constitute them. 
Furthermore, we can even grant that there are concepts which have robust normativity 
built into their conceptual essence. These three assumptions can clearly support an 
explanation of Non-Accidentality, but what about Content Success? It might seem as 
though Content Success can be explained as well, once we’ve granted that robust 
normativity can be built into a concept’s essence. However, by now the problem is a 
familiar one. Showing that we have substantive conceptual moral knowledge and that 
some concepts are robustly normative is not enough: We need to further show that our 
moral concepts are the robustly normative ones. For again, there could be any number 
of alternative sets of broadly speaking normative concepts which deny some or all of 
the moral fixed points while affirming others. There are, for example, the schmoral 
concepts, and with them, the schmoral fixed points, which are conceptual truths 
grounded in the essences of the schmoral concepts. (It doesn’t matter whether any 
actual (or possible) agent grasps the schmoral concepts or believes the schmoral fixed 
points. Since the schmoral concepts are mind-independent entities, the conceptual 
truths will exist either way.) We could enumerate such non-moral but broadly speaking 
normative sets of concepts, fixed points, and essences indefinitely. What we need is 
some reason to believe that our moral concepts, as opposed to any of these other sets, 
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are the robustly normative ones. This is what explaining Content Success requires, and it 
is difficult to see how it would fall out of Cuneo & Shafer-Landau’s view.  
Interestingly, Cuneo & Shafer-Landau acknowledge a related point, asking “Why 
think that we have reason to pledge our allegiance to this normative system, rather than 
another—call it schmorality—that fails to incorporate…the moral fixed points?”63 (I take 
it that they mean “reason” here in the robustly normative sense.) In response to this 
question, they concede: 
It’s an excellent question, but one that we don’t propose to answer here…this 
question is a perennial worry for all forms of moral realism…And while 
regarding some substantive moral norms as a species of conceptual truth might 
not specifically aid us in explaining the reason-giving power of moral facts-, 
neither does it make our version of realism any less apt to offer such an 
explanation, whatever it may be.64 
 
In itself, this is a fair enough concession: A single paper can’t defend every controversial 
piece of non-naturalist metaphysics. However, this concession has a crucial 
epistemological upshot. We have no explanation—by Cuneo & Shafer-Landau’s own 
lights—as to why we should think our moral concepts are the robustly normative 
concepts. Furthermore, there are any number of alternative systems of normative 
concepts, each from our epistemic standpoint equally likely to be the robustly 
normative concepts. So, for all that’s been shown so far, we have more reason than not, 
                                                          
63 Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014), 8-9.  
64 Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014), 9. They furthermore cite Shafer-Landau (2009) as an attempted answer to this 
question. I discuss Shafer-Landau (2009) briefly below.  
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probabilistically speaking, to think that our moral concepts are not the robustly 
normative concepts. This would mean that without further argument, Cuneo & Shafer-
Landau (2014) will have shown that (many of) our beliefs in the moral fixed points are 
non-accidentally true, but of no more normative interest than our beliefs about the rules 
guiding how one can move one’s pawn in chess.65  
  The upshot at present is just an instance of the more general lesson of this paper: 
An explanation of Non-Accidentality does not wholly resolve our epistemic worries. Any 
explanation of Non-Accidentality must be integrated with a solution to Content Success, 
and this is a non-trivial task. As with Huemer and Schroeter, Cuneo & Shafer-Landau 
have provided a solution to the former, but one whose ability to be coupled with an 
explanation of Content Success is unclear at best.  
6. Conclusion 
 A core commitment of non-naturalist moral realism is that there is some unique 
or nearly unique set of robustly normative facts. Moral norms, along with rational 
norms, share a distinctively binding normative authority that other conventional 
norms—such as the norms of chess—do not. Non-naturalists also separately 
acknowledge that, given the irreducible and non-causal nature of normative facts, some 
                                                          
65 Interestingly, Cuneo & Shafer-Landau reference an earlier Shafer-Landau article (2009) for a defense of the claim 
that there are categorical reasons. As noted above, categoricity is not the same as robust normativity, but they do 
seem to be closely related. However, whatever strengths Shafer-Landau’s argument has in the categoricity case, it 
won’t solve the present problem, because it relies on substantive first order judgments of the very sort which are 
in question.  
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explanation must be given as to how at least some of our first-order justified moral 
beliefs are non-accidentally true.  This metajustificatory requirement is traditionally 
considered independently of the robustly normative nature and uniqueness of the 
normative facts. The arguments above have attempted to demonstrate that this is a 
mistake. Establishing that our normative beliefs are non-accidentally true—that is, 
establishing Non-Accidentality —does not establish that the robustly normative 
properties or concepts feature in those beliefs—that is, Content Success. Without further 
argument, we have no reason to believe that our normative beliefs, even if justified, pick 
out the robustly normative rather than some merely formally normative properties or 
concepts.  
 I have tried to defend the importance of integrating Non-Accidentality and Content 
Success by way of three case studies in moral epistemology: Huemer (2005), Schroeter 
(ms), and Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014). Each of these approaches to meeting the 
metajustificatory requirement, while importantly distinct from each other, appeal to 
conceptual or semantic competence to attempt to resolve the epistemological worries. 
And each is subject to the same concerns related to the connection between Non-
Accidentality and Content Success. At best, these views do not explain Content Success. At 
worst, the explanations given for Non-Accidentality undermine any chance at also 
explaining Content Success. The lesson here is not that we should give up on non-
naturalist epistemology (though that is a possible response). Rather, the lesson is that 
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non-naturalist epistemologists must pay close attention to the relationship between 
their explanation as to how our moral beliefs can be non-accidentally true and their 
explanation as to how our moral beliefs refer to the robustly normative. An adequate 
non-naturalist epistemology must show substantial overlap between the set of justified 
moral beliefs and the set of moral beliefs that pick out the robustly normative. For the 
non-naturalist, Non-Accidentality and Content Success need to stand or fall together. And 
while this may not be an impossible task, it is certainly non-trivial.   
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Chapter 4: Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience 
The view that it is possible to gain moral knowledge by directly perceiving moral 
properties is an unpopular position in moral epistemology. Instead, moral 
epistemologists have appealed to the use of intuitions, “rational insight”, or some other 
a priori access as providing substantive moral knowledge.1  However, some authors 
have recently defended moral perception as a source of moral knowledge.2 Although 
these defenses have their virtues, most are lacking in at least one of two ways.3 First, 
rather than giving a positive argument that moral perception actually occurs, these 
authors focus on responding to objections against the very possibility of moral 
perception. Second, even where positive accounts are given, many fail to engage the 
recent literature in the epistemology of perception and how moral perception may fit 
(or not fit) with recent accounts of the contents of experience.4   
                                                          
1 This kind of view has a long tradition, of course. See Shafer-Landau (2003), part IV, Audi (2004), Zamulinski 
(2007), Parfit (2011) Part II Ch.32, and Enoch (2011) Ch. 7, for recent defenses of the intuition/a priori access view. 
Singer (2005) differentiates “rational” from emotional intuitions, arguing that the former, but not the latter, are 
justificatory. See also Greene (2007).  
2 McGrath (2004), Chappell (2008), Väyrynen (2008), Audi (2010, 2013),  Cullison (2010a), McBrayer (2010a, 
2010b), and Cowan (2013a, 2013b) . 
3 An important exception here is Cowan (2013b), who provides a qualified defense of moral perception while 
engaging the philosophy of perception literature. The present paper provides a distinct positive argument for 
moral perception.  
4 Väyrynen (2008, Section IV) defends a posteriori ethical intuitionism from a particular objection from Sturgeon 
(2002), but notes that his reply would fail “if we could not perceive ethical properties as being instantiated” 
(p.500).  Väyrynen admits that his response to Sturgeon is weak insofar as “establishing that we can perceive 
ethical properties as being instantiated is a tall order.” (ibid.) This paper can be seen as attempting to meet that 
burden.  
McBrayer (2010a, 2010b) is also engaged with the philosophy of perception literature, but only uses it to respond 
to objections to moral perception, not to provide a positive argument for it.  
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 I will give a positive argument in favor of the perception of moral properties by 
drawing on a recent debate in the philosophy of perception. Using a contrast argument, I 
argue that moral properties can be part of the contents of experience. In section I, I 
explain the structure of a contrast argument and provide an example of a (non-moral) 
contrast argument that can be found in the philosophy of perception literature. Sections 
II-IV contain my contrast argument in favor of moral perception. In section II, I propose 
and defend a case involving a contrast in phenomenal character between two 
individuals perceiving the same scene. In section III, I provide some preliminary 
reasons for explaining the contrast by appealing to the perception of moral properties 
by one but not the other individual. Since contrast arguments are inferences to the best 
explanation, I spend section IV considering and rejecting alternative explanations for 
the contrast. I conclude that the best explanation for the contrast is that moral properties 
are capable of being part of the contents of experience.  
 Before getting into the arguments, I should make explicit three background 
assumptions I will not defend here. First, I assume that some version of non-skeptical 
moral realism is true, where by this I mean that (a) there are at least some moral 
properties whose existence does not depend on the mental states of human beings—at 
least not in any interesting sense, and (b) at least some human beings have at least some 
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non-trivial moral knowledge.5 6 Second, I assume that at least some moral properties 
supervene on natural properties, where identity is one kind of supervenience.7 Third, I 
assume what Susanna Siegel calls the “Content View”—the view that “experiences have 
contents, where contents are a kind of condition under which experiences are accurate, 
similar in many ways to the truth-conditions of beliefs.”8 
1. Contrast Arguments and the Contents of Experience 
Proponents of the Content View tend to agree that at least some properties such 
as colors, shapes, and states of motion can be part of the contents of experience. Call 
these properties low-level properties. There is much dispute over whether more 
complicated properties can be part of the contents of experience as well. Call these 
properties high-level properties. There are many different kinds of high-level properties: 
Natural kind properties, artifact kind properties, the properties of causal chains, etc. 
According to liberals, at least some high-level properties can be part of the contents of 
                                                          
5 How exactly to characterize realism is controversial. Rather than getting bogged down in those debates, my 
definition of realism here is intentionally vague. I don’t believe how we cash out realism has much importance to 
the argument that follows. In particular, I don’t mean to take a stand on the naturalism/non-naturalism dispute. 
(With one exception: Shafer-Landau (2003), who carves up naturalism/non-naturalism in terms of epistemic 
access, and endorses non-naturalism. Since his non-naturalism is defined in terms of a priori access, moral 
perception is conceptually impossible for non-naturalism as he defines it.) 
Isn’t MP ruled out by the view that the moral properties are causally inert? I think that McBrayer (2010a, Sect. IV) 
has shown that this natural thought is mistaken, and that MP is compatible with causally inert moral properties, 
but I cannot defend that here.  
6 Given that the broader project of this dissertation is defending the possibility of moral knowledge against an 
argument for moral skepticism, one may wonder how this assumption is fair in this context. The project of this 
chapter is to establish the in principle possibility of moral perception as a source for moral knowledge. Later 
chapters (especially chapter 7) address the more difficult question of whether we should think the required 
conditions are met.  
7 I don’t believe that the arguments of this paper hinge on any particular conception of supervenience.  
8 Siegel (2010), p.4.  
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experience. According to conservatives, high-level properties cannot be part of the 
contents of experience; 9 rather, the existence of such properties from our perception of 
low-level properties is only concluded as a result of some further (possibly 
unconscious) cognitive act.10  The difference between low-level and high-level 
properties is probably best represented as a continuum, rather than as a binary. 
Nonetheless, it’s helpful for bookkeeping purposes to roughly divide them up, so I use 
these categories throughout despite this qualification. 
 The thesis I intend to defend below is: 
Moral Perception (MP): At least some moral properties can be part of the contents 
of perceptual experience.  
 
I will take it as uncontroversial that moral properties would be high-level properties, so 
if MP is true, then liberalism is true. As Robert Cowan points out, this is why, in 
assessing MP, we should be careful not to “[prejudge] the outcome of an ongoing 
debate in the philosophy of perception as to what sorts of things can come to be 
represented in experience”.11 However, we should also keep in mind that liberalism 
does not commit one to the view that any and all high-level properties can be 
represented in experience. A defense of the perception of high-level properties can 
proceed on a case-by-case basis.   
                                                          
9 I take this liberal/conservative terminology from Bayne (2009).  
10 This could result from an unconscious inference, or, as a referee pointed out to me, our perception could cause 
an intuition (which wouldn’t itself count as a perceptual state). There are other possibilities here, but for present 
purposes what is important is that the high-level properties are not part of the contents of experience.  
11 Cowan (2013b), 12.  
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 There are two views in moral epistemology that entail MP. First, according to 
Perceptual Intuitionism, moral properties can be part of the contents of experience in one 
of the traditional sense modalities (sight, sound, etc.).12 On the other hand, according to 
Affectual Intuitionism, (a) emotional experiences are a mode of perception (the 
perceptual theory of emotions), and (b) moral properties can be part of the contents of 
emotional experience.13 I wish to remain neutral for the purposes of the arguments 
below between these two views. As will be seen, I believe that emotions play an integral 
role in moral perception. However, the view that emotions play an integral role in 
moral perception is in principle compatible not just with Affectual Intuitionism (for 
obvious reasons), but also with Perceptual Intuitionism. This is because it may turn out 
that affective states cognitively penetrate the perceptual processing of the traditional 
sensory modalities such that they alter the contents of classically perceptual 
experiences. So, for example, a visual experience, while remaining strictly visual, may 
contain moral properties as part of its contents as a result of affective penetration. Of 
course, whether affective states penetrate classically perceptual processing is at least 
partially an empirical question which I cannot address here.14 All I am claiming here is 
                                                          
12 Perceptual Intuitionism is defended by McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), and on one reading of Audi (2013).  
13 This view has been recently defended by Roeser (2011), who sees herself as developing the ideas of Thomas 
Reid. Cowan (2013, section 4) also discusses this view (and does not outright reject it).  
14 Cognitive penetration here, as elsewhere, also raises interesting and difficult epistemological issues which are 
outside of the scope of the present chapter.  
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that even though I take emotional states to play an integral role in moral perception, the 
arguments of this paper remain neutral between Affectual and Perceptual Intuitionism.  
 Though both Affectual and Perceptual Intuitionism entail MP, the entailment does 
not go in the other direction. This is because according to both of these versions of 
intuitionism, moral properties contained within the contents of experience can serve the 
role of justifying epistemically basic moral beliefs, which MP does not entail. The claim 
that an experience E which contains a property F can justify epistemically basic beliefs 
about F is plausible, but it is non-trivial in the case of high-level properties such as 
moral properties. Things are not epistemically straightforward here because moral 
properties may figure in experience only as a result of the cognitive penetration of prior 
moral beliefs.15 If this were the case, the justification of moral judgments formed on the 
basis of moral perception would depend at least in part on the status of the prior moral 
beliefs. While I do think that Intuitionism can be defended despite these concerns, I 
intend the argument of this paper to be neutral on the relationship between MP and its 
broader epistemological consequences. I only mean to claim here that the truth of MP is 
an important piece of the moral epistemological puzzle.  
One typical defense of the presence of some high-level property in the contents 
of experience proceeds by way of a contrast argument of the type recently defended by 
                                                          
15 Vayrynen (2008) and Cowan (2013) both contain excellent discussions of this issue. 
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Susanna Siegel and others.16 Siegel argues for liberalism using what she calls the Method 
of Phenomenal Contrast. The method involves considering two very similar but 
phenomenally distinct experiences. We first consider an experience in which it is 
plausible that the high-level property could be part of the contents of that experience. 
Then we consider an experience that (a) uncontroversially does not represent the high-
level property, but (b) is in other respects as similar to the first experience as possible. 
Now we have two similar but uncontroversially distinct phenomenal states. The 
method now proceeds by inference to the best explanation. There must be some 
explanation for the difference between the two experiences. The liberal regarding a 
particular property contends that the best explanation is that one experience represents 
the high-level property while the other does not. A conservative about the property in 
question must provide some superior alternative explanation as to why the two 
experiences are distinct. This could involve, for example, appealing to differences in 
low-level properties of the two experiences, an appeal to a difference in cognitive 
phenomenology, or perhaps a denial that the phenomenal difference is a 
representational difference. Since the method of phenomenal contrast will always 
involve an inference to the best explanation, any particular application of the method is 
                                                          
16 Siegel (2006, 2010, forthcoming), Bayne (2009). For an auditory application of a contrast argument, see 
O’Callaghan (2011). Cowan (2013b, 5n16) mentions contrast arguments in the context of a discussion of moral 
perception, but does not himself provide such an argument.  
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bound to be contentious. This is perhaps to be expected, since it’s hard to imagine what 
a plausible deductive argument for or against liberalism would look like.  
 It may be helpful to consider an example. Here is Siegel: 
Suppose you have never seen a pine tree before and are hired to cut down all the 
pine trees in a grove containing trees of many different sorts. Someone points out 
to you which trees are pine trees. Some weeks pass, and your disposition to 
distinguish the pine trees from the others improves. Eventually, you can spot the 
pine trees immediately: they become visually salient to you…Gaining this 
recognitional disposition is reflected in a phenomenological difference between 
the visual experiences had before and those had after the recognitional 
disposition was fully developed.17 
 
The target property in this example is the kind property of being-a-pine-tree. Our two 
experiences are someone looking at the trees before and after developing the ability to 
recognize them. There is allegedly a phenomenal difference between experiencing a 
pine tree before and after someone can recognize them. We have a phenomenal contrast 
in need of an explanation. Siegel goes on to argue that the best explanation for this 
phenomenal contrast is that one’s coming to be able to recognize pine trees gives them a 
new ability to represent pine trees in the contents of experience.18 In the course of her 
book, Siegel gives similar contrast arguments about recognizing other kind properties, 
semantic properties, and causation.  
                                                          
17 Siegel (2010, p.100). Peacocke (1992, Ch.3) uses a similar example.  
18 Siegel (2010, Ch.4) considers and rejects other possible explanations of the contrast. I take no stand on whether 
she is correct about the best explanation in this particular case.  
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 The method of formulating contrast arguments should be accepted by liberals 
and conservatives alike. This is because so long as the proponent of a contrast argument 
can provide sufficient evidence that a phenomenal contrast exists between two 
experiential states, there is a difference for which some explanation needs to be 
provided. But contrast arguments do not in principle favor liberal explanations over 
conservative-compatible explanations, so they are not unacceptably question-begging. 
However, it should also be noted that since contrast arguments trade in appeals to 
better and worse explanations, their conclusions will rest on a number of different 
considerations, some of which are bound to be disputable. Nevertheless, I think that 
they can help us make progress even if they do not compel all liberals or all 
conservatives in any particular instance.   
2. A Contrast Case for (Moral) Badness 
 Now we can turn to MP. In order to test MP, we need a contrast case. Perceiving 
moral properties, if possible, plausibly involves some kind of recognitional 
disposition.19 However, perceiving moral properties is not straightforwardly analogous 
to learning a second language or learning how to distinguish pine trees from fir trees. 
For many, the development of our ability to notice moral features in our environment is 
subtle enough that it will be difficult to provide a clear and uncontroversial example of 
a phenomenological contrast in an individual before and after developing a 
                                                          
19 See Siegel (2010, Ch. 4).  
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recognitional capacity for some moral feature or property.  This is not to suggest that 
we could not develop moral capacities which would make us more phenomenologically 
sensitive to the moral features of certain situations. In fact, I think such cases are 
possible.20 However, these cases would probably all be too contentious to provide the 
strong explanatory burden that a contrast argument places on us. So I propose to set 
this kind of cross-temporal intra-subjective contrast case aside for the purposes of 
establishing or rejecting MP. 
Instead, I propose that we consider two separate individuals perceiving the same 
situation. Just to illustrate that there is no in principle problem with a contrast argument 
of this sort, consider a brief example, two individuals taking an Ishihara Test of Color 
Blindness. In an Ishihara Test for red-green color blindness, individuals look at a circle 
made up of much smaller red and green dots of various shades. The dots of one of the 
colors make up a number.21 An individual with red-green color blindness will not be 
able to distinguish the red from the green dots in order to read the number. The circle 
will look like it is made up of similarly colored dots in no particular pattern. A color-
sighted individual will be able to distinguish the red from the green dots and thus be 
                                                          
20 For example, understanding the mechanisms and pervasiveness of subtle sexual harassment may help someone 
be able to perceive moral properties of an instance of harassment that the same well-intentioned but uninformed 
individual could not. And such a case may involve a phenomenological contrast in the experiences of the individual 
before and after learning about sexual harassment. (Fricker’s (2006) discussion of the concept of sexual 
harassment may be helpful here.) I thank Steve Swartzer and an anonymous referee for pressing me to explain 
why I don’t think intra-subjective cases are the best kind for a moral contrast argument. I also thank Steve 
Swartzer for the example of the perception of subtle sexual harassment, and an anonymous referee for the 
possible connection with Fricker (2006). 
21 For some examples, and to take the test yourself, see http://www.toledo-bend.com/colorblind/Ishihara.asp.  
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able to read the number. It is overwhelmingly plausible that these individuals, while 
looking at the circle of dots, will be in phenomenally distinct states.22 Just as in intra-
subjective cases, it appears that some explanation of the phenomenal contrast is 
required in cases like these as well—at least where we can clearly establish, using 
empirical data, a phenomenal contrast between two individuals.   
I turn now to the moral contrast case which I will use to defend MP. In this case, 
one individual is a normally functioning adult human being. The other individual is 
what I’ll call an emotionally empathic dysfunctional individual (EEDI). EEDIs are 
individuals who have a fully functioning “theory of mind”—that is, they are capable of 
inferring the mental states of others based on behavioral, vocal, and contextual 
evidence—but who nonetheless lack affective empathy in the sense that they fail to 
have “an emotional response to another individual that is congruent with the other’s 
emotional reaction.”23   For present purposes, all that is required is that EEDIs have an 
“inability to feel empathy with the victim” of a particular distressing experience, one 
common trait associated with psychopathy.24 It may be helpful to think of EEDIs as 
psychopaths; in fact, one popular theory of psychopathy is just that psychopaths are 
EEDIs.25 I refrain from using the term “psychopath” in my contrast case because there is 
                                                          
22Explanations of the Ishihara Test even sometimes provide examples of what the circles look like to individuals of 
various sorts. See, for example, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ishihara_test (Accessed June 21st , 2013). 
23 Blair (2006, p.4). 
24 Hare (1985).  
25 Blair (2006), Hare (1991), Arnett (1997). 
99
no consensus in the field of psychology about the essential features of psychopathy, and 
I don’t want to delve into those debates here.26 What is of importance for generating my 
contrast case is only that there really are EEDIs, not whether they are to be identified 
with psychopathy or some subset thereof.   
Consider two individuals coming across the situation described in Gilbert 
Harman’s famous chapter on moral observation.27 They each “round a corner and see a 
group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it.” Both Norma, the 
normally functioning adult human being, and Pathos, the EEDI, come across the same 
scene.28 There is good reason to believe that Norma and Pathos are in phenomenally 
different states when perceiving the scene. EEDIs tend to not respond to distress cues, 
whereas for normally functioning individuals, distress cues can invoke powerful 
phenomenological states. For example, in one study, adults who scored highly on the 
Hare Psychopathy Checklist—Revised were shown images of sad faces as their skin 
conductance response (SCR) was tested. SCR is correlated with physiological arousal, 
and thus with emotional intensity more generally. The individuals who scored highly 
on the Psychopathy Checklist showed heavily reduced SCRs in comparison to the control 
group.29 Similar results have been shown for children with psychopathic tendencies.30 
                                                          
26 Skeem et. al. (2011).  
27 Harman (1977, 8).  
28 Thanks to an anonymous referee for recommending these heuristically helpful names.  
29 Blair et. al. (1997)  
30 Blair (1999).  
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Those who score high on the Psychopathy Checklist have also been shown to not differ in 
their  “startle responses” (blinking and twitching) when surprised by an acoustic 
stimulus regardless of whether they are looking at a pleasant image, such as a smiling 
face, or an unpleasant image, such as a mutilated animal. A control group was shown to 
have a higher startle response when viewing an unpleasant image.31 These differences, 
as well as others, appear to be explained by some kind of amygdala dysfunction in 
EEDIs.32 
A difference in SCRs, heart rate, and startle responses does not deductively 
prove that EEDIs and normally functioning individuals are in states with a differing 
phenomenal character. These measurements only directly show that EEDIs and 
normally functioning individuals differ physiologically. But to demand such a proof 
would be asking for a solution to the problem of other minds. What we have is the best 
empirical evidence currently available, and it all seems to point in the direction of a 
phenomenal contrast in cases like that of Norma and Pathos above.  For most people, 
witnessing a cat being lit on fire invokes a very strong phenomenological response. But 
for EEDIs, it appears that no such strong phenomenological response is present. So we 
have a phenomenal contrast in need of explanation.33  
                                                          
31 Patrick et. al. (1993). 
32 Blair (2006), pp.9-13.  
33 An anonymous referee points out that the difference between Norma and Pathos appears at first blush to be 
emotional. While it is true that the contrast almost certainly has some relationship to emotion, what is unclear is 
whether the contrast is explained in terms of the affect, or whether affect is merely causally related to the state 
(belief, desire, perception, etc.) that the explains the contrast. See Sect 4.  
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3. MP as the Explanation for the Contrast 
 The phenomenal contrast between Norma and Pathos’s perceptions of the 
burning cat needs an explanation. I contend that the best explanation is a difference in 
the perception of moral properties—Norma’s experience represents the cat’s burning as 
bad, whereas Pathos’s doesn’t. Norma’s experiential state meets three conditions that 
standardly count as sufficient for a states’ representing some property F. First, assuming 
non-skeptical moral realism, Norma has developed a disposition to be in this particular 
experiential state which more or less reliably tracks badness. Second, Norma’s relevantly 
associated phenomenology is counterfactually correlated with badness (or at least a 
particular type of badness) in her local environment. Finally, Norma is disposed to form 
moral beliefs based on experiential states of this kind. In the contrast case in question, 
we can safely assume that Norma will spontaneously come to form the belief that the 
cat’s suffering is bad. So not only are Norma’s experiential states historically correlated 
with badness in her local environment, there is also a link between experiential states of 
this kind and Norma’s forming beliefs about badness in her local environment. It would 
appear then that we have some good preliminary reasons in favor of MP as the best 
explanation of the contrast in question. This hypothesis would also help to explain how 
Norma can more or less track and respond to badness in her local environment without 
explicit, conscious rule following, while Pathos, as an EEDI, cannot do so. To be sure, 
the experiential feature that Norma has that Pathos does not is probably emotional in 
102
some sense. But I don’t think this should rule out its being perceptual, for reasons I 
mentioned above (Sect. 1) and discuss in more detail below (Sect. 4.4).  
4. Are There Better Alternative Explanations? 
I have proposed an explanation for the Pathos and Norma contrast case. 
However, in order to fully assess this explanation, it is necessary to consider alternative 
explanations of the contrast and see why they are unsatisfactory. I think there are four 
alternative possibilities: (a) the contrast is due to a non-representational difference in 
phenomenology, (b) the contrast is part of their cognitive phenomenology, rather than 
their perceptual phenomenology, (c) the contrast is due to their representing different 
non-moral high-level properties, or (d) the contrast is because of a difference in their 
representations of internal bodily processes. I’ll address each of these in turn. 
4.1. A Non-Representational Difference? 
The first alternative explanation is that the contrast is best explained by some 
non-representational phenomenal difference. According to this explanation, despite the 
fact that Norma and Pathos are in states with different phenomenal character, the 
contents of their experiences are the same. Norma’s experience has some raw feel, some 
purely qualitative non-representational character, which Pathos’s experience lacks. I 
have no knock-down argument against this first alternative, but I can see at least two 
serious drawbacks. First, this explanation relies on the denial of intentionalism, roughly, 
the view that phenomenal character is identical to or supervenes on representational 
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content. Intentionalism is a serious and popular view, and it would be ill-advised to 
reject it only in order to deny MP—especially in the absence of a principled reason. 
Second, the defender of this alternative explanation must provide some independent 
reason to believe that Norma and Pathos’s phenomenal contrast in this particular case is 
non-representational. Given that Norma and Pathos’s difference in experiential states 
could correspond to differing dispositions to judge the cat-burning as bad, we have 
some positive reason to believe that the phenomenological difference corresponds to 
either a difference in perceptual content or in cognitive content, broadly construed. If 
the thought is that the phenomenal contrast is due to differing background cognitive 
states, then this response just collapses into the second alternative discussed below.  
One motivation for this alternative that may avoid the objections just discussed 
arises from the combination of (a) the fact that something distinctively affective seems 
to underlie the phenomenal contrast, and (b) the view that affect is a good candidate for 
a raw feeling, even if intentionalism is true of most other phenomenological states. While 
I agree that (a) is overwhelmingly plausible, there is good reason to reject (b). Though 
the idea that affect is a raw feeling is a view that has been defended historically,34 most 
philosophers and psychologists reject this view of affect because it cannot account for 
the fact that affective states have intentional objects.35 To be sure, current orthodoxy 
                                                          
34 Most famously by William James (1884).  
35 See, for example, DeSousa (2013, Sect. 2), Fox (2008, Ch.2). Goldie (2003, 2009) defends a view according to 
which affective states are essentially feelings, but allows that feelings can themselves be intentionally directed—
which renders them more than mere raw feelings. 
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could be mistaken here, but we’d need some argument to this effect in order to consider 
the raw feels explanation a viable alternative. 
4.2. A Difference in Cognitive Phenomenology? 
The second alternative proposal is that the difference is one of cognitive 
phenomenology. The relationship between cognitive states and phenomenology is a 
contentious one, but for the purposes of this paper I will grant that propositional 
attitudes have associated phenomenological characters.36 There are a few possible 
candidate differences between Pathos and Norma’s cognitive phenomenology. One 
difference is in the beliefs that Pathos and Norma have. A second possible difference is 
in the desires that they have. A third possible difference is in the intuitions that they have 
(or don’t have). I’ll address each of these in turn.  
Plausibly, Norma will form something like the judgment “That is bad” while 
observing the scene, while Pathos will not form such a judgment. So, one non-
perceptual difference between Norma and Pathos is that they have different beliefs 
about the scene in front of them. If occurrent cognitive states can have an associated 
phenomenal character, then this difference in cognitive states could lead to a difference 
in phenomenal character. Couldn’t this difference explain the phenomenal contrast?  
                                                          
36 The literature on cognitive phenomenology has exploded in the past decade, but arguably the most influential 
paper is Horgan and Tienson (2002).  
105
 This explanation will not do. Although EEDIs are unable to feel empathy for a 
victim in distress, they are capable of learning and applying moral norms.37 Imagine 
that Pathos has been taught that lighting cats on fire is bad. Further, imagine that 
Pathos has much practice in the lab at applying such norms swiftly and accurately. 
When Pathos sees the scene, he will be able to quickly judge that “That is bad.” In short, 
Norma and Pathos can have the same judgments about the scene, and thus, if the 
cognitive phenomenology explanation of the contrast is correct, they should have the 
same cognitive phenomenology. However, we can be confident that the phenomenal 
contrast would remain despite the sameness of cognitive phenomenology. Thus, the 
explanation of the phenomenal contrast in terms of different beliefs is unsuccessful.38  
 Now turn to the possible difference in the desires that Norma and Pathos have. 
Norma probably has some desire that the cat’s suffering end, while Pathos plausibly 
lacks such a desire.39 This difference in cognitive phenomenology could explain the 
contrast as well. But the explanation depends on two questionable assumptions. First, 
                                                          
37 Blair (1995). 
38 One possible objection: It could be claimed that Pathos doesn’t really understand his judgment that “That is bad” 
in the way that Norma understands it, and thus his judgment differs in content from Norma’s. But, the objection 
goes, if Pathos’s propositional attitude really did have the same content as Norma’s, then the phenomenal 
contrast would disappear. Although I cannot rule out this possible explanation, without some positive independent 
reason to think that Pathos’s judgment can’t share the same content as Norma’s, it seems to be special pleading 
on the part of the opponent of MP. We could stipulate that Pathos can track badness (at the level of belief) as 
reliably as Norma, albeit through rule application, thus avoiding this possible explanation. So although this is a 
possible explanation for the phenomenal contrast, it doesn’t seem to be the one that most straightforwardly 
explains the data.  
Alternatively, it could be that Pathos and Norma’s cognitive phenomenology differs, though their contents are the 
same. But then we would need some further explanation for this fact.  
39 I thank David Sobel and Aaron Elliott for pressing me on this point. 
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as above, Pathos very well could desire that the cat’s suffering end. Perhaps he has been 
trained up to believe that he will be paid $500 every time he stops a cat from suffering. 
He then could have a strong desire to stop the cat’s suffering, just as Norma does. But 
it’s implausible to think that this would make the phenomenal contrast disappear. 
 It could be objected that in the case as just described, Norma and Pathos do not 
share the same desire. Norma desires that the cat stop suffering as an end whereas 
Pathos only desires it as a means. They are motivated by different goals, so their desires 
must differ in content. But rather than getting bogged down here, I turn to the second 
questionable assumption of the current alternative explanation. This alternative 
explanation assumes that Norma has a desire that Pathos does not, namely the desire 
that the cat’s suffering end. However, Norma need not have this desire. Suppose that 
Norma knows that these kids lit the cat on fire for a reason—there is an evil mastermind 
just out of sight who will shoot the children if the cat is not burned alive. Norma is 
confident that there is no open possibility in which both the cat and the children are 
able to live. As a result, Norma most certainly does not desire that the cat’s suffering 
end, because this would lead to the children’s deaths.  Yet we would expect the 
phenomenal contrast to remain.  
Perhaps the defender of this alternative explanation would argue that Norma 
does have a desire that Pathos does not have, but that it is more fine-grained than I have 
been assuming.  Maybe she has a desire that the cat not have to suffer in order to save 
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the children. And this may very well be a desire that Pathos does not have. I agree that 
Norma may very well have this desire, and that Pathos probably lacks it. However, 
recall that the challenge here isn’t just to find some relevant difference between Norma 
and Pathos’s desires, but to find one that more plausibly explains the phenomenal 
contrast than MP. And it seems implausible that this desire could plausibly explain 
differences between SCRs, heart rate, startle responses, etc. between Norma and Pathos 
better than MP. It is more likely that the fine grained desires that Norma has that Pathos 
does not are cognitively downstream from the immediate phenomenology of their 
respective experiences. 
A third possible difference is in the intuitions that Norma and Pathos have. 
Plausibly, Norma has the intuition that “That is bad”, while Pathos does not. If 
intuitions are distinct from other representational states such as beliefs and perceptions, 
we have another possible explanation for the contrast. And on at least one 
understanding of “cognitive”, intuitions will count as cognitive phenomenology since 
they are propositionally structured, unlike experiences.40 Unfortunately, in order to 
settle the plausibility of this explanation, we would need to settle the extremely 
contentious debate about the nature of intuitions. Instead of attempting that daunting 
task, let me just briefly canvas a few of the answers on offer and consider how they 
                                                          
40 Whether or not intuitions count as “cognitive” is not of present importance. If the reader does not prefer this 
terminology, she can just consider this as a wholly distinct alternative explanation to MP.  
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would fare as potential explanations of the phenomenal contrast in the case of Pathos 
and Norma.41 
On one view, intuitions are just beliefs.42 If this is the correct view of intuitions, 
then this alternative explanation of the contrast just collapses into the belief explanation 
that I have argued is unsatisfactory above. On a second view, intuitions are not beliefs, 
but are dispositions to believe.43 If this is the correct view of intuitions, then intuitions 
will not provide an adequate explanation of the contrast either. To see why, consider 
again the possibility that Pathos has been taught that lighting cats on fire is bad. Then 
he will be disposed to form the belief that “That is bad” when he witnesses the burning 
cat, just as Norma will. So they both share the disposition in question. But as noted 
above, it is implausible to expect the relevant phenomenological contrast to go away 
just because Pathos has been taught to apply a general rule. 
The last account of intuitions I’ll consider is the view that intuitions are sui 
generis representational states.44 According to this view, intuitions are the mental states 
commonly picked out by “seems” language. Since intuitions are sui generis states, it is 
difficult to provide an in depth account of their nature, other than to give examples to 
                                                          
41 On a fourth kind of view defended by Sabine Roeser (2011), ethical intuitions are perceptual emotional states. I 
hope it is clear enough that such a view is committed to something like MP, and so does not present an alternative 
to the view defended in this paper.  
42 Lycan (1988, 154-166), Swinburne (2001, 141-142).  
43 Sosa (2007, Ch.3), Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009). Rogers and Matheson (2011), Werner (forthcoming).  
44 Huemer (2001, 2007), Cullison (2010b), Tucker (2010), Chudnoff (2011). This view is associated with Phenomenal 
Conservatism in epistemology, the view that seemings (intuitions) can provide prima facie justification for beliefs.  
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pick out the phenomenon in question. Mathematical intuitions, linguistic intuitions, and 
metaphysical intuitions provide three such types of cases. If intuitions are sui generis 
representational states, then they may be a good candidate to explain the phenomenal 
contrast between Norma and Pathos. The idea would be that it non-perceptually seems 
to Norma that the cat burning is bad, but it does not seem this way to Pathos.45 Norma 
has an intuition that Pathos does not, and this is why their experiences differ.  
There are at least two things to say to this alternative explanation. For one thing, 
it will only serve as a possible alternative explanation to those who accept the account 
of intuitions as a sui generis representational state.46 This doesn’t render this alternative 
explanation a non-starter, but it does give some reason to search for a more ecumenical 
explanation of the contrast, if possible. Second, I see no reason to favor this explanation 
over MP. Note that such an appeal to a priori intuition to explain non-moral but 
otherwise similar contrast cases would be implausible. We don’t think, for example, 
that a priori intuition could explain the contrast between the person who can distinguish 
pines from firs and the person who cannot. So there is some extra burden on those who 
would favor this explanation to explain how the moral case is importantly different 
from the non-moral case.47 Furthermore, for anyone who rejects or is agnostic about the 
                                                          
45 This scenario is still possible if Pathos believes that the cat burning is bad, since we can believe things even 
despite seemings to the contrary. For example, in the Muller-Lyer illusion, one line continues to seem longer even 
though I believe that it is not.  
46 To lay my cards on the table, I don’t accept the sui generis view of intuitions.  
47 One potential difference: Intuitions are prima facie important for moral theorizing, but not for pine tree 
theorizing. Fully addressing this possible difference would require much more than I can say here about moral 
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sui generis view of a priori intuition, MP serves as a more ecumenical and more 
explanatorily simple explanation. I don’t mean to claim that these burdens cannot be 
met. I concede that, without a more fully fleshed out picture of this alternative, we can’t 
fully assess the prospects of the a priori intuition route for explaining the case of Norma 
and Pathos.48 I only mean to stress that more work would need to be done to render this 
alternative explanation as a real contender.  
4.3. A Difference in Non-Moral Properties Represented? 
 The third alternative explanation acknowledges that the phenomenal contrast 
between Pathos and Norma is due to a difference in which properties are perceived. 
However, according to this explanation, the different properties perceived are not 
(explicitly) moral properties. On this approach, Norma and Pathos directly perceive 
different properties, but not different moral properties (since neither of them perceives 
any moral properties at all). The challenge of this approach is to pinpoint a candidate 
non-moral property to explain the phenomenal contrast. To see why this challenge is a 
serious one, consider one candidate high-level (non-moral) property, being-a-cat-in-pain. 
                                                          
epistemology and moral methodology. I do not think that the use of intuitions in moral theorizing, once properly 
understood, supports the appeal to intuition to explain the contrast in question, because I believe that a priori 
intuition cannot provide epistemic access to the moral properties. However, defending that claim is outside of the 
scope of this paper. My positive claim in the text is only that there is an extra burden to be met by the would-be a 
priori intuitionist in order for their alternative to be properly assessed. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing 
me on this issue.   
48 Just to be clear, MP is compatible with a priori intuition as a source of moral knowledge—it is only incompatible 
with a view that says that a priori intuition is the only source of moral knowledge. For all that MP says, a priori 
intuitions may be the source of the vast majority of moral knowledge (though presumably this would be unlikely if 
MP is true). So the skepticism expressed in the text is only skepticism about a priori intuitions explaining Norma’s 
particular instance of forming a moral belief.  
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Here is how the third alternative explanation could be cashed out with being-a-cat-in-
pain as the candidate property: When Norma rounds the corner, she directly perceives 
the property of being-a-cat-in-pain. From this perception in addition to other background 
beliefs, Norma infers (perhaps unconsciously) that the property of badness is present in 
the state-of-affairs in front of her. On the other hand, when Pathos rounds the corner, he 
fails to directly perceive the property of being-a-cat-in-pain. He lacks the recognitional 
capacity to directly perceive that property. Thus, the contents of Pathos’s experience are 
different from those of Norma’s, which also explains why Pathos can’t infer, at least not 
in the same spontaneous way, that the state-of-affairs in front of him is bad. What is 
most important is that the phenomenal contrast is a result of Pathos’s failure (and 
Norma’s success) at directly perceiving the (non-moral) property of being-a-cat-in-pain.49  
 The problem with this explanation is that there is no reason to suppose that 
Pathos fails to perceive the property of being-a-cat-in-pain if we already suppose that 
Norma does. And this is what would be required to generate a phenomenal contrast. As 
noted above, EEDIs are not impaired in their ability to perceive the pain or suffering of 
others.50 Nor are they impaired in their ability to perceive any other non-moral 
properties. Since EEDIs are not impaired in their ability to perceive most non-moral 
                                                          
49 Note that this is compatible with Pathos’s having the concept of cats’ being in pain. Pathos may be able to infer, 
based on directly perceiving other low-level properties, that being-a-cat-in-pain is being instantiated in front of 
him. And he may even be able to infer from that that badness is instantiated in front of him. However, the 
important difference for the topic at hand is in the properties directly perceived.  
50 Richell et. Al. (2003), Blair et. Al.(1996).  
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properties, the explanation given with respect to being-a-cat-in-pain will extend to other 
alternative explanations of this third sort.  
4.4. A Difference in Representations of Internal States? 
 According to the fourth alternative explanation, Norma’s differing 
phenomenology may be explained by appeal to a representational state about herself. 
She may be representing herself as, for example being in pain or distress as a result of 
her affective empathy from witnessing the cat’s suffering. On this alternative 
explanation, Norma and Pathos’s phenomenal contrast is explained purely by a 
difference in their internal mental states—Norma is in distress (or some similar state) 
and represents herself as such, and Pathos is not in distress (because he lacks affective 
empathy toward the burning cat). No appeal to a difference in their perception of 
properties “out there”, in the world, is necessary. We only need to appeal to Norma’s 
representation of changes within her own bodily states (increased heart rate, SCR, etc.).  
 To see one way in which this response might fail, consider another kind of 
emotional response, fear. Suppose I am hiking and I notice a snake near my feet. This 
invokes a strong fear response with an associated powerful phenomenological 
character. I freeze in fear—an appropriate response, since with patience the snake will 
become disinterested and move away. Furthermore, suppose that this fear response and 
its associated phenomenological character are more generally causally correlated with 
danger in my local environment, and that the responses in part invoked by states with 
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this phenomenological character tend to appropriately respond to that danger. A 
natural question arises—does the phenomenological state associated with fear represent 
danger, (or perhaps more specifically, dangerous-to-me)? Or does it merely represent an 
internal state, being-afraid? Perceptual and cognitivist theorists of emotions have 
compellingly argued that the feeling of fear is capable of representing danger, where this 
is construed as a relation between an object (such as a bee or a snake) and a subject. In 
brief, this is because the feeling of fear (a) meets all of the appropriate 
(Dretske/Millikanian) externalist conditions on representation, (b) is capable of having 
an intentional object, and (c) disposes us to react in ways appropriate to the danger in 
our local environment (e.g. my freezing when a bee lands on my arm). This perceptual 
theory of emotions can also be extended to many if not all other emotions with equal 
plausibility.51  
 Of course we could reject perceptual and cognitivist theories of emotion, and I 
don’t expect to have convinced anyone with what I have said or will say here. However, 
as noted above, it is widely agreed that emotions can be directed at objects, and most 
philosophers of emotion accept the possibility of some kind of external world 
representation in emotional states.52 We would need some independent reason for 
rejecting such theories, or at least the representational nature of emotions that these 
                                                          
51 For a defense of a perceptual theory of emotions, see Prinz (2004), especially pp.67-78. For a defense of a 
(similar in broad outlines) cognitivist theory, see Nussbaum (2001). See also de Sousa (2013).  
52 See de Sousa (2010).  
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theories entail. Though I can’t defend perceptual or cognitivist theories here, I will say 
that I don’t think such reasons are forthcoming.  
The last two paragraphs have explained the contrast in terms friendly to the 
Affectual Intuitionist, according to which emotional experiences are a subset of 
perceptual experiences. But suppose that the perceptual theory of emotions is false. It 
still could turn out that emotional states, such as Norma’s distress, cognitively penetrate 
her visual processing and thus affect her visual experience. Furthermore, these changes 
in her visual experience as a result of this cognitive penetration may very well 
themselves meet conditions (a)-(c) canvassed above. So even if the perceptual theory of 
emotions is false, we still have a more holistic potential explanation of the differences 
between Norma and Pathos’s experiences which can make more sense of the role of 
these experiences and their function in each of the individuals’ broader cognitive set up. 
This is the way in which, as mentioned above, Perceptual Intuitionism is compatible with 
the role of emotion in this contrast case.   
 Whether or not the perceptual theory of emotions is correct, the aspect of 
Norma’s phenomenal character that Pathos lacks meets analogous conditions with 
respect to badness that my feeling of fear meets with respect to dangerous. Though 
Norma’s phenomenal character tracks some change in her internal state, it also tracks a 
property in her external environment. And, plausibly, this phenomenal character 
disposes her to act appropriately in response—she may try to put out the cat, for 
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example. Her feeling of distress either represents badness in her local environment in the 
same way that my feeling of fear represents danger in mine, or it causally influences 
visual processing to represent badness in her local environment. If the explanation works 
in the latter case, there seems to be no reason not to extend it to the former.53 Of course, 
if Norma’s phenomenal character does not track badness in her local environment, then 
all bets are off. But again, we are assuming non-skeptical realism, and we are assuming 
that Norma generally does a decent job at picking out badness in her local environment. 
So it appears that this fourth alternative explanation, while plausible, also does not 
provide the best explanation for the phenomenal contrast.  
5. Conclusion 
The idea that we directly perceive at least some moral properties is one worth 
taking seriously. It could provide an alternative, or at least a supplementation of, 
current intuition-based moral epistemologies. In this paper, I have used a contrast 
argument, commonly used in the philosophy of perception, to provide an inference to 
the best explanation in favor of MP, the thesis that at least some moral properties can be 
part of the contents of experience. My arguments have concerned one particular moral 
property, badness. I don’t take myself to have established that all moral properties can 
be part of the contents of experience. Since contrast arguments must proceed on a case by 
                                                          
53 Robert Cowan (2013a) argues that emotional experiences must be epistemically dependent since they “are, or 
ought to be, responsive to reasons” (12). He is also worried (as are many philosophers of perception) about 
problems with cognitive penetration. (He develops the former of these concern in more detail in 2013b.) I cannot 
address these concerns here, though they are certainly legitimate worries.  
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case basis, this is an open question. However, since MP is an existential claim, if the 
contrast argument for badness given above is successful, then MP is true. Nevertheless, I 
think some reflection will show that badness is not unique and that similar contrast 
arguments could be constructed with respect to many moral properties, though perhaps 
not all. I leave this exercise for future research.  In sum, I think we have some positive 
reason to believe that MP is true, and thus that the direct perception of moral properties 
is not just possible, but actual. 
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Chapter 5 
A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and the Problem of Cognitive Penetrability 
 
 According to a posteriori ethical intuitionism (AEI), perceptual experiences can 
provide non-inferential justification for at least some moral beliefs. Teasing this apart a 
bit, AEI consists of two important epistemological claims. The first claim is that the 
structure of moral justification is—in at least many cases—foundationalist. Beliefs 
formed on the basis of evaluative experiences are at least prima facie justified 
independently of any other beliefs. The second aspect of AEI is that the justificatory 
force of these foundationalist beliefs comes from perceptual experience, rather than 
from some traditionally a priori cognitive apparatus. Moral epistemology, for the 
defender of AEI, is less like the epistemology of math and more like the epistemology of 
tables and chairs.  
 AEI, while still a minority position, has made something of a resurgence in recent 
years.1 But its unpopularity is not without reason: Many serious objections have been 
leveled against it, both historically and recently.2 Perhaps the most common objection is 
that it is implausible that evaluative properties could figure in the contents of 
experience, as AEI seems to entail.3  However, even supposing that rejoinders to this 
objection have been successful, what seems to be an equally pressing issue lurks right 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Cullison (2010), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Roeser (2011), Audi (2010, 2013), and Cowan (2013a, 2013b) 
2 See, e.g. Strugeon (2002), Huemer (2008, especially 4.4), Cullison (2010), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), and Faraci 
(ms).   
3 Värynen (2008, forthcoming), Huemer (2008, 4.4). Defenses of the claim that evaluative properties can figure in 
the contents of experience can be found in McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Roeser (2011), and Werner (forthcoming).   
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around the corner. The worry is that even if evaluative properties could figure in the 
contents of experience, they would only be able to do so if prior cognitive states 
influence perceptual experience.4 Such cognitive penetration in moral perception would 
arguably undermine the foundationalist credentials of beliefs formed on the basis of 
those perceptual states. Even granting that evaluative properties can figure in the 
contents of experience, cognitive penetration provides a serious threat to the 
foundationalist aspect of AEI.  
 In this chapter, I defend AEI against the above objection. Rather than deny that 
cognitive penetration exists, I argue that some types of cognitive penetrability are 
actually compatible with the AEI’s foundationalist structure. I claim that once we notice 
that cognitive penetration can take distinct forms, we can see that the force of the 
objection depends on how—if at all—cognitive states affect evaluative perceptual 
experience. The kind of cognitive penetrability required for the objection to go through 
is much more specific than its proponents assume. This means that, despite appearances 
to the contrary, it is proponents of the objection—rather than proponents of AEI—that 
are compelled to go out on an empirical limb. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin in section 1 by briefly canvassing 
the minimal commitments for the proponent of AEI. In section 2, I explicate in detail 
                                                          
4 This objection is pressed most forcefully by Cowan (2013b, forthcoming) and Väyrynen (forthcoming). A closely 
related objection is given by Faraci (ms).  
119
 
 
both what cognitive penetration is, as well as how its existence is supposed to cast 
doubt on AEI.  I illustrate the strongest form of the objection by giving what I call the 
Epistemic Dependency Argument (EDA). In section 3, I distinguish justificatory questions 
from what I call genetic questions, pointing out that a belief’s epistemic dependency 
hinges on answers to the former but not the latter sorts of questions. In section 4, I 
distinguish synchronic and diachronic cognitive penetration, two importantly distinct 
ways that cognitive states can influence perceptual experiences.5 In section 5.1, I use 
distinctions drawn in sections 3 and 4 to illustrate that diachronic cognitive penetration 
is actually compatible with epistemic independence. If correct, this means that some 
perceptual experiences can foundationally justify moral beliefs despite being 
cognitively penetrated. Finally, in section 5.2, I examine what all of the above means for 
AEI, and propose a tentative model of foundational moral justification for the 
proponent of AEI by analogy to cases of perceptual expertise and their cognitive 
structure. I conclude in section 6 with some thoughts about where AEI stands with 
respect to the epistemological concerns that arise from cognitive penetration.6  
1. A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism 
 As I understand it, AEI consists in two substantive claims. First, AEI is a version 
of Ethical Intuitionism: 
                                                          
5 I don’t mean to be taking a stand here on whether these types of cognitive penetration are natural psychological 
kinds, or about whether they could be divided into further subcategories.  
6 This is all assuming that the philosophical arguments in defense of AEI are successful, which is, of course, very 
controversial.  
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EI: “[N]ormal ethical agents have at least some non-inferentially justified first-
order ethical beliefs.”7  
 
As stated, EI is just the claim that foundationalism—understood in the epistemologist’s 
sense—is true of the structure of ethical beliefs, and that some ethical beliefs are 
members of the set of foundational beliefs.8 However, EI does not entail what we might 
call Classical Intuitionism, the claim that the non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs are 
grounded in intuitions, whatever those turn out to be.9 EI has its unfortunately 
misleading name presumably because most defenders of EI have also been defenders of 
Classical Intuitionism.10 I continue to label EI as such in order to accord with what has 
now become standard usage in the literature. 
The second claim that constitutes AEI is Ethical Empiricism: 
EE: The justificatory force of non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs 
is grounded in the instantiation of evaluative properties in some kind of 
perceptual experience.  
 
According to EE, non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs are justified analogously to 
non-moral perceptual justification, on one sort of traditional foundationalist view. The 
basic picture is as follows. Under certain circumstances, evaluative properties figure in 
the contents of perceptual experience. Furthermore, at least sometimes, the evaluative 
                                                          
7 Cowan (2013b), 2.  
8 A foundationalist who rejected EI may claim that the structure of moral belief justification is foundationalist, but 
that the justification of moral beliefs is always mediated by some foundational non-moral beliefs. Something like 
this is the view defended by Setiya (2013). Note that such a view may also have problems with cognitive 
penetration insofar as the non-moral perceptual states which justify moral beliefs may themselves be cognitively 
penetrated in a way incompatible with foundational justification.  
9 As Cowan (2013b, 2n2) himself notes.  
10 See, e.g., Ross (1939), Audi (2004), Roeser (2011), and Tropman (2011, 2014). 
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properties that figure in the contents of perceptual experience are capable of providing 
non-inferential justification for beliefs about the instantiation of evaluative properties. 
This is compatible with the claim that sometimes evaluative perceptual experiences fail 
to non-inferentially justify. First, there may be defeaters for the justification that an 
evaluative perceptual experience would otherwise provide. Second, some evaluative 
perceptual experiences may be epistemically dependent in the sense that they can’t 
provide justificatory force independently of some prior evaluative belief. AEI only 
claims that, in at least some circumstances, neither of these things holds. When they do 
not, an evaluative perceptual experience can ground a non-inferentially justified moral 
belief.11  
 AEI is not a single view but a family of views. I briefly note two recently 
discussed versions of AEI. According to Perceptual Intuitionism, evaluative properties 
are perceived in the same way that any non-moral but otherwise high-level properties12 
are perceived. For example, the Perceptual Intuitionist may contend that the property 
goodness is capable of triggering a recognitional disposition within the visual processing 
                                                          
11 Of course, a view that held that one or both of these conditions holds for almost all instances of moral 
perception, while being compatible with the letter of AEI, would go against the spirit of the view. I take it that the 
advocate of AEI is attempting to provide a moral epistemology which entails that human believers can have 
justified moral beliefs in at least some every day circumstances, on pain of something nearing skepticism. (Thanks 
to Nicole Dular for pressing me to clarify this point.)  
12 High-level properties are generally thought to be any properties other than color, shape, or edge-based 
properties. Some examples include kind properties (tables, chairs), causal properties (X-caused-Y), and at least 
some relational properties (X is-taller-than- Y). It is difficult if not impossible to provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for what makes something a high-level property, but this issue is not important for purposes of this 
paper so I set it aside.  
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system.13 On the other hand, according to Affectual Intuitionism, evaluative properties 
are perceived via affective states, which are themselves construed as either a form of 
perception or as a submodule14 within a broader perceptual (as opposed to cognitive) 
system.15 AEI is also compatible with a number of views about the metaphysics of moral 
properties—though perhaps it fits with some views more easily than others. So long as 
one’s metaphysics of moral properties is such that they could figure in the contents of 
experience, one could in principle endorse AEI. Subjectivists,16 relativists,17 and both 
naturalist18 and non-naturalist19 realists have all endorsed some version of AEI. The 
arguments of this chapter, then, are of interest to a variety of otherwise theoretically 
disparate metaethicists.  
2. Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemic Dependency Argument  
2.1 Clarifying Cognitive Penetrability  
                                                          
13 Such a view seems to best fit with a reductionist conception of the evaluative properties. See Cullison (2010a).  
14 I mean “submodule” here in only the lose sense of being part of a structure in the brain, rather than the strict 
Fodorian sense entailing information encapsulation.  
15 Affectual Intuitionism (which is the view that I endorse) has both benefits and costs in comparison to Perceptual 
Intuitionism. The cost is that Affectual Intuitionism requires a commitment to perceptualism about affective states, 
which is a controversial position among philosophers of emotion. (For defenses, see Nussbaum (2001), Prinz 
(2006),  and Zagzebski (2003). For critical discussion, see Deonna & Teroni (2012, Ch.6).) Some potential benefits of 
Affectual Intuitionism (which I cannot defend here) are: (a) it is well-situated to explain the tight connection 
between moral judgments and emotions, (b) it seems better placed than Perceptual Intuitionism to explain the felt 
normativity of evaluative perception, and (c) because affective states arguably have a dual direction-of-fit, it 
provides a way of rejecting Humeanism about motivation. 
16 Prinz (2011), Zagzebski (2004) (Though notably her subjectivism is tied to affective responses of God.)  
17 Nichols (2004).  
18 Cullison (2010a), and on one reading, Deonna & Teroni (2012). 
19 Huemer (2005), Roeser (2011). 
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Jill believes that Jack is angry. This belief causally impacts Jill’s experience such 
that she experiences Jack’s face as expressing anger. If she hadn’t believed that Jack was 
angry, she wouldn’t have experienced his face as angry.20 Jill’s experience is cognitively 
penetrated. What’s important here is not just that the belief affects Jill’s interpretation of 
her visual experience; rather, in cognitive penetration, the character of the experience 
itself is altered by a prior cognitive state. Presumably, no one would deny that prior 
beliefs can affect how we interpret experiences. The thesis of cognitive penetration is a 
more contentious claim about the character of perceptual experience itself.  
 It will help to more precisely pin down what it takes for a given experience to 
count as cognitively penetrated. As Susanna Siegel has argued, different conceptions of 
cognitive penetration will be useful for different projects.21 The present concern is 
epistemological, more precisely with foundational beliefs. So an understanding of 
cognitive penetration which is relevant to the foundational status of beliefs formed on 
the basis of experience will be most useful. 
A simple counterfactual condition—if S hadn’t had the cognitive state c, then she 
wouldn’t have had the experience e—won’t suffice. Cognitive states can alter our 
behavior, including our local environment and what we attend to, which will in turn 
alter what experience we have. For example, my wanting to see what is in my 
                                                          
20 This case is originally from Siegel (2012), 202.  
21 Siegel (forthcoming). See also Stokes (forthcoming).  
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refrigerator (in part) causes me to open my refrigerator and experience its contents. 
Cognitive states that affect our experiences in this way meet the simple counterfactual 
condition sketched above. Nonetheless, such cases are intuitively not of a kind with 
cases like Jill and Jack. The phenomenon of cognitive penetration is best construed—at 
least for present purposes—as a causal relationship between pieces of mental 
architecture. 
In light of this problem with the simple counterfactual condition, cognitive 
penetration is better defined in terms of an internal causal dependency of some 
experience e and a cognitive state c, where “internal” indicates that the dependency in 
question is all “inside the head”.22 A test developed from Fiona Macpherson captures 
this rough idea: 
(CP) A perceptual experience e is penetrated by some cognitive state(s) c iff  
it is not possible for a subject who lacks c to have a different experience e* when 
the nature of the proximal stimulus on the sensory organ, the state of the sensory 
organ, and the location of attentional focus of the subject is held fixed.23 
 
(CP) doesn’t provide us with a neurophysiological understanding of cognitive 
penetration. Nor does it build in the idea of informational encapsulation, an idea that is 
commonly thought to be of importance for understanding the full range of 
philosophical upshots of cognitive penetration. Despite these weaknesses, it does 
provide us with a test which seems to get the cases right, and is plausibly connected to 
                                                          
22 Wu (2013, Section 5) is helpful on this point, though he rejects Macpherson’s test.  
23 This test is a loose adaptation of a principle found in Macpherson (2012), 29.  
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those features. For example, if different subjects can have different experiences despite 
all other sensory features held fixed, this suggests that there is some present or 
historical information flow between cognitive states and the perceptual system. Rather 
than getting too bogged down in these issues, I will understand cognitive penetration in 
what follows in terms of (CP), while acknowledging that a more precise notion will be  
theoretically required in the long run.  
 The case of Jack and Jill involved the cognitive penetrability of vision. Affective 
experience can also be subject to cognitive penetration. Jona Vance provides an 
example:  
Whistle Fear. Winnie believes that her family is out of the house late at night and 
if someone else is in the house, they’re an intruder. Winnie then hears someone 
whistle close behind her. Her background belief that if someone else is in the house, 
they’re an intruder (together with the auditory stimuli as of the whistle) plays a 
role in causing her to feel fear. If she lacked the belief, she would not feel fear in 
response to those stimuli.24 
 
It is widely believed that some affectual experiences, e.g. the experience of fear, can 
justify beliefs, e.g. that danger is present. If the cognitive penetrability of visual 
experience has any consequences for the epistemological role of those experiences, it is 
plausible that similar consequences also hold for affective experiences. Both perceptual 
and affectual intuitionists should be concerned by the potential epistemological 
challenges that arise from the existence of cognitive penetration.  
                                                          
24 Vance (2014), pp.270-271. 
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2.2 The Epistemic Dependency Argument  
 The proponent of AEI claims that perceptual experiences (broadly conceived as 
to include affective experiences25) can at least sometimes provide justification for moral 
beliefs. Furthermore, these moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified insofar as they 
are justified independently of any other beliefs. The non-inferential nature of this 
justification is crucial, since without it the proponent of AEI would require some other 
source for foundational moral beliefs, and no other non-a priori route seems available. 
So for AEI to be tenable as a position in moral epistemology, some of our moral beliefs 
must meet the condition that Robert Cowan calls “epistemic independence”: 
 Epistemic Independence (EI): A justified belief b is epistemically independent iff 
there is no cognitive state d such that b’s justification depends, directly or 
indirectly, on d’s epistemic status.26 
 
A belief which depends for its justification on a perceptual experience of a certain sort 
will count as epistemically independent so long as the perceptual experience alone is 
enough to do the justificatory work. A belief b is epistemically dependent, then, when 
there is some cognitive state(s), d, that b’s justification depends on. Suppose, for 
example, that I have a justified belief that I don’t have both almond milk and soy milk 
in my refrigerator. I open my fridge and have the perceptual experience as of there 
                                                          
25 Unless otherwise indicated, I intend “perceptual experience” in this broader way, encompassing affective 
experiences as well.  
26 I take this conception of epistemic independence from Cowan (2013a), 10—though of course epistemic 
independence is a pervasive notion in foundationalist epistemology. My formulation of EI is different from 
Cowan’s, but I believe it captures the same idea.  
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being a carton of soy milk. As a result, I form the justified belief that I have no almond 
milk in my refrigerator. Although the justification for my belief is partially grounded in 
my experience of the soy milk in my fridge, it is also partially grounded in my belief 
that I don’t have both almond milk and soy milk. In this way, my belief is epistemically 
dependent.  
 The case of epistemic dependency just given is uncontroversial. But what should 
be concerning to proponents of AEI (as well as perhaps foundationalists generally) is 
that there are seemingly epistemically analogous cases involving cognitive penetration. 
The justification for Jill’s belief that Jack has an angry expression on his face is grounded 
in her experience of Jack as having an angry expression on his face. But her experience 
of Jack’s having an angry expression on his face is causally dependent on her prior 
belief that Jack is angry. So it seems that her experience’s justification conferring 
status—if any—is in turn grounded in the justification she has for her prior belief that 
Jack is angry. So her belief that Jack has an angry expression on his face is epistemically 
dependent, and so not foundational. 
 Suppose the reasoning of the previous paragraph is correct. Further, suppose 
that all or almost all of our perceptual experiences of evaluative properties are a result 
of cognitive penetration. Then it would seem that all or almost all of the beliefs we 
formed on the basis of those experiences would be epistemically dependent in the same 
way that Jill’s belief that Jack has an angry look would be. This would cast serious doubt 
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on AEI, since AEI entails that there is some non-trivial set of justified moral beliefs 
which are epistemically independent. Without a set of epistemically independent 
justified moral beliefs, AEI loses its foundationalist credentials. 
It will be helpful to formulate this argument somewhat more formally. Take 
some moral property M which is part of the contents of some perceptual experience E:  
(1) If M’s instantiation in E is causally dependent on the penetration of some 
prior cognitive state(s) S, then any moral belief B which is based on E is 
epistemically dependent in the sense that B is justified (if at all) partially in virtue 
of S.  
(2) All moral content in perceptual or affective experience is causally dependent 
on the penetration of prior cognitive states. 
(3) So M’s instantiation in E is causally dependent on the penetration of some 
prior cognitive state(s) S. (From 2, Existential Instantiation)  
(4) So any moral belief B which is based on E is epistemically dependent in the 
sense that B is justified (if at all) partially in virtue of S. (1, 3 MP) 
(5) But this reasoning extends to any moral property which figures in perceptual 
or affective experience.  
Therefore, 
(Con) AEI is false.  
 
We can call this the epistemic dependency argument, or EDA.  
 What should the proponent of a posteriori ethical intuitionism say about EDA? 
(1) looks  
plausible, considering the Jack and Jill case discussed above. As (2) is not an 
epistemological claim, but a causal one (with epistemological consequences), its status 
is primarily an empirical question.27 Furthermore, it is an empirical question that is far 
                                                          
27 (2) is not a wholly empirical question, since questions about how mental states get their contents are at least 
partially philosophical. But I set this aside for the purposes of this paper.  
129
 
 
from settled.28 This makes (2) a natural place to put pressure on EDA. But while the 
pervasiveness of cognitive penetration—both with respect to morally loaded cognitive 
states as well as others—is not yet established, pointing this out is a non-ideal response 
on behalf of AEI. (2) remains a serious empirical possibility, so by rejecting EDA on 
these grounds, the defender of AEI is making herself hostage to empirical fortune. 
However, the rest of the argument follows logically from the first two premises. So if (2) 
remains safe from empirical refutation, the argument looks initially to be very powerful.  
While research which impinges on the truth of (2) is certainly relevant to AEI, a 
better response to the argument would involve providing some positive reason to 
doubt one of the premises, rather than just providing reasons to remain agnostic. In 
what follows, I argue that, even granting (2), EDA as given still fails, because (1) is not 
true. That is, I will argue that not all prior causal dependence of a perceptual experience 
on a cognitive state thereby renders it epistemically dependent. While this move from 
causal dependence to epistemic dependence is easy and intuitive to make, once we 
make explicit the difference between a perceptual experience’s justification conferring 
status and the historical explanation for its justification conferring status (what I call its 
genetic explanation), a case can be made that some cognitive penetration is compatible 
with epistemic independence.  
                                                          
28 The most well-known argument against the cognitive penetrability of perceptual states is Pylyshyn (1999). 
Raftopoulos (2009) also argues against penetrability. Arguments in favor generally focus on just one or two 
candidate instances of penetration, e.g. Macpherson (2012), Wu (2013). For an excellent and current overview of 
the evidence in favor, see Vetter & Newen (2014).    
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3. Epistemic Dependence and the Justification/Genetic Explanation Distinction 
 What does it take for a given mental process to have prima facie justification 
conferring status? This is one of the deepest questions of contemporary analytic 
epistemology, and I certainly don’t propose to answer it here. The answer may appeal 
to facts about the reliability of the outputs of the process,29 the phenomenology of the 
process or its outputs,30 the relationship (e.g. counterfactual) between the outputs of a 
process and the facts,31 or some combination of these three or other features. Let’s call F 
the set of features, whatever they turn out to be, that a mental process or its outputs 
must have in order for it to have prima facie justification conferring status. 
 Having F alone will not always be sufficient for the outputs of an otherwise 
justification conferring process to have justificatory force.32 This is because some mental 
processes themselves take as their input the outputs of other mental processes. Suppose 
I infer from my belief that P and my belief that if P then Q that Q. There is nothing 
wrong with the mental process of modus ponens.33 But my belief that Q may still fail to be 
justified, since the beliefs that fed into the process of modus ponens may themselves be 
                                                          
29 See Goldman (1979, 2008).  
30 Huemer (2001), Tucker (2010).  
31 Nozick (1981), Sosa (1999).  
32 For brevity, I from here on out drop “prima facie” from my claims about justification-conferring states. Unless 
indicated otherwise, I don’t assume that the outputs of a mental process are more than prima facie justification-
conferring. 
33 I use modus ponens as a mental process for simplicity (and relative theory-neutrality about F), not because I 
endorse any particular view of mental process individuation. I remain agnostic about whether modus ponens 
counts as a mental process, an instance of some broader mental process, or not a joint-carving mental process at 
all.  
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unjustified. Generalizing a point originally made by reliabilists,34 some processes only 
generate justificatory force conditional on the justificatory force of their inputs. Garbage 
in, garbage out, as the cliché goes.  
 When we are asking about how a particular belief is justified, we are looking for 
an explanation in terms of how the belief was the output of some process or chain of 
processes which all have feature(s) F.35 However, this need not be the end of inquiry. 
The epistemologist may be interested in a further question, about how these mental 
processes came to have F in the first place. Our epistemologist could here be asking two 
questions. First, she could be asking why it is that feature(s) F (rather than G, H, or J) are 
the necessary conditions on a process’s being justification conferring. This is a close 
relative of the question that I set aside at the beginning of this section, about what 
features F are. I mention it again here only to disambiguate from the other question our 
epistemologist may be asking. The second kind of question the epistemologist could be 
asking is distinctly causal. That is, she wants to know how these particular mental 
processes came to have F: Was it through some evolutionary selection? Social 
conditioning? Taking a logic course? Call this question the Genetic Question, or GQ. 
 GQ is an intrinsically interesting (and largely empirical) epistemological 
question. Potential answers to the question can also be important for first-order 
                                                          
34 Goldman (1979).  
35 I am assuming throughout this discussion that some version of foundationalism is correct. I am also setting aside 
complications about defeaters which may undercut the prima facie justification-conferring status of one or more 
of the processes or their outputs.  
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questions of justification as well, because the causal history of a given mental process 
may debunk that process as unreliable, or as reliable but in a lucky way such that its 
justification conferring status is undermined.36 But so long as the explanation of a 
process’s reliability is not debunking in this way, it will not figure in the explanation of 
the first order justificatory story about a belief formed as a result of that process.  
To illustrate this, consider an example of the belief that that object is green formed 
on the basis of a (non-cognitively penetrated) visual experience. At the very least, the 
explanation of this belief’s justification will appeal to its being based in the visual 
experience, along with the experience’s character.37 The explanation may also include 
the fact that visual experience (in this agent, in these circumstances, etc.) has feature(s) F 
(e.g. is a reliable process, has the proper justification conferring phenomenology, etc.).  
But what isn’t required to explain the justification of the belief that that object is green is 
the full causal history of the visual system of that agent or the evolutionary history of 
the visual system of the species of which the agent is a member. To demand such stories 
as part of the explanation of the justification of a first order belief is to confuse the 
question of a belief’s justification with genetic questions about the justification 
conferring process(es) that resulted in the belief. The explanation of first order 
                                                          
36 Such as, for example, if the reliability is not a result of epistemic access to the facts in question (see my “How to 
Understand the Access Requirement for Non-Naturalist Realism”).  
37 For the dogmatist or phenomenal conservative, this will likely be the complete explanation of the belief’s 
justification. See Huemer (2001), Tucker (2010). 
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justification bottoms out in the appeal to processes which have feature(s) F, whatever 
they turn out to be.  
I take this distinction to be relatively uncontroversial, at least to anti-skeptical 
foundationalists.38  But as I shall soon argue, it is only by conflating justification and 
genetic explanation that premise (1) the epistemic dependency argument gains its 
intuitive appeal. Once we assess premise (1) in light of this distinction, we can see that 
in order to be true it must be restricted. Once properly restricted, it becomes clear that 
some beliefs will retain their epistemic independence despite being formed on the basis 
of cognitively penetrated experiences. But first, we must distinguish four ways that 
cognitive penetration can take place.  
4. The Varieties of Cognitive Penetration 
 We can functionally carve up types of cognitive penetration along two different 
metrics, for a total of four types of cognitive penetration.39 First, we can distinguish 
between the cognitive penetration which involves representational states vs. cognitive 
penetration which involves non-representational, or orectic,40 states. The paradigmatic 
instances of these kinds of cognitive penetrability involve beliefs and desires, 
                                                          
38 Internalists should accept it on pain of denying that visual experiences can justify for anyone who doesn’t have 
access to how the visual system evolved (i.e. nearly everyone in history). Externalists should accept it, because a 
process’ ability to be reliable or track the truth is an intrinsic property of the process, rather than a historical one.  
39 Of course, we could differentiate types of cognitive penetration along lines other than functional, e.g. on 
neurophysiological grounds. However, for present purposes a functional division is the most helpful way to 
illustrate the epistemological implications of cognitive penetration.  
40 The idea (and terminology) of orectic cognitive penetrability is discussed in Stokes (2012).  
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respectively. I will set aside orectic penetration in what follows. The second important 
difference between cases of cognitive penetration is the difference between synchronic 
and diachronic cognitive penetration. Synchronic penetration occurs when the 
background cognitive state(s) influence the visual system as the visual processing takes 
place in generating a visual experience. In other words, the visual experience is causally 
dependent on the existence of the penetrating cognitive state(s) at t or immediately 
prior to t. In synchronic penetration, the cognitive states’ influence on the perceptual 
system is co-temporal with the visual processing itself. The case of Jill and Jack 
discussed above provides an example of synchronic belief penetration. On the other 
hand, in diachronic penetration, rather than being co-temporal, the influence of the 
cognitive states on the perceptual system takes place prior to the particular visual 
process that is subject to the influence. Research on the Müller-Lyer Illusion (figure 1) 
provides an interesting potential example of this. Segall et. al. (1963) illustrated that 
susceptibility to the illusion varies cross-culturally.41 However, it is unlikely that this 
variance is due to synchronic penetration, because the illusion doesn’t disappear (for 
those who experience it) after an agent knows that it is an illusion.  
                                                          
41 Much debate since the original study has arisen amongst psychologists about what explains the difference. See, 
e.g., Berry (1971), McCauley & Henrich (2006), Davis & Carlson (1970). On one recalcitrant view (see Ahluwalia 
1978), people who grew up in “carpenetered” environments (with many square cornered buildings) are more 
susceptible to the illusion than those who did not. Figure 1 is from 
http://www.rit.edu/cla/gssp400/muller/muller.html , which also contains an explanation of the illusion.  
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Figure 1 
One plausible interpretation of this phenomenon is that one’s susceptibility (or lack 
thereof) to the illusion is based on past experiences of patterns similar to the lines found 
in figure 1 usually favored a particular interpretation of such figures. This favoring led 
(presumably unconscious) cognitive processes to reshape the late visual processing 
system to tend toward the interpretation that has been correct in the past (for that 
agent).42 This “interpretation” all occurs in visual processing prior to visual experience, 
which is why the illusion can’t be easily overcome by, for example, shifting one’s 
attention.43  
  The Müller-Lyer case, and culturally relative visual illusions more generally, are 
helpful for illustrating how diachronic penetration may occur even while a visual 
experience is not synchronically penetrated. There are many other plausible instances of 
diachronic penetration. A relevant set of cases are those that involve perceptual 
                                                          
42 Cecchi (2014, 63) calls this “architectural cognitive penetration”, because this sort of cognitive penetration 
involves “modulating [the perceptual system’s] structure…[through] neural reorganization.” I choose not to use 
Cecchi’s term here, since, on his conception, some architectural cognitive penetration is synchronic.  
43 For an extended discussion of the relationship between diachronic cognitive penetration and the Müller-Lyer 
Illusion, see McCauley & Henrich (2006).  
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expertise, such as a musician who develops perfect pitch or a coffee connoisseur who 
develops her olfactory and gustatory discriminative abilities. Perceptual expertise 
arguably (though not uncontroversially44) alters perceptual experience, which suggests 
cognitive penetrability of some sort. The fact that perceptual expertise develops over 
some period of time suggests diachronic penetration as an explanation. However, an 
alternative interpretation of perceptual expertise alleges that perceptual expertise 
involves synchronic penetration. On this alternative, the explanation of the change in 
experience over time is that the perceptual expert develops her beliefs and knowledge 
about the phenomenon over time and that these changes in beliefs synchronically 
penetrate the perceptual expert’s experiences. I focused on the Müller-Lyer case above 
because I think it is one of the clearest cases of diachronic penetration, whereas in the 
perceptual expertise cases the synchronic penetration interpretation remains 
empirically plausible. But I mention the perceptual expertise case as well because it 
provides a helpful possible model of the relationship between an agent’s moral beliefs 
and her affective and perceptual moral experiences according to the proponent of AEI. I 
will return to this model below (Sect. 5.2).  
5. A Restricted Defense of AEI against the Epistemic Dependency Argument  
5.1. Synchronic and Diachronic Penetration: Test Cases 
Return to the epistemic dependency argument. Recall premise (1): 
                                                          
44 Those who deny cognitive penetrability altogether would deny that perceptual expertise is properly perceptual.  
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(1) If M’s instantiation in E is causally dependent on the penetration of some 
prior cognitive state(s) S, then any moral belief B which is based on E is 
epistemically dependent in the sense that B is justified (if at all) partially in virtue 
of S.  
 
The clearest case for (1) lies in instances of synchronic penetration. Return to Jill and 
Jack. Jill believes that Jack is angry. When she looks at Jack’s face, this belief causally 
influences her visual system as it is processing the visual information which will 
generate her experience of Jack’s face as having an angry expression. Information flows 
between Jill’s cognitive system and her visual perceptual system during the time in 
which the experience is formed. Her belief that Jack has an angry expression is 
grounded in her experience of Jack’s face as having an angry expression. But this 
particular experience’s character depends, at present, on her prior belief. So it seems to 
be epistemically dependent on her prior belief.  
 The case of Jill’s belief that Jack has an angry expression is not unique; the 
features of her case will plausibly generalize to all standard cases of synchronic 
penetration. By definition, synchronic penetration involves a cognitive state’s being 
directly relevant to a particular property’s representation in experience. This can be 
illustrated by considering the nature of the experience if the cognitive system were 
temporarily blocked from influencing the visual processing system. If this were the 
case, Jill’s visual experience of Jack’s face would have differed. This illustrates that the 
belief is epistemically dependent on Jill’s prior belief that Jack is angry. Of course, this 
isn’t to say that Jill’s belief that Jack has an angry look isn’t justified. Rather, it is to say 
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that if it is, it is justified partially in virtue of the justification-conferring status of her 
prior belief that Jack is angry. In sum, synchronic representational penetration is 
compatible with justified belief, but not with foundationally justified belief—as the 
proponents of EDA claim.  
 Next we can assess whether the same line of reasoning applies to diachronic 
penetration. To test this, return to the proposed explanation of different individuals’ 
susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion. According to one proposal, our susceptibility 
to the illusion depends greatly upon the architectural environment in which an 
individual developed.45 Consider Rebekah, who will be our exemplar stereotypical 
“Western” perceiver. Rebekah grew up in Generic, USA, an environment filled with 
pervasively straight lined, right angled architecture. In such an environment, visual 
inputs which are similar to those found in the Müller-Lyer illusion tend to represent 
straight lines which obey certain patterns. As one guide explains (from the perspective 
of a Western observer such as Rebekah):  
In the three-dimensional world, depth perception concerns judging distance. The 
closer an object is to the retina, the larger it is on the retina. However, in the two-
dimensional world of the Muller-Lyer illusion, our brain makes assumptions 
about the relative depths of the two shafts based on monocular (pictorial) cues. 
We are used to seeing outside corners of buildings as near to us with the top and 
bottom of the corner sloping out and away (like the outward slanting fins of the 
Muller-Lyer illusion). We are used to seeing inside corners of buildings as farther 
                                                          
45 Ahluwalia (1978). This hypothesis has been challenged. See Berry (1971), Segall et. al. (1966), and Stewart (1973) 
for further discussion.  
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from us with the top and bottom of the corner sloping in somewhat towards us 
(like the inward slanting fins of the Muller-Lyer illusion).46   
 
What happens to Rebekah, then, is that her visual processing system “infers” certain 
things about the length of the lines, given the historical tendency of lines like these to 
obey certain patterns in her environment. Her cognitive system influenced her visual 
processing system over some pattern of time, priming it to favor the interpretations that 
are more reliable given her Westernized environment. Crucially, what separates 
Rebekah’s case from synchronic cases of penetration is that, if the diachronic hypothesis 
is correct, the cognitive influence is not taking place while Rebekah is looking at the 
illusion. In fact, at least with respect to information relevant to interpreting the length of 
the lines, Rebekah’s visual system is presently wholly informationally encapsulated.47 
Her cognitive system is at present playing no role in the character of her experience of 
the lines as being different lengths. Rebekah may full well know that the lines are the 
same length, but the illusion will not disappear. If this is a case of cognitive 
penetrability, it is arguably diachronic.  
 Suppose, though, that Rebekah has never seen the Müller-Lyer illusion before. 
She looks at it closely and, based on her visual experience, forms the belief that the line 
on the left is longer. What, if anything, is her belief’s justification grounded in? As with all 
of our cases, her belief would be at least partially justified in virtue of her visual 
                                                          
46 http://www.rit.edu/cla/gssp400/muller/muller.html 
47 Fodor (1983, 66), Pylyshyn (1999). 
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experience as of the line on the left being longer.48 But the proponent of EDA must claim 
that her visual experience is itself dependent on some background (cognitive) theory 
about lines like these and their tendency to obey certain patterns. Of course, this theory 
is presumably unconscious. But we can grant for the sake of argument that such a 
theory is still a part of Rebekah’s broader cognitive system, and that this theory 
previously exerted some influence on her visual system. A background cognitive theory 
has causally influenced Rebekah’s visual system, restructuring it such as to prime it to 
favor certain interpretations of data. This is just how diachronic penetration works. The 
proponent of EDA must claim that this past restructuring renders Rebekah’s current 
belief epistemically dependent on her background cognitive theory.  
I contend that this is to conflate a justificatory question with a genetic question. 
What is relevant to the justification of Rebekah’s belief is whether or not the processes 
that caused it have feature(s) F (whatever they turn out to be). If Rebekah’s visual 
experience has F, then it is justification conferring. And her visual experience—in this 
case—was produced by her visual processing system, without any cognitive 
informational input. Her visual experience, if it is justification conferring at all, is 
                                                          
48 This case is complicated since Rebekah’s belief here is subject to the illusion and so false. I am assuming, for 
explanatory simplicity, that her belief is justified. In most cases, Rebekah’s dispositions to interpret Muller-Lyer 
type appearances as she does will lead to increased reliability given her local environment. (This is why she 
developed the disposition to interpret the lines in this way, after all, given her ‘carpentered’ environment.) The 
reader should not get hung up on this disagreement, because the same line of argument given in the text could be 
given with respect to Rebekah’s claim to justification in her non-experimental real world experiences of right-
angled walls and buildings. I thank Teresa Bruno-Niño for pressing me to make this clearer.   
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foundationally justification conferring.49 Now, the proponent of EDA may protest, ‘Of 
course her visual experience involved cognitive informational input. For her visual 
system was primed to interpret data in this way by her cognitive system. So there was 
cognitive informational input, it’s just that it occurred in the past.’ This is correct, but 
not directly relevant to our justificatory question. This past cognitive input may explain 
how Rebekah’s visual experiences of this type came to have F, but that is decidedly a 
genetic question about Rebekah’s visual processing system. Pointing to the fact that 
Rebekah’s belief resulted from a mental process with features F answers our 
justificatory question. But once we have moved beyond this to further explaining how 
the given mental processes got to have the structure and tendencies that they do, we’ve 
stopped talking about justification and started talking about genetic explanations.  
Compare: Suppose I was asked how my belief that there is a green cup on the table 
is justified. I’ll appeal to my visual experience. If my experience is synchronically 
penetrated, I may have to appeal to some prior beliefs or recognitional concepts that I 
have. But now suppose my interlocutor responds: ‘You haven’t even begun to show me 
how your belief is justified. In order to do that, you have to provide me with a full 
evolutionary history of your visual system and how its evolutionary adaptations are 
                                                          
49 Again, this claim is limited to this particular case, since other visual experiences may involve synchronic 
penetration.  
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truth-conducive. Only once you’ve done that can you claim to be justified in believing 
that there is a green cup on the table.’  
By demanding the evolutionary history of my visual system, my interlocutor has 
just changed the subject. If my visual system and any prior beliefs appealed to are 
justification conferring, then, barring any defeaters floating around, the total 
justification for my belief has been provided. Asking how the justification conferring 
processes became justification conferring is surely to ask an interesting question, but not 
one that directly bears on the justification for my particular belief that there is a green cup 
on the table. Of course, in some cases, a mental process’ history may provide an 
undercutting defeater for the claim that the process is justification conferring after all. 
But, as noted above, so long as no defeaters are present, genetic explanations will have 
no direct bearing on the justificatory status of some particular output of a justification 
conferring process. My belief is not rendered epistemically dependent by the fact that 
my visual system has an evolutionary history.  
The demand on behalf of the proponent of EDA is similar to that of the imagined 
interlocutor above. She claims that the causal history of the visual system’s justification 
conferring status must itself be part of the justification of Rebekah’s particular belief. 
The mistake is more difficult to notice, perhaps because the relevant history is cognitive, 
rather than un-designed and evolutionary. But once we are careful to distinguish 
justificatory questions from genetic questions, it becomes clear that the causal history of 
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Rebekah’s visual system is not part of the justification for her particular belief in the 
Müller-Lyer case.  
5.2. AEI and Degrees of Perceptual Expertise  
The case of the Müller-Lyer illusion illustrates that (1) is false. But now we must 
ask whether the lesson of the Müller-Lyer illusion generalizes to all cases of diachronic 
representational penetration. If it doesn’t, the general epistemological worry that lies 
behind EDA will remain. So let’s consider a kind of cases more amenable to an AEI-
friendly model of foundational moral knowledge: Perceptual expertise. I begin with a 
non-moral case of perceptual expertise, before turning to the moral case.  
We have some empirical reason to believe that perceptual expertise, in many 
cases at least, is an instance of diachronic representational penetration.50 Interestingly, in 
these diachronic models of perceptual expertise, the relevant penetration is wholly 
analogous to the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion discussed above. Krigolson et. al. 
(2009) explain: 
[T]he ability to make object classifications is dependent upon feedback-related 
reinforcement learning. This begins with feedback signaling from the medial 
frontal areas…to early sensory areas…As the training progresses, these observers 
develop the ability to map the internally generated responses onto their early 
sensory percepts…This may eventually lead to better representations of the 
object categories in the early sensory areas.51 
 
                                                          
50 Though synchronic penetration remains an empirically possible alternative still taken seriously. For a helpful 
overview of the research, see Wong & Wong (2014). See also, e.g. Krigolson et. al. (2009), Tanaka & Pierce (2009), 
Cecchi (2014), and Stokes (2014).  
51 Krigolson et. al. (2009), 113.  
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Just as Rebekah’s visual system became primed over time to interpret Müller-Lyer lines 
in a certain way, becoming a perceptual expert involves the development of a 
perceptual system, through cognitive feedback, to make sensory discriminations that 
the perceptual novice cannot make. There is evidence that this cognitive feedback can 
“[influence] the architecture of the visual system determining the content of the 
subject’s perceptual states”.52 Further support for the diachronic model of perceptual 
expertise for some domain could be provided by establishing synchronic perceptual 
encapsulation. For example, if the coffee expert cannot help but taste the hints of citrus 
in some cup of coffee, even despite belief to the contrary, we would have some reason 
to believe that there was no synchronic belief penetration. (Such research, has not, so far 
as I know, been done.)  
 Cases of perceptual expertise which fit this diachronic model are epistemically 
analogous to the case of Müller-Lyer illusion above. The upshot is that many of the 
beliefs formed on the basis of perceptual experience by perceptual experts will be 
epistemically independent and thus foundationally justified. Which kinds of perceptual 
expertise will fit this model is an empirical question, but it is empirically promising that 
many kinds will. This is good news for the foundationalist.  
 We can finally turn to the upshot of all of this for the plausibility of AEI. Critics 
of AEI qua foundationalism claim that an evaluative property couldn’t figure in a 
                                                          
52 Cecchi (2014), 91.  
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perceptual experience (broadly conceived) unless there were some cognitive 
penetration occurring. And, as EDA claims, any cognitive penetration of an experience 
is incompatible with a downstream belief’s formed foundational status. However, the 
discussion above illustrates that there is a possible model of evaluatively-laden 
perceptual experience that is compatible with AEI.  
 Here is the sketch of how AEI goes on this model. An agent begins as a moral 
novice. Still, as a result of affect-laden experience, she has positively and negatively 
valenced experiences. Over time, the agent develops moral beliefs which influence and 
restructure her perceptual and affective systems. This influence primes her perceptual 
and affective systems to trigger positively and negatively valenced experiences which 
track evaluative properties. The agent forms beliefs about particular cases based on 
these positively and negatively valenced experiences, e.g. that making that face at 
someone is bad. These beliefs will be justified insofar as the experiences they are based 
off of have feature(s) F. These beliefs will be foundationally justified insofar as the 
experiences they are based on are not synchronically penetrated.  
 Of course, as much as we’d like to think we are expert moral perceivers, this may 
not be true. Perceptual expertise comes in degrees, and so too would be the case with 
moral perceptual expertise. So whether a given individual’s experience grounded moral 
beliefs are justified is a difficult question. But it is not a question particular to moral 
expertise, and so no special ground for skepticism about beliefs formed on the basis of 
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evaluative experience. Just as with all perceptual expertise, then, the justification 
conferring status of a particular individual’s moral experiences will be a difficult 
assessment to make. What is important at present is that we have an empirically 
plausible model of moral experience which illustrates the flaw in EDA. As a result, we 
have an empirically plausible model of evaluative experience which is compatible with 
AEI, which is just what we were looking for.  
 One limitation on this model should be emphasized. In order to preserve the 
foundational nature of AEI, it must turn out that at least many of the perceptual and/or 
affective experiences that ground our particular moral beliefs do not have the character 
they do as a result of synchronic cognitive penetration. How frequently, if at all, moral 
experiences are synchronically penetrated is an empirical question to which we don’t 
yet know the answer. The ultimate plausibility of filling out AEI in this way is held 
hostage to future empirical research. The most salient alternative to this understanding 
of AEI would be the approach which denies the cognitive penetrability of evaluative 
experiences altogether. Compared to this alternative, the diachronic penetration model 
looks to be far more empirically plausible. The extent and nature of cognitive 
penetration is an open empirical question, but it is becoming more and more difficult to 
deny its existence altogether.53 In this way, the alternative to the model defended in this 
paper seems far more empirically doubtful. If AEI is to remain a serious contender for 
                                                          
53 Vetter & Newen (2014).   
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our moral epistemology, then, I think the diachronic penetration model defended here 
is its best shot. 
6. Conclusion 
 AEI provides an alternative to a priori, rationalist moral epistemology, and even 
provides some prima facie advantages or its a priori rivals.54 However, the existence of 
cognitive influences on perceptual and affective experience threatens to undermine 
AEI’s foundationalist credentials. In this paper, I have explored an argument against 
AEI based on this intuition, EDA. I argued that diachronic representational penetration 
is, contrary to EDA, compatible with an experience’s foundationally justification 
conferring status. If the kind of cognitive penetration on evaluative experiences is 
diachronic, then, AEI can retain its plausibility. On one popular empirical model of 
perceptual expertise, perceptual expertise involves diachronic rather than synchronic 
penetration. On one understanding of AEI, evaluative experience involves an analogous 
form of perceptual expertise. The upshot here is that, if this popular empirical model is 
correct, at least for evaluative experiences, then the kind of cognitive penetration 
involved in evaluative experiences provides no threat to AEI after all.  
  
                                                          
54 Proponents of AEI have appealed to many considerations, none of which are uncontroversial, in support of this 
claim. It may be thought, for example, that AEI better fits with empirical data on the psychology of moral belief 
formation, that AEI is more phenomenologically realistic, that it fits better with a naturalistic/empiricist worldview, 
and/or that it can better account for our epistemic access to the moral properties.    
148
  
 
Chapter 6: Perceptualism about Emotions and the Rational Criticizability Problem  
Introduction 
 According to perceptualism, emotional experience is a kind of perceptual 
experience.1 For example, when I see a snake on the trail, I feel fear. This fear represents 
the snake as dangerous. One feature of perceptualism is its epistemological component: 
Since emotional experience is a form of perceptual experience, it prima facie justifies 
beliefs as traditional sense perception can.2 
Besides being of intrinsic interest, perceptualism is also relevant to Affectual 
Intuitionism, a version of A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism, in moral epistemology. 
According to Affectual Intuitionism (AI), emotional experiences provide prima facie non-
inferential justification for moral beliefs.3 For example, when Pam senses Jim’s 
discomfort at Dwight’s line of questioning, she perceives this as bad, and thus tactfully 
changes the subject. Pam’s belief that Jim is being harmed is justified by her experience 
of discomfort. For the proponent of AI, then, the role that affective experience plays in 
ethics is analogous to the role that perceptual experience plays in the justification of 
run-of-the-mill empirical beliefs.  
                                                          
1 See Soloman (1984), De Sousa (1984), Prinz (2004).  
2 Of course, how perceptual experience justifies is itself a contentious issue. But the perceptualist about emotions 
can remain agnostic on this question—she need only claim that, however perceptual experience justifies, 
emotional experience does in a similar way. See BonJour (2007) for discussion.  
3 See Prinz (2008), Roeser (2011), Cowan (forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b), Werner (forthcoming).  
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 Objections to perceptualism about emotions should cause concern, for both 
perceptualists and proponents of AI. This is especially true of objections to 
perceptualism that purport to undermine the claim that emotional experiences can non-
inferentially justify. Recently, several philosophers have leveled one objection of just this 
sort.4 As will be explained in more detail below, the idea is this: Any state that can non-
inferentially justify will be immune from rational and moral criticism. In other words, 
non-inferentially justifying states, such as perceptual experiences, cannot themselves be 
justified or unjustified—that’s what makes them epistemic regress stoppers, after all. 
However, emotions are criticizable in just this way. So emotions cannot play the 
epistemic role that perceptualists and proponents of AI claim they do.  
 The project of this chapter is to defend perceptualism in light of this objection, 
which I call the Rational Criticizability Problem, and thus indirectly defend AEI. To 
foreshadow, I claim that once we look more closely at rational and moral criticisms of 
emotional states, it becomes clear that the criticisms target not the epistemological 
component of emotional experiences but one of a cluster of other properties of the agent 
which are closely related to the emotion. It shouldn’t come as a surprise, given the role 
affect plays in our cognitive economy, that even if affective experience is a special form 
of perceptual experience, it will be bound up with action tendencies and values in a 
                                                          
4 Of course this is not the only objection to perceptualism. See also, e.g. Deonna & Teroni (2012), Whiting (2012), 
and Lacewing (2015). Though I do not find these objections compelling, addressing every such objection to 
perceptualism is outside of the scope of the present paper.  
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unique way. However, this doesn’t entail anything about the epistemic status of 
emotional experiences.   
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 1, I explain and (briefly) 
motivate AI and perceptualism as versions of AEI. Then, in section 2, I lay out the 
Rational Criticizability Problem in detail. In sections 3, 4, and 5, I respond to the objection 
by surveying several case studies in criticism of emotions and their relation to the role 
that affect plays. Finally, in section 6, I assess where things stand.  
1. Affectual Intuitionism and Perceptualist Theories of Emotions  
 On a familiar foundationalist view, all empirical justification, though it may be 
mediated by an arbitrary number of other beliefs, bottoms out in perceptual experience 
(plus some basic principles of reasoning, which may be a priori). With respect to 
empirical justification, perceptual experiences seem well-placed to serve as justificatory 
regress stoppers.5  
Suppose foundationalism, broadly speaking, is correct. What the moral 
epistemologist needs, then, is a plausible story about what could serve as a regress 
stopper, analogous to perceptual experience, for justified evaluative beliefs. One such 
story is Affectual Intuitionism:  
Affectual Intuitionism (AI): “Normal ethical agents have non-inferential 
justification for first-order ethical beliefs in virtue of emotional experiences.”6 
                                                          
5 See Fumerton & Hasan (2010), especially Section 1.  
6 Cowan (forthcoming-a), 11. This is actually Cowan’s helpful precisification of a view most prominently defended 
by Roeser (2006, 2011). As we’ll see below, Cowan is at best ambivalent about AI.  
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To see how AI works, consider a cliché case:7 Norma rounds the corner to see some 
teens lighting a cat on fire, while the cat struggles to get away, clearly (and justifiably!) 
afraid. Norma has a strong emotional response of anger, sadness, and perhaps even 
disgust at the sight of the cat’s suffering and the teens’ laughter. Rapidly and 
unreflectively, on the basis of this emotional response, Norma forms the belief that the 
cat’s suffering is (morally speaking) very bad. According to the proponent of AI, two 
things are true: First, Norma’s belief that the cat’s suffering is bad is grounded in her 
emotional experience (in the sense of being non-deviantly caused). Second, this 
grounding relation also serves to render Norma’s belief justified. This is because 
emotional responses of this sort in Norma more or less reliably track badness in her 
environment, and do so in a way which represents badness in some way. In other 
words, the evaluative properties are in some sense part of the contents of Norma’s 
affective experiences.   
AI is most naturally paired with what I’ll call Perceptualism about Emotions: 
Perceptualism: Emotional experiences are a special sort of perceptual experience, 
in that they are pre-doxastic representational states that serve to prima facie justify 
beliefs about their contents.  
 
It’s widely believed, by both philosophers and psychologists, that emotions have 
intentional objects.8 But there are also well-known reasons to not identify emotions with 
                                                          
7 Harman (1977), Ch. 1.  
8 See Fox (2008), Ch. 1, De Sousa (2013), Sect. 3, Goldie (2007).   
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beliefs.9 These two features of emotions motivate a broadly Perceptualist view. For 
some Perceptualists, emotional experiences are literally perceptions, and the affective 
system is a perceptual module to be placed aside the visual, aural, and other perceptual 
systems.10 For others, emotional experiences are not literally perceptions, but are 
epistemologically analogous to perceptions in that they can serve to justify beliefs in 
their contents in the way, e.g. visual experiences, can.11  
 In what follows, I remain neutral between literalist and non-literalist versions of 
Perceptualism. What is relevant at present is the epistemological aspect of 
Perceptualism, which literalists and non-literalists agree about: emotional experiences 
have (intentional) contents, and these contents can serve to prima facie justify beliefs. The 
pairing of AI with Perceptualism is, I hope, relatively straightforward. While neither 
Perceptualism nor AI entail each other, each one naturally fits with the other into a 
cohesive overall affective epistemology.  
2. The Rational Criticizability Problem  
 The Rational Criticizability Problem arises from the mutual inconsistency 
between Perceptualism and two other seeming truisms about emotions and perceptual 
states: 
                                                          
9 See, for example, Brady (2014), Ch. 2, De Sousa (2013). Though these arguments are more controversial—see, 
e.g. Nussbaum (2001), Ch. 1.  
10 Johnston (2001), Döring (2003), Prinz (2004).  
11 De Sousa (1984), Roberts (2003).  
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Criticizability: We can be legitimately criticized for our affective responses. 
Perceptual Non-Rationality: Perceptual states can be veridical or not, but they are 
not subject to rational or moral criticisms (charges of irrationality, charges of 
unreasonableness, etc.). 
 
First, a word about Criticizability. Although I am calling the problem that arises here 
the Rational Criticizability Problem (RCP), I intend “Rational” to be read in a very 
broad way, to encompass criticisms of emotions as irrational, unreasonable, or even 
immoral. The kinds of criticisms that legitimately apply to emotional states fall under a 
variety of guises, and Criticizability is intended to capture all of them. (I discuss 
examples below.)  
 Perceptual Non-Rationality is also intuitive. Unlike someone who is insensitive 
to the feelings of others, we don’t think that someone who is red-green color blind is 
thereby subject to rational or moral criticism. Similarly, while I may be criticizable for 
continuing to be duped into believing it, I am not criticizable because one line continues 
to look longer than the other in the Müller-Lyer Illusion after I know better. Besides 
taking actions such as plugging my ears or closing my eyes, perceptual experiences are 
not subject to rational control in the right kind of way to be criticizable. They are 
passively exercised faculties, unlike paradigmatically criticizable states such as 
believing or intentionally acting.  
 The tension here for Perceptualism should be clear: Perceptual states are not 
rationally criticizable. Affective states are criticizable. So affective states are not 
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perceptual states. The problem has been approached from a few different directions. 
Peter Goldie discusses the worry in terms of responsibility: 
Intuitively, emotions are passive, and often seem to overcome us, sometimes in 
spite of our efforts. These considerations suggest that we cannot be directly 
responsible for our emotions…However, consideration of other examples might 
suggest otherwise: if I feel a deep loathing of foreigners, I might reasonably be 
thought to be directly responsible for this, just as much as I am for the actions 
that I do which are expressive of that loathing.12 
 
Robert Cowan, on the other hand, levies the objection in terms of reasons: “Emotions 
can be justified or unjustified because they are, or ought to be, responsive to reasons—
e.g. my acting lecherously at the party is a reason for me to feel guilty.”13 Finally, Mikko 
Salmela, in a discussion of recalcitrant emotions (such as a fear of flying even despite 
knowledge that it is safe), notes that  
[T]he fact that we regard many recalcitrant emotions as well as pathological 
emotions as irrational rather than arational, and try to get rid of them, implies 
that the problem with recalcitrant emotions is not so much whether they need to 
be revised in light of better knowledge, but rather whether they can be so 
revised.14 
 
In short, the RCP takes many forms. Perhaps it is that we are responsible for our 
emotions but not for our perceptual states. Alternatively, perhaps it is the fact that we 
can have reasons for or against having certain emotional states, but not for perceptual 
states. Or it may be a claim about the rational assessability of emotional states. There are 
                                                          
12 Goldie (2007), 932-933.  
13 Cowan (forthcoming-a), 12.   
14 Salmela (2011), 15. In this passage, Salmela is responding to Döring’s (2009) discussion of recalcitrant emotions, 
but I take it he intends his remarks to generalize to all perceptualist views.  
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probably other ways to think about the problem too, some surely reducible to others. 
What is important for the RCP to get off the ground is that there is some important and 
seemingly normative difference between emotional experiences and perceptual 
experiences: The former are criticizable in some important respect, while the latter are 
not.  
 RCP is an objection to Perceptualism. But it should be especially worrisome to 
the proponent of Affectual Intuitionism. Recall that for AI, affective experiences play an 
analogous epistemic role with respect to evaluative beliefs that perceptual experiences 
do with respect to empirical beliefs. If they are to do this on a foundationalist view such 
as AI, they must provide non-inferential justification—that is to say, they must justify 
without being epistemically dependent on any other mental state for their justifying 
force. However, the rational criticizability of emotions suggests that they depend on 
something independent of them for their justificatory power, e.g. other mental states. 
For example, if, as Cowan says, someone can give me reasons to feel guilty, this suggests 
that emotions are only justified in virtue of something else, e.g. our ability to recognize 
reasons, or our belief that reasons to feel a certain way are present. The upshot is that, 
even if AI could be separated from Perceptualism, the RCP would arguably still be a 
problem for the proponent of AI.  
3. Cases of Criticizability 
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 Because Criticizability comes in different forms, it will be helpful to consider a 
few test cases that a response to the RCP should explain. The simplest case is one when 
someone’s emotions lead them to overreact: 
Overreaction. Andy is cut in line at the coffee shop. He throws over a display rack 
and screams at the line-cutter before storming out. 
 
Andy is criticizable for overreacting. However, he’d also be criticizable even if he didn’t 
react so strongly: 
Overfeeling: Andy is cut in line at the coffee shop. Outwardly, he does nothing. 
Inwardly, he is so upset that he shakes with rage, fantasizing about punching the 
line-cutter, wishing ill upon his family, etc. 
 
Both Overreaction and Overfeeling are cases where the strength of the emotion is 
inappropriate. Even if some limited level of anger is a proper response to someone 
cutting in line, the amount of anger that Andy feels outpaces what is appropriate.  
 A third case involves responding to certain features of a situation to the 
detriment of noticing other salient features. In these cases, one emotional response 
crowds out all others in a way that is criticizable. For example: 
Selective Empathy: A police officer shoots an unarmed Black teen. In the process of 
getting out of her squad car, she accidentally and painfully slams her fingers in 
the car door. Jane, who has witnessed the entire interaction, empathizes very 
strongly with the officer’s pain and stress, while feeling little for the shot teen.  
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The issue here is not merely that Jane feels sympathy for the police officer, for her pain, 
mental and physical, is genuine.15 Rather, it is that Jane’s sympathy for the police officer 
is inappropriate given that another person has just been shot.  
A final case worth considering is the case of phobias: 
Phobia: Doug is powerfully afraid of mice. He is so powerfully afraid that at times 
it affects his well-being—for example, he refuses to sleep in old houses for fear of 
them being infested with mice, he will not visit pet stores for fear of seeing mice, 
nor can he enjoy watching Ratatouille with his children. Despite this, he knows 
that mice are, for the most part, harmless, and that the situations he avoids for 
fear of mice are not dangerous. 
 
As Salmela notes, phobias are called irrational rather than merely incorrect. This suggests 
that phobias involve some kind of rational failing, and are thus criticizable.16  
4. The Complexity of Emotions 
 There are three (non-exclusive) options as to how to respond to the Rational 
Criticizability Problem (RCP). The anti-perceptualist has us reject perceptualism in light 
of Criticizability and Perceptual Non-Rationality (PNR). The perceptualist must reject 
either Criticizability or PNR. Each approach appears to be seriously revisionary. Giving 
up Criticizability seems to entail an error theoretic conception of our assessments of 
                                                          
15 It could be plausibly claimed that the police officer here deserves no sympathy, given that her action in shooting 
the teen was likely seriously blameworthy. This gets into some thorny issues about sympathy/empathy for the 
blameworthy that are beyond the scope of this paper. The reader should feel free to substitute her favored case of 
selective empathy.  
16 Salmela (2011), 15.  
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emotional states. Giving up PNR entails that perceptual experiences are rationally 
criticizable.17   
 Rebutting the RCP doesn’t require anything so bold. Rather, I think that once we 
carefully separate out the representational component of emotional responses from a 
variety of other features of emotional states, the force of Criticizability melts away. 
Criticizability is ambiguous between two readings; on a more general reading it is true 
but doesn’t conflict with Perceptualism, and on a more narrow reading it is in conflict 
with Perceptualism but lacks support. Clarifying this requires a brief digression on 
some widely accepted facts about the emotional system.  
 Whether Perceptualism is true, the emotional system is complex and unique in 
the roles it plays within our broader cognitive system. Perceptualism has two 
components: First, it says that emotional experiences are non-doxastic representational 
states. Second, it says that these representational states serve to prima facie justify beliefs 
in an analogous way to perceptual experiences. Both components are compatible with 
emotional states functioning in other important ways. In fact, to deny the other roles 
that the emotional system plays would be to deny widely accepted psychological and 
philosophical facts.18  
                                                          
17 Interestingly, Siegel (forthcoming) has argued that at least some perceptual experiences are rationally 
assessable. See also Watzl (2014).  
18 I have no ready-to-hand way to carve the emotional system off from other cognitive systems precisely. Broadly 
speaking, by “emotional system”, I refer to the cognitive structures that underlie the generation of affective 
experiences, and I take this rough and ready characterization to be satisfactory for the claims made in this paper. 
(Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to be clearer on this point.)  
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 Other than the representational and epistemological features that emotional 
states have according to Perceptualists, emotional states, or some component of the 
emotional system,19 play the following roles: 
(a) Motivation. Emotional states directly cause us to act—that is, they cause us to 
act without intermediary work by beliefs or desires. The sight of a snake, for 
example, can cause someone to freeze in fear before any belief that there is a 
snake present is formed.20 
 
(b) Action-Priming. As per Motivation, emotional states can directly cause us to 
act. But they can also play a weaker role, by priming us toward certain actions 
without causing us to act. A feeling of uneasiness about someone may prime 
someone to turn away, make less eye contact, and stop believing what that 
person is saying. Or again, a feeling of fear may in many cases prime us to action 
(freezing, running away, tensing up to prepare for impact, etc.), but not to any 
particular action.21  
 
(c) Attention Focusing. Over and above representing their objects as having certain 
properties, emotions also serve to focus attention on the emotionally-laden 
features of a situation. This can occur even at the cost of neglecting relevant but 
not emotionally-laden features. Ben-Ze’ev compares this aspect of emotions to 
“burglar alarms going off when an intruder appears, emotions signal that 
something needs attention.”22 From a neurophysiological standpoint, what this 
comes to is the emotional system playing a role in selecting which information in 
a perceptual input is to be further processed and brought to conscious 
awareness.  
 
(d) Affective Style and Temperament. Affective style and temperament are notions 
used by psychologists to describe tendencies to experience affect-laden situations 
as positive or negative. Individuals classified as neurotic will be more sensitive to 
experiencing situations as anxiety-inducing and potentially harmful (rather than 
                                                          
19 Whether these features are realized in distinct physiological states from the (purported) representational 
features of emotion is an interesting empirical question. But what is important for the argument below is only that 
these things are conceptually separable, and it seems that they clearly are. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
pressing me on this point.)  
20 Fox (2008), Ch. 1.  
21 Fox (2008), Ch. 1.  
22 Ben-Ze’ev (2000), 13. See also Brady (2014), pp.20-22, and Faucher and Tappolet (2002), 114-115. 
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potentially rewarding), and thus (in light of (a) and (b) above) be more motivated 
to fear and other avoidance behavior. Two individuals with differences in 
temperament may both represent the emotionally-laden features of a situation 
accurately but with differences in the perceived salience of those features, while 
in other cases an individual with a particularly strong temperament may outright 
miss certain emotionally-laden features of a situation because of a preoccupation 
with other features of the situation.23  
 
(e) Character. A philosophical aspect of the affective system that pairs with the 
psychological notions of affective style and temperament is the notion of 
character. Of course, the philosophical issues surrounding character are far too 
deep to even scratch the surface. What is relevant here is that, arguably, one’s 
emotional dispositions play some important role in making up part of an 
individual’s character. As Angela Smith puts it, “We react with…envy, 
admiration, resentment, awe, amusement, regret, and gratitude to the people and 
events we encounter…we regularly take these involuntary responses to have a 
great deal of expressive significance.”24  
 
Finally, besides all of the above roles that the emotional system plays in our broader 
cognitive economy, there is also an important way in which our background cognitive 
states can influence our emotional system: 
(f) Emotional Regulation. Emotional Regulation (or Self-Regulation) involves an 
agent exercising cognitive control over the felt strength and motivational force of 
her emotion. Regulation can be external, as when someone with a fear of snakes 
avoids the snake exhibit at the zoo, or it can be internal, as when someone 
consciously directs their attention to something less emotionally abrasive to quell 
their anger.25  
 
It’s worth noting briefly that Emotional Regulation is wholly compatible with 
Perceptualism. One powerful motivation for Perceptualism is that emotional 
                                                          
23 See Fox (2008), Ch. 3 for an introductory discussion with references to the psychology literature.   
24 Smith (2005), 249.  
25 For discussion, see Gross (2008), Roberts (forthcoming).  
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experiences seem to be passive in a way that beliefs are not. It might seem that this 
claim about the passivity of emotions conflicts with Emotional Regulation. However, the 
sort of regulation that we have over our emotional experiences is not in conflict with 
passivity in the relevant sense. In external emotional regulation, an agent alters her 
emotional experience by consciously selecting her external inputs. Choosing to avoid 
the snake exhibit at the zoo is regulating one’s emotions, not in the sense that one is 
actively and directly preventing some emotional experience; rather, the agent knows 
that she won’t be able to avoid feeling fear in the snake exhibit because her emotions are 
not directly in her control, and so avoids the relevant situation which would result in her 
negative emotional experience. Internal emotional regulation works similarly, except 
that instead of avoiding the emotion-invoking experience altogether, an agent 
consciously redirects her attention as to avoid the emotional stimulus.26  
 There are analogous kinds of regulation in the traditional perceptual realm. If I 
hate the taste of mushrooms, I can avoid experiencing it by not eating mushrooms; if 
norms of politeness dictate that I do, I can distract myself from the taste of mushrooms 
by directing my attention to the conversation at hand. Neither of these instances of what 
we might call “Perceptual Regulation” cast doubt on the passivity of perceptual 
                                                          
26 In cognitive reappraisal, an agent consciously and intentionally reinterprets a situation in an effort to suppress a 
negative emotion or replace it with a positive one (Gross 2002, 2007). Such a reinterpretation does not have a 
direct analogy to anything in traditional perceptual processing (though attentional shifts, such as in the duck-rabbit 
illusion, may be similar), because this reinterpretation takes place cognitively downstream, it remains compatible 
with the passivity of emotional experiences in a particular moment. (Thanks for an anonymous referee for 
stressing the importance of cognitive reappraisal as an important kind of emotional regulation.)  
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experience. There is no pressure on the Perceptualist to deny Emotional Regulation 
either.  
 It’s clear that, Perceptualism notwithstanding, the emotional system does a lot of 
cognitive work. In section 5, I return to the cases discussed above in light of this fact. As 
we’ll see, a closer look illustrates that the criticizability in each of the cases is not a 
criticism of the representational nature of the emotional experience, but a criticism of 
one or more of features (a)-(f) above. 
5. Complexity and the Rational Criticizability Problem 
 With the background on the many distinctive (but related) roles that emotions 
play within our broader cognitive systems, we can return to what this means for the 
RCP. I begin by providing the response in the abstract before illustrating how this plays 
out with respect to the cases discussed in section 3.  
 Let’s begin by reminding ourselves of Criticizability, one of the key principles 
underlying the RCP: 
Criticizability: We can be legitimately criticized for our affective responses. 
Especially as reinforced by the cases given in section 3, Criticizability seems undeniable. 
Rejecting it would be a tough bullet to bite for the Perceptualist. However, as stated, 
and contrary to the proponent of RCP, the Perceptualist need not deny Criticizability at 
all. Given the plural function of emotions in our cognitive systems, it may very well 
turn out that emotions are rationally or morally criticizable along many of these metrics, 
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compatible with their failing to be criticizable qua representation. To take just one 
example, suppose that Carl’s annoyance directly causes him to yell obscenities at a 
child. His annoyance will be criticizable qua causing his immoral action. This is 
compatible with Perceptualism, since Carl’s emotional representation of the child as 
annoying is not the thing which is rationally or morally criticizable. Only the 
motivational upshot of that emotion is under criticism.  
 What this shows us is that, if the RCP is really to put pressure on Perceptualism, 
Criticizability is too broad of a principle. Rather, we need to replace it with: 
Criticizability*: The representational aspect of our emotional experiences can be 
legitimately criticized.  
 
Since the affective system is complicated, playing several different (related) roles at 
once, the narrower principle Criticizability* is necessary for RCP to be a genuine 
problem for Perceptualism. The problem, though, is that Criticizability* is much less 
intuitive than Criticizability, and the common sense sorts of cases used to motivate the 
latter don’t obviously extend to the former. What the proponent of RCP would need are 
a class of cases where someone’s emotional experience are being rationally or morally 
criticized in a way not subsumable to criticisms of the other features of the emotional 
system (a)-(f). It is difficult to see what these cases might look like.  
 In the abstract, once we get clear about what kind of criticizability is really 
required to cast doubt on Perceptualism, the RCP loses its original intuitive force. But it 
is worthwhile to see how this plays out in particular cases, such as those discussed in 
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section 3. Begin with Overreaction and Overfeeling. In Overreaction, recall, Andy explodes 
into a violent rage as a result of someone cutting in front of him in line. In this case, 
Andy is surely criticizable, morally and probably rationally as well. However, it seems 
clear that the criticism is directed at Andy’s emotion only insofar as it caused his 
immoral and irrational behavior. So here it is the motivational component of Andy’s 
emotional response that is under censure.  
 In Overfeeling, on the other hand, Andy does not act immorally or irrationally. 
Instead he stews in his rage, thinking terrible things and shaking with anger, but 
outwardly showing a calm demeanor. While in this case there is no direct action of 
Andy’s to trace our emotional criticism back to, there seem to be multiple other 
candidate explanations of the target of our criticism of Andy here. First, insofar as his 
anger is priming him to take drastic action, his motivational dispositions, even if 
currently suppressed, seem like legitimate targets for criticism. Relatedly, insofar as 
Andy doesn’t seem to be distancing or repudiating his rage, instead dwelling on it, he’ll 
be criticizable from the standpoint of emotional regulation. In this instance, Andy can 
choose to regulate and distance himself from his anger by thinking about something 
else, finding distractions or otherwise avoiding the sorts of situations that predictably 
trigger his rage. Instead, Andy has chosen to endorse at least the felt strength of the 
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emotion, even encouraging it (both now and in future situations which are similar in 
kind). For that he is criticizable.27  
 Selective Empathy, recall, involves Jane’s strong empathy for the police officer to 
the expense of having very little sympathy for the unarmed teen. In this case, it’s not 
that her empathy for the police officer is misrepresenting per se; rather, it’s that her 
empathy is inappropriate in these circumstances since it crowds out her ability to 
empathize with the unarmed teen, where empathy would be more legitimately placed 
in this situation. If we suspect that Jane is implicitly or overtly racist, our criticism of her 
emotional dispositions in this case could first and foremost be seen as a criticism of her 
character. If this is not a fluke emotional reaction on Jane’s part, but rather represents a 
pattern, her character seems legitimately criticizable. But even supposing that this is a 
fluke, Jane may still be criticizable. But the most plausible candidate for criticism here, it 
strikes me, is that her emotions have shifted her attentional focus in a problematic way. 
Again, notice that the problem with Jane isn’t that she represented the police officer as 
deserving empathy when she doesn’t—as I’ve stipulated the case, the police officer does 
deserve empathy. So she isn’t misrepresenting. Rather, she’s overlooking crucial features 
of the situation, and she is doing so because her empathy for the police officer has given 
                                                          
27 We may also criticize Andy from the standpoint of his overall emotional temperament, if he is prone to these 
sorts of overreactions frequently. But I don’t want to belabor the point.  
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her emotional tunnel vision of sorts. So again, Jane doesn’t appear to be criticizable for 
the representational aspect of her emotion. 
 The final case study to consider are phobias such as Doug’s in Phobia. Now, first, 
I should flag that it is unclear to me that people really are criticizable for having 
phobias. Surely phobias can be detrimental, even destructive to our well-being. But that 
merely shows that they are pervasively incorrect, not that they are subject to blame. In 
defense of the claim that emotions like phobias are criticizable, Salmela points out that 
“the fact that we regard many recalcitrant emotions…as irrational rather than arational, 
and try to get rid of them, implies that the problem with recalcitrant emotions is not so 
much whether they need to be revised…but rather whether they can be”.28 As for the 
linguistic point, that we label phobias as “irrational” rather than “arational”, I don’t 
think this provides much evidence one way or another. What of the point that we all 
accept that recalcitrant emotions ought to be revised? It is true that we often have 
emotional dispositions that we want to alter, judging them to be prone to error. But this 
is no different from perception. If I could easily retrain myself to not fall victim to the 
Müller-Lyer illusion, without thereby causing other potential visual errors, I would do 
so. 
Emotion may come apart from perception in two ways here: First, insofar as 
emotion is tightly linked to normative judgments and action, it may be more 
                                                          
28 Salmela (2011), 15.  
167
  
 
normatively important to correct dispositions to emotional errors than dispositions to 
(traditionally) perceptual errors. Second, as a matter of empirical fact, our emotions 
may be more malleable than (traditionally) perceptual systems. This isn’t to say that we 
directly control our emotions—rather, we can indirectly affect our emotional 
dispositions with time and practice. But neither of these differences casts doubt on 
Perceptualism; first, these are only differences in degree, not in kind, and second, 
neither difference entails any epistemic difference between emotions and traditional 
perceptual systems, which is the heart of Perceptualism (as I’m understanding it here).  
Suppose that all of what I’ve said in the last paragraph is mistaken, and that 
phobias are rationally criticizable after all. Insofar as Doug is criticizable for his fear of 
mice, it seems as though the criticism must be of his ability to regulate this fear 
adequately. For the fear is, qua phobia, recalcitrant and not in his control. What is in his 
control—or at least is presupposed to be, if the criticism is to hit the target—is his ability 
to suppress his fear in order to, e.g., watch Ratatouille with his child. So again, it appears 
as though it is Doug’s Emotional Regulation (or lack thereof) that is criticizable, not the 
representational aspect of his fear. (Of course, his fear is misrepresenting the world; that 
is common ground between the Perceptualist and her opponent.)  
6. Conclusion 
 There are prima facie good reasons to endorse Perceptualism about emotions, 
both for the proponent of AI as well as for independent reasons. On the other hand, the 
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criticizability—moral, rational, and prudential—of emotional states looks to be in 
conflict with modelling emotions on perceptual states. This criticizability is pervasive in 
our interactions with others, so denying it would seem radically implausible. However, 
I have argued that, once properly understood, the criticizability in question is actually 
perfectly compatible with Perceptualism. If what I’ve argued is correct, we can preserve 
both the common sense intuitions about the criticizability of emotions as well as the 
well-motivated perceptualist theory of those states.  
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Chapter 7  
Toward a Perceptual Solution to Epistemological Objections to Non-Naturalism 
Stance-independent non-naturalist moral realism1 is subject to two related 
epistemological objections. First, there is the metaethical descendant of the Benacerraf 
problem in philosophy of math.2 Second, there are evolutionary debunking arguments.3 
How best to understand these two arguments, as well as whether one problem is 
reducible to the other, both remain controversial.4 I have defended the claim that each 
of these arguments is best understood in terms of claims about our epistemic access to 
the moral properties in chapter 1. And, as is no surprise, the success of these arguments 
is contentious as well. In chapters 2 and 3, I have argued against several realist attempts 
to resolve the problem. 
 These epistemological objections against moral realism are, perhaps, 
unsurprising. What is surprising is that, despite many other differences, the most 
widely discussed attempts to solve these epistemological problems have done so 
without appealing to any particular moral epistemology. To some extent, this makes 
                                                          
1 Shafer-Landau (2005, p.15) defines stance independence as the claim that “the moral standards that fix the moral 
facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective.” 
“Non-naturalism” is also subject to different understandings. I will not define “non-naturalism” precisely for the 
purposes of this paper, except to say that on a non-naturalist view, the moral facts are not identical or reducible to 
natural facts. (This conflicts with the epistemological characterization of “non-naturalism” which Shafer-Landau 
favors.)  
2 Benacerraf (1973).   
3 The two most famous examples of evolutionary debunking arguments are those of Joyce (2001, Ch.4, 2006) and 
Street (2006).  
4 See, for example, Enoch (2011, 7.1-7.3), Vavova (2015), and Clarke-Doane (forthcoming), amongst many others.  
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sense: A response to these particular epistemic concerns that is otherwise neutral about 
surrounding epistemological issues would be preferable to one only available to those 
willing on to take on other epistemological commitments. On the other hand, I think 
that the focus on these epistemologically neutral responses leaves many interesting 
theoretical stones unturned. Exploring the ability of particular theories in moral 
epistemology for handling these difficult epistemological objections can help to 
illuminate strengths or weaknesses within these theories themselves, as well as opening 
up potentially unexplored avenues for responding to deeply entrenched concerns about 
our epistemic access to the moral properties.  
 This chapter can be seen as a case study in the latter kind of project. In particular, 
I assess the prospects of an empiricist and perceptualist model of moral knowledge, A 
Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism, for responding to the Benacerraf problem and 
evolutionary debunking arguments against non-skeptical moral realism. I argue that 
AEI has powerful responses to these objections which are not open to other moral 
epistemologists. Furthermore, the uniquely perceptualist responses are arguably more 
compelling than the various other approaches to EA that have cropped up in the 
literature. The upshot is that if some version of AEI is correct, then the realist has less to 
fear from Benacerraf and evolutionary debunking style epistemological objections. 
Insofar as one is already a committed realist, then, this provides some indirect support 
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for AEI. The more general suggestion, however, is that non-naturalists look to particular 
theories of moral justification in responding to skeptical arguments.  
 The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 1, I discuss the origins of, 
and relationships between, the Benacerraf Problem and Evolutionary Debunking 
Arguments against non-skeptical moral realism. In section 2, I begin by briefly 
sketching the perceptualist position in moral epistemology. In sections 3-5, I tease out 
three distinct ways of understanding these sorts of epistemological worries—rather 
than engaging in exegesis, I formulate what I take to be the three most powerful 
epistemological problems in the area. (I leave it to evolutionary debunkers to argue that 
there is some stronger way of understanding the objection that I have overlooked.)  In 
the remainder of the paper, I argue that AEI provides a framework for responding to 
each of these three distinct epistemological worries. (A full defense requires a brief 
digression into the philosophy of perception, in section 8.) A non-naturalist proponent 
of AEI, then, seems to be able to handle these traditional epistemological problems. 
Whether other substantive non-naturalist epistemologies can do the same remains to be 
seen—but at the very least, I hope this case study in AEI encourages further thought 
about this method for responding to epistemological concerns targeted at non-
naturalists.  
1. Benacerraf’s Problem and Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: A (Very) Brief 
History 
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 As discussed in chapter 1, the so-called Benacerraf problem goes back at least to 
Paul Benacerraf’s (1973) “Mathematical Truth”. As its title suggests, Benacerraf was 
worried about the epistemology of mathematics within a Platonist conception of 
mathematical objects. The gist of Benacerraf’s argument is straightforward. Benacerraf 
(at least in 1973) accepts a causal constraint on a theory of knowledge. On a Platonist 
conception, mathematical objects have no causal power. So if Platonism were true, 
mathematical knowledge would be impossible. An obvious initial worry here is that 
causal constraints on knowledge (or justification) have largely fell out of favor.5 But the 
argument has remained influential, because even if the problem isn’t the causal 
inefficacy of Platonic objects per se, there does seem to be a serious mystery about how 
we could have any epistemic access to abstracta of that sort, causal or not.6  
 While Benacerraf was concerned with the case of mathematical knowledge, a 
similar sort of problem arises for non-naturalist moral realists, according to which 
moral properties are not causally efficacious.7 This parallel was first noticed by Gilbert 
Harman (1977). And again, as in the mathematical case, even while causal conditions on 
knowledge have fallen out of favor, there is still a widespread sense that explaining our 
epistemic access—in terms of responsiveness to the moral facts—is a serious concern for 
                                                          
5 For an overview and references, see Jenkins Ichikawa & Steup (2012).  
6 Field (1989), Cheyne (2001), and Liggins (2010) for discussions of this point and developments of Benacerraf’s 
problem.  
7 E.g. Heathwood (2015, p.3), McGrath (2014, p.186), and Scanlon (2014). Oddie (2005) is an exception to this 
general rule, advocating a version of non-naturalism according to which the non-natural properties are causally 
efficacious.   
173
 
 
the non-naturalist moral realist. Part of the challenge here is just to understand what 
kind of explanation is being called for. While there is certainly dispute about that, I 
think it’s overwhelmingly plausible that there is something of real concern in the 
ballpark of Benacerraf’s original worry. Non-naturalists shouldn’t be satisfied to wait 
until a clear consensus emerges on the question of what epistemic access comes to 
before giving a positive epistemological story which assuages these concerns.  
 On the other hand, a more specific sort of undercutting defeater for moral 
knowledge comes in the form of evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). 
Evolutionary debunking arguments are a relative of Benacerraf-style objections. Though 
they have almost certainly been around much longer, interest in EDAs has skyrocketed 
largely as a result of the work of Sharon Street (2006) and Richard Joyce (2001, 2006). 
The details of Street and Joyce’s (as well as other debunkers) EDAs differ in important 
ways. At the most abstract level, the idea of an EDA is to provide a genealogy of our 
moral beliefs or belief-forming mechanisms in terms of the fitness-enhancing 
evolutionary nature of those beliefs or belief-forming mechanisms. Such an explanation, 
the debunker argues, will make no appeal to any mind-independent moral facts. This 
tells us that the moral beliefs or belief-forming mechanisms that we have are, given the 
wide variety of (conceptually) possible moral systems, extremely unlikely to be tracking 
the moral facts. This knowledge of almost certain unreliability serves to undercut any 
justification we initially had about stance-independent moral facts.  
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 In the above, I’ve provided nothing more than the briefest of sketches of 
Benacerraf arguments and EDAs. But I think it’s clear that these challenges are, if not 
the same, at least closely related. Both of them are tightly connected to two ideas. First, 
if the explanation of our moral beliefs or moral belief-forming mechanisms do not 
invoke some connection to the moral facts, then we should be skeptical about our 
prospects for moral knowledge. And second, if moral facts have the metaphysical status 
that non-naturalists believe that they do, then it is difficult if not impossible to see how 
an explanation of our moral beliefs or belief-forming mechanisms could invoke the 
moral facts.  
 Such is the general outline of the two challenges, but we’ll need to precisify 
before we can fully assess their chances at success. In the next section, I provide three 
potential ways of precisifying these sorts of challenges. Each precisification is distinct 
and compelling enough that it requires a distinct response, which I attempt in sections 
4-6. But first, I recap the AEI, which will be doing some of the heavy lifting below. 
2. A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism: An Outline8 
AEI consists in two substantive claims. First, AEI is a version of Ethical Intuitionism: 
EI: “[N]ormal ethical agents have at least some non-inferentially justified first-order 
ethical beliefs.”  
 
                                                          
8 This section is largely overlap from my “A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and the Problem of Cognitive 
Penetration” [Ch. 5].  
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As stated, EI is just the claim that foundationalism—understood in the epistemologist’s sense—
is true of the structure of at least some ethical beliefs, and that some ethical beliefs are members 
of the set of foundational beliefs. However, EI does not entail what we might call Classic 
Intuitionism, the claim that the non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs are grounded in 
intuitions, whatever those turn out to be. EI has its unfortunately misleading name presumably 
because most defenders of EI have also been defenders of Classic Intuitionism. I continue to 
label EI as such in order to accord with what has now become standard usage in the literature. 
The second claim that constitutes AEI is Ethical Empiricism: 
EE: The non-inferential justification of first-order ethical beliefs is grounded in the 
instantiation of evaluative properties in some kind of perceptual experience.  
 
According to EE, non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs are justified analogously to non-moral 
perceptual justification, on one sort of traditional foundationalist view. The basic picture is as 
follows. Under certain circumstances, evaluative properties (or their instantiations) figure in the 
contents of perceptual experience. Furthermore, at least sometimes, the evaluative properties that 
figure in the contents of perceptual experience are capable of providing non-inferential 
justification for beliefs about the instantiation of evaluative properties. This is compatible with 
the claim that sometimes evaluative perceptual experiences fail to non-inferentially justify. First, 
there may be defeaters for the justification that an evaluative perceptual experience would 
otherwise provide. Second, some evaluative perceptual experiences may be epistemically 
dependent in the sense that they can’t provide justificatory force independently of some prior 
evaluative belief. AEI only claims that, in at least some circumstances, neither of these things 
holds. When they do not, an evaluative perceptual experience can ground a non-inferentially 
justified moral belief.  
176
 
 
    AEI is not a single view but a family of views. I briefly note two recently discussed versions 
of AEI. According to Perceptual Intuitionism, evaluative properties are perceived in the same 
way that any non-moral but otherwise high-level properties are perceived. For example, the 
Perceptual Intuitionist may contend that the property goodness is capable of triggering a 
recognitional disposition within the visual processing system. On the other hand, according to 
Affectual Intuitionism, evaluative properties are perceived via affective states, which are 
themselves construed as either a form of perception or as a submodule within a broader 
perceptual (as opposed to cognitive) system. AEI is compatible with a number of views about the 
metaphysics of moral properties. However, as the focus in what follows is on epistemological 
objections to non-naturalist moral realism, I assume that version of AEI throughout.  
3. Formulation 1: Epistemic Access is Impossible 
 The first formulation of the epistemological problem, and perhaps the boldest, revolves 
around the claim that, given the metaphysical status of the non-natural properties, we could bear 
no justification conferring relationship to them. As Bengson says in a similar context, “What 
relation does a thinker’s mental state…bear to an abstract fact that explains how the state can be 
non-accidentally correct with respect to that fact, and hence able to serve as a source of 
knowledge for it?”9 In short, epistemic access to the moral properties is impossible. Call this the 
Impossibility Argument (IA): 
1. Any complete non-skeptical epistemology for a particular domain d must explain how 
we have epistemic access to the d-facts such that we are able to form beliefs that are 
responsive to those facts.10 
 
2. There is no explicable mechanism to explain how human beings could have epistemic 
access to non-natural moral facts such that our beliefs are responsive to those facts. 
 
Therefore, 
                                                          
9 Bengson (forthcoming), 8.  
10 Notice that this is the “access requirement” (AR) discussed at length in Ch. 1.  
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 3. Non-skeptical non-naturalist moral realism is false.  
 
Premise 1 is an attempt to reframe Benacerraf’s causal requirement on knowledge in 
non-causal terms. Epistemic access may be causal, but it may also be through one of 
several other routes: Introspective, Conceptual, Intuitive, or Constitutive.11 The rough 
idea here is that, causal or not, the believed fact should be playing a role in explaining 
why the belief is held.12 So premise 1 is an attempt to preserve the intuitive force behind 
Benacerraf’s argument without begging any questions against the non-naturalist. 
Premise 2 merely states that there is no such epistemic relationship between human 
agents and the non-natural moral facts to provide epistemic access of the sort discussed 
in premise 1.13 So, assuming that premise 1 is correct, the challenge for the non-
naturalist is to provide a positive account of what such an epistemic relationship might 
look like.  
4. Formulation 2: Reliability Would Be Extremely Unlikely 
 The proponent of the second formulation of a debunking argument is grants the 
possibility of epistemic access (at least for the sake of argument). But she claims that this 
is not enough to rebut skepticism, since it remains extremely unlikely that our actual 
moral beliefs are latching onto the moral facts. This seems to be what Sharon Street has 
                                                          
11 [See Ch. 1]  
12 For more on this, see Jenkins (2008, Ch.3).  
13 Hartry Field (2005, 77) gives a powerful statement of the sentiment behind premise 2: “[Non-naturalism] 
postulate[s entities] that are mind-independent and bear no causal or spatiotemporal relation to us, or any other 
kinds of relations to us that would explain why our beliefs about them tend to be correct”. 
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in mind when she says that “Allowing our evaluative judgments to be shaped by 
evolutionary influences is analogous to setting out for Bermuda and letting the course 
of your boat be determined by the wind and tides”.14  Just as it would be a priori 
extremely unlikely that our boat would make it to Bermuda with no guidance, it would 
be extremely unlikely—given all the conceptually possible ways the moral truths could 
turn out—that our evolved moral beliefs latched onto the moral facts.  
 Call this the Extreme Unlikelihood Argument (EUA): 
1. There is a huge range of logically possible stance-independent moral truths 
(and systems of truths).  
 
2. Our actual moral judgments are not caused by the moral facts.15 
 
Therefore, 
 
3. It is extremely unlikely that a significant subset of our moral beliefs are true, 
and those that are true are true as a result of luck in a way that undermines their 
justification. 
 
EUA, as stated, is not logically valid. But it remains a powerful inference to the best 
explanation, and so merits some sort of response on behalf of the non-naturalist.  
5. Formulation 3: No Good Reason to Think We’re Tracking the Moral Facts  
                                                          
14 Street (2006), pp.121-122.  
15 In Street’s argument, evolution plays the central role in the genealogy of our moral judgments, but a proponent 
of EUA could also appeal to culture, individuals’ upbringing, or some combination of these three things. Regardless 
of the details here, most non-naturalists would accept premise 2, so I do not distinguish between these 
possibilities.   
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 The third and final formulation of the epistemological objection to non-
naturalism that I’ll consider relies on something like the following plausible epistemic 
principle: 
No Good: “If you have no good reason to think that your belief is true, then you 
cannot rationally maintain it.”16 
 
If No Good is correct, and our moral beliefs are caused by something other than the 
moral facts, it looks as though we have a defeater for most if not all of our moral beliefs. 
Take some actual moral belief that we have, such as that suffering is bad.  The proponent 
of No Good points out that we have no good reason to think this belief is true—after all, 
whatever it was caused by, it presumably wasn’t caused by the fact that suffering is bad 
(even if it in fact is). So we can’t rationally maintain it. A similar argument would apply 
to any moral belief you choose, so skepticism seems to follow.  
 Now, the anti-skeptical non-naturalist may try to forestall this sort of argument 
by pointing out that we do have good reason to think many of our moral beliefs are 
true. And she can claim this by appeal to any of a number moral belief-forming 
processes: Her beliefs may be based on moral intuitions, or moral perceptions, 
acquaintance relations with the moral facts, etc. And she can say that her preferred 
theory about what grounds our moral beliefs does give her good reason to think they’re 
true after all.  
                                                          
16 This is Vavova’s (2014) formulation. Street (forthcoming, p.2) endorses a similar but more sophisticated 
principle.  
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 However, this kind of response on behalf of the anti-skeptical realist only serves 
to move the bump in the rug. That’s because insofar as No Good is an attractive 
epistemological principle, so too is: 
No Good Process: If you have no good reason to think that a given belief-forming 
process generates true beliefs, you cannot rationally maintain beliefs formed on 
the basis of such a process.  
 
Even granting the anti-skeptical realist’s initial response above, then, she’ll still owe us a 
good reason to think that her favored moral belief-forming process(es) generate true 
beliefs a significant portion of the time. And this is no easy task.  
Putting this together, we get what I’ll call the No Reason Argument (NRA): 
1. If you have no good reason to think that a given belief-forming process 
generates true beliefs, you cannot rationally maintain beliefs formed on the basis 
of such a process. 
 
2. We have no good reason to think that moral belief-forming processes generate 
true beliefs.  
 
Therefore, 
 
3. We cannot rationally maintain our moral beliefs (i.e. they are unjustified).  
 
Notice the difference between NRA and EUA. Unlike EUA, NRA doesn’t depend on 
any claim about the logical space of possible moral facts or the prior likelihood that we 
would latch onto the moral facts. It only depends on the claim that we’ve got no (good) 
non-circular reason to think that our moral belief-forming processes are reliable. This, 
along with the plausible claim that lacking such a reason undermines any claim to 
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justification (or rational belief), is enough to undermine justification to most, if not all, 
of our moral beliefs.  
6. Two Epistemically Neutral Responses to Epistemological Objections (and Their 
Problems) 
Standard realist responses to epistemological arguments like those above have so 
far tried to remain ecumenical between different moral epistemological views. This 
makes sense, since it allows the realist to remain otherwise neutral about substantive 
positive moral epistemology, and thus available to as many anti-skeptical realists as 
possible. I briefly consider two approaches of this sort, before turning to a discussion of 
AEI in particular.  
 A first strategy of this kind is the familiar ‘partners in guilt’ strategy.17 In this 
context, the idea is to argue that these arguments must fail, since we clearly have 
knowledge in other domains where similar arguments could be given. For example, it’s 
clear that we have mathematical and logical knowledge, but mathematical and logical 
facts plausibly have a similar ontological status to moral facts, non-naturalistically 
construed. Metaphysical facts, such as claims of essence, may have a similar ontological 
status. But we surely have at least mathematical and logical knowledge, if not 
metaphysical knowledge as well. So whatever other epistemological problems there 
                                                          
17 See, e.g. Brink (1984), Shafer-Landau (2005, 209-211), and Tropman (2008). Some also refer to this as the 
“partners in innocence” strategy. Shafer-Landau (2005, 209) calls them “partners in crime”.  
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might be for non-naturalism, it cannot be the lack of epistemic responsiveness, 
luckiness, or a principle like No Good Process.  
 The partners in guilt strategy assumes virtually nothing about what a positive 
moral epistemology must look like. Nor does it make any assumptions about the 
genealogy of justified moral beliefs. In that sense, the partners in guilt strategy has the 
advantage of being open to a wide range of otherwise diverse moral epistemologists.  
 On the other hand, the partners in guilt strategy relies on two assumptions which 
are, I think, both problematic. A partners in guilt strategy is only going to be successful 
insofar as the partners in question really are (a) uncontroversially epistemically 
innocent as well as (b) metaphysically analogous.  The first problematic assumption that 
those who appeal to partners in guilt in this context make is that (a) and (b) are met 
with respect to the domains of math, logic, and metaphysics. The partners in guilt 
strategy is especially ironic in this context, since the arguments presented above are 
arguably descendants of analogous arguments given against Platonism in mathematics. 
Similar concerns have been raised by philosophers of logic18 and metaphysicians19 about 
those respective domains.  These concerns are not only taken seriously, but have 
motivated many to less ontologically robust conceptions of these domains.20 In short, 
                                                          
18 Cheyne (2001), Liggins (2010), Schechter (2010).  
19 Kornblith (2007), Bengson (forthcoming).  
20 See, for example, Field (1989), and, in the ethical case, Street (2006, 2008). Note that such a move preserves our 
claim to knowledge in a given domain, and so avoids the skeptical conclusion. 
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the partners in guilt strategy in this context is unconvincing because the partners are 
(arguably) guilty.  
 A second problem for the appeal to partners in guilt here is that it must also turn 
out that the partners in question genuinely fail to meet the epistemic criterion laid out 
in the three formulations above. Some story about the justification in these contested 
domains must exist, if skepticism is false. Proponents of the epistemological analogy 
between morality and these other domains assume that a successful epistemology for 
any one of them will be easily extendable to each of the others. Such a “one size fits all” 
theory of the traditionally a priori domains would be nice, but it is non-trivial whether 
any such approach is feasible. The partners in guilt response to the epistemic access 
argument given above assumes without argument that some “one size fits all” 
epistemological theory of these domains exists. 
 A second and recently popular strategy for responding to epistemological 
objections to non-naturalism are so-called “third factor”, or “pre-established harmony” 
explanations.21 Proponents of this strategy first argue that an explanation of the truth of 
our moral beliefs is enough for moral knowledge, even if those beliefs are not to be 
explained in terms of the facts they are about. Then, second, they attempt to provide an 
explanation as to why many of our actual moral beliefs are true. For example, Enoch 
points out that there’s a good evolutionary reason why the belief that survival is good is 
                                                          
21 Enoch (2011, Ch.7), and Skarsaune (2011) both take this approach.  
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adaptive, so it’s no coincidence that we happen to have such beliefs. And, since it turns 
out that survival is good, our belief is true.22 Such a third factor story gives an 
explanation of reliability without positing any positive relation between us and the non-
natural normative facts, so it provides a way of rejecting the arguments above.23  
 One way to respond to third factor explanations is to consider them on a case-by-
case basis. For example, one might deny that the belief in question (e.g. survival is good) 
is adaptive, or one might deny that the adaptive belief in question is true (e.g. survival, 
it turns out, is not good). I want to claim that such a piecemeal approach is unnecessary, 
because a mere explanation of reliability is not enough to underwrite positive 
justificatory status. To see why, consider: 
Genetic Luck. As a result of a very strange genetic mutation, Teresa, who is 
otherwise epistemically normal, is born with the unshakeable belief that 
Water=H2O. Teresa has no independent evidence that this belief is true; she just 
can’t help but believe it. Her disposition to form this unshakeable belief is 
essential to Teresa, insofar as it is wired into her DNA.  
 
Teresa believes that Water=H2O at all and only those worlds in which it is true and she 
exists. Her belief is not just reliable, but (to borrow a term from Hawthorne (2002)) 
hyperreliable. We thus have an explanation of the reliability of her belief. Still, it seems 
                                                          
22 Enoch (2011), pp.168-177.  More carefully, Enoch points out that his particular appeal to “survival is good” as the 
particular normative claim that harmonizes with our evolutionarily ingrained beliefs may not be correct. But so 
long as there is some normative fact or other that aligns with our evolutionary dispositions, the general strategy 
will succeed. See Enoch (2011), 171.  
23 To be clear, Enoch doesn’t understand the epistemic challenge to non-naturalism as IA. However, if his third 
factor response is successful, it may also undermine IA. Enoch himself doesn’t understand the epistemic challenge 
in accordance with IA, since he thinks that anything like premise 1 is mistaken (2011, 152-153). [I defend premise 1 
in Ch. 1.] 
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wrong to say that Teresa is justified. Arguably, this is because neither Teresa’s belief, 
nor her method for forming it, have anything to do with the fact that water is H2O.  
The pre-established harmony between Teresa’s belief about water and the facts 
about water does not, then, seem to be enough to underwrite justification. But the 
relationship that holds between Teresa’s belief and the facts about water are analogous 
to the relationship between our moral beliefs and the moral facts according to 
proponents of third factor rejoinders to IA. The purported adaptiveness of certain moral 
beliefs on such accounts are not explained by their truth—it is just a coincidence that the 
moral truths happened to also be the things that were adaptive to believe.24  
 While I do think this issue is a serious and often overlooked one for proponents 
of third factor responses to debunking arguments, there is surely more to be said. 
However, I propose to set further discussion aside and turn to a distinct approach to 
these epistemological objections. The strategy is to assess the prospects for responding 
to the epistemological objections from within a particular moral epistemology, AEI. If 
successful, and assuming AEI is independently plausible, this would provide a 
response to these epistemological objections and, in doing so, provide a further reason 
to support AEI, namely, its ability to explain epistemic access to the normative facts. I’ll 
consider each of the three versions of the epistemological arguments given above in 
turn.  
                                                          
24 For further discussion of this and related issues, see [Chapter 1].  
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7. A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and the Impossibility Argument 
Recall the second premise of IA: 
2. There is no explicable mechanism to explain how human beings could have epistemic 
access to non-natural moral facts such that our beliefs are responsive to those facts. 
 
The challenge, for AEI or any other positive moral epistemology, is to explain how epistemic 
access to non-natural moral facts is possible. It may initially seem like the proponent of AEI has 
a simple but complete answer: Our access is perceptual. We perceive the non-natural moral facts, 
and after all, there is nothing implausible about claiming that perception can provide access to 
mind-independent properties. Insofar as premise two of IA is false with respect to other 
perceivable properties—tables, cats, shapes, etc.—it will also be false for non-natural moral 
properties. So, according to AEI, the non-natural facts are epistemically accessible, and IA fails. 
 This response may sound too good to be true, and that’s because it is. While it’s true that, 
according to AEI, our access to the non-natural facts is perceptual, just how this is possible is 
much more unclear than it is in the case of tables, cats, or shapes.25 This is because, unlike tables, 
cats, and shapes, the non-natural properties are widely thought to be non-causal.26 The non-
naturalist may, of course, reject this aspect of the view. But setting that aside, it seems as though 
the quick and dirty response given above just pushes the problem of epistemic access back a 
step. The skeptic can now ask: How could we have perceptual access to a causally inefficacious 
property, when perception is essentially a causal relationship? Insofar as this is impossible, the 
spirit of IA retains its full force.  
 The proponent of AEI could deny that perception is essentially causal, but without further 
motivation, this would appear ad hoc. She could also deny that non-natural properties are 
                                                          
25 Schroeder (2008, Sect. 4) raises a similar worry for the view that desires are appearances of the good.  
26 See n.7.  
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causally inefficacious, but that would raise its own problems.27 It might seem that these two 
options, both unpalatable, are the only routes available for the proponent of AEI. And so it may 
look as if, initial appearances aside, AEI is not well placed to provide an adequate account of our 
epistemic access to the non-natural properties.  
 What we have, then, is a seemingly inconsistent triad: 
Causally Inefficacious (CI). Non-natural moral properties are causally inefficacious. 
 
Perceptual Access (PA). We have epistemic access to non-natural moral properties 
through perception.  
 
Causal Condition on Perception (CCP). Perception is an essentially causal relation. 
 
As we’ve just seen, we should be reluctant to give up either CI or CCP. Rejecting PA, and thus 
accepting premise 2—and thus the soundness—of the Impossibility Argument, appears to be the 
only option left. But this isn’t right. Contrary to initial appearances, the triad above is not 
inconsistent. We can simultaneously accept CI, CCP, and PA—or so I presently argue.  
 The appearance of inconsistency arises because perception is essentially causal, whereas 
non-natural moral properties are non-causal. However, once we focus on what precisely CCP 
says (and doesn’t say), it becomes clear that CCP is actually compatible with moral perception, 
and thus compatible with PA, even if the moral properties are non-causal. To see this, notice that 
the proponent of a posteriori ethical intuitionism needn’t—and in fact shouldn’t—deny that 
moral perception is causal. If Norma perceives that Tibbles’s being lit on fire is bad, and this 
perception isn’t hallucinatory, she surely must stand in some causal relation to Tibbles.28 Thus, 
Norma’s perception is essentially causal; CCP is met. And yet her perceptual experience 
represents badness, a causally inefficacious property; so we haven’t given up CI either.  
                                                          
27 For this strategy, see Oddie (2005).  
28 Emily surely is causally related to Tibbles, but is she causally related to the badness being instantiated? Arguably 
not. See sections 9 and 10 for a response to this worry.  
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 Again, it would be fair to worry that there is some implicit sleight of hand going on—can 
epistemic access really be this easy? In a sense, I think the answer is yes, in that I think the 
explanation just given is correct. But it’s also frustrating, because it seems to respond to the letter 
of the epistemological concern without adequately addressing the spirit. Since I’m worried about 
the spirit of the objection as well, it is well worth saying a bit about what the underlying 
philosophy of perception issues that I think are going on beneath the surface.  
8. Interlude: Just What is Essentially Causal about Perception?  
 There is a vast literature in the philosophy of perception concerning what properties 
figure in the contents of perceptual experience. Call Conservatism the view that only low-level 
properties—such as shapes, colors, and tones—can be represented. Call Liberalism the view that 
some high-level properties—such as natural kinds, artifacts, and relations—can also be 
represented. Conservatives and liberals disagree radically about what properties feature in 
perceptual experience, but they nevertheless widely29 agree that perception is an essentially 
causal relationship.  
I cannot adjudicate the conservative/liberal dispute here. But it seems safe to assume that 
AEI is only going to be even initially plausible to liberals—assuming that moral properties are 
high-level properties, conservatives are going to reject AEI from the get go. In what follows, I 
will assess how best to understand the essentially causal nature of perception from within a 
liberal framework. In the bigger picture, this is a contentious assumption. But since proponents 
of AEI are already committed to liberalism, it is a safe assumption to make in this context. The 
idea, then, is to home in on the essentially causal nature of perception by considering some 
                                                          
29 Though not universally—see Snowdon (1979).  
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causally unique cases of properties thought to be perceivable by liberals about perceptual 
experience.  
 Begin by considering one natural but strict way to understand the causal constraint on 
perceptual representation: 
Strict CC. Necessarily, if a property F is part of the contents of S’s perceptual experience 
e, then F (or the fact that F is instantiated) is at least partially causally responsible for e.  
 
Strict CC is a relatively robust causal constraint on perceptual representation. But it’s also an 
initially intuitive way of characterizing the causal nature of perception in a precise way. 
Nevertheless, I now argue that Strict CC should be rejected by liberals about perceptual 
experience. I’ll argue this by considering three sorts of properties that liberals have defended as 
perceivable that couldn’t be, if Strict CC were true: Absences, Gibsonian affordances, and the 
mental states of others. I consider each in turn. 
 Many liberals have recently argued that perceptual experience extends beyond the 
representation of positive properties to the representation of what we can call absence properties. 
For example, you may perceive a gap in an otherwise predictable pattern of coins arranged on 
the table,30 the holes in a slice of Swiss cheese,31 darkness in the inside of a cave,32 or the sound 
of silence.33 Suppose that these liberals are right—that we do perceive at least some absence 
properties. It’s unclear if this is compatible with Strict CC, since it is unclear that the lack of 
something can figure in a genuine causal relationship. It’s plausible that silence, for example, 
does not involve the existence of some causal property, but rather the lack of any causally 
efficacious property of a certain sort. The causal (in)efficacy of absence properties is a matter of 
                                                          
30 Farennikova (forthcoming), 2.  
31 Lewis & Lewis (1970), Casati & Varzi (1994), pp.156-158.  
32 Sorensen (2008), Ch.10.  
33 See, e.g., Sorensen (2008, Ch.14, 2009), Soteriou (2011), Phillips (2013), and Simon & Garfunkel (1964).    
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some controversy.34 However, the liberal arguments for the perceivability of absence properties 
do not directly depend on any such metaphysical claim. So, while it’s not uncontentious, the 
perception of absence properties does provide some prima facie reason to favor a less robust 
causal constraint on perception than Strict CC.  
 A second set of properties which appears to conflict with Strict CC are what I’ll call 
affordance properties. The idea of affordances in perceptual experience goes back to the 
psychological research of James J. Gibson (1977, 1979), but it has also been the subject of quite 
a bit of recent work in the philosophy of perception.35 In Gibson’s words, affordances are 
properties that tell an animal what an environment “offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes, either for good or ill.”36 Others—both philosophers and psychologists—following in 
Gibson’s footsteps have attempted to refine the idea of affordance properties in various ways.37 
But paradigmatic instances of affordance properties should illustrate the idea clearly enough for 
present purposes. For example, an animal’s prey may be seen as to-be-killed, a cup as able-to-be-
picked-up, and the liquid in the cup as drinkable.38 In brief, affordance properties relate agents 
and their abilities to the environment. They represent something like potential actions.  
 Though affordance properties are surely grounded in causal properties (for example, the 
structure of the cup underlies its ability to be picked up), they are arguably not themselves 
causal. However, according to at least many psychologists and philosophers, affordance 
properties are perceivable.39 Insofar as this is right, it casts doubt on Strict CC, since the 
                                                          
34 See, e.g. Lewis (2004), McGrath (2005), and Dowe (2009).   
35 Chemero (2003), Prosser (2011), Nanay (2012), and Siegel (2014).   
36 Gibson (1979), p.127. 
37 See, e.g. Reed (1996), Chemero (2003).  
38 Affordance properties appear, then, to come in two levels of strength—some features of objects render things 
possible, while others render things as appearing (practically) necessary. See Siegel (2014) for discussion of this 
point. 
39 This claim is far from uncontentious. But so far as I know, no one has rejected the perceivability of affordances 
on the grounds that they’re not causal.  
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perception of affordance properties is incompatible with it. In short, affordance properties (and 
their perceivability) give us further reason to favor a less robust causal constraint on perception 
than Strict CC. 
 Finally, consider perception of the mental states of others. For example, many 
philosophers of perception and mind have recently argued that we can literally perceive the 
affective states of others.40 Rowland Stout, for example, argues that we can “literally perceive 
someone’s anger” in the sense that this perception is non-inferential.41 The causal efficacy of 
mental states is one of the thorniest issues in philosophy. But, as far as I know, no one arguing 
against the perception of mental states has claimed that the perception of these states hinged on 
this controversy. Appeals in favor of the claim that we can perceive these states are generally 
phenomenological and empirical (appealing to modules in the brain dedicated to “mindreading”), 
not to the causal efficacy of these states. So it seems as though at least many liberals should be 
friendly to the perception of the mental states of others, regardless of their direct causal efficacy.  
 If a broadly liberal view of perceptual content is correct, it seems like Strict CC is not the 
right way to understand the causal constraint on perception. However, given the consensus that 
there is some causal constraint on perception, some weaker constraint must hold. Unfortunately, 
without taking controversial stands on the cases above (and others), a full account can’t be 
attempted here. However, if any of the properties discussed above are perceivable, something at 
least as weak as the following must hold:   
Weak CC. Necessarily, if a property F is part of the contents of S’s perceptual experience 
e, then either (a) F or (b) some property (or set of properties) G which grounds F is at 
least partially causally responsible for e. 
 
                                                          
40 See, e.g. Green (2010), Stout (2010), and McNeill (2012).  
41 Stout (2010), 29.  
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Depending on what one says about the cases above, Weak CC may remain too strong to be an 
accurate causal constraint on perception. But I hope to have established that the liberal about 
perceptual experience should favor something at least as weak as Weak CC, independent of any 
consideration of the perception of moral properties.  
9. Moral Properties and the Reformulated Causal Constraint on Perception 
 I have argued that liberals about perceptual experience can plausibly reject Strong CC. 
This argument was necessary because ensuring that causally inefficacious moral properties can 
figure in the contents of perceptual experience is crucial to rebutting the Impossibility Argument. 
The weaker the causal constraint that one favors, the easier moral perception will be to 
accommodate. Suppose everything I’ve claimed is correct. It then appears that the strongest 
skeptical argument to be made against moral perception is to (a) grant Weak CC and then (b) 
argue that moral properties could not meet even this reformulated version of the causal 
constraint. I propose to grant (a) for the sake of argument, and turn to (b). 
 Whether moral properties can meet Weak CC turns on the metaphysical question of 
whether moral properties are wholly grounded in natural properties.42 This is in principle 
compatible with a non-naturalist conception of moral properties, since grounding doesn’t entail 
identity or reduction.43 Consider a candidate moral principle, suffering is bad. If the truth of this 
moral principle is grounded in instances of causally efficacious properties, then the perception of 
the badness of suffering will be compatible with Weak CC. 
                                                          
42 See Väyrynen (2013) for a helpful discussion about grounding and its potential use in illustrating the relationship 
between the natural and the normative.  
43 Rosen (2010), Audi (2012). For a non-naturalist metaphysics that fits this mold, see Leary (forthcoming).    
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 Not every non-naturalist view favors this understanding of the grounding relation 
between the natural properties and the non-natural, normative properties.44 I cannot hope to 
adjudicate this complex issue here. What must be flagged, however, is that different conceptions 
of the nature of the moral properties may still be compatible with the perception of those 
properties. Furthermore, there may be independent reasons to favor a causal constraint on 
perception which is weaker than Weak CC. If this is the case, a partial grounding of the 
normative in the natural may be enough. The weaker a causal constraint that holds, the easier it 
will be to defend a perceptualist moral epistemology.  
10. A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and the Impossibility Argument: Redux and Recap  
 We saw above (section 7) that standard responses to the Impossibility Argument attempt 
to cast doubt on premise 1 (or its variants): 
1. Any complete non-skeptical epistemology for a particular domain d must explain how 
we have epistemic access to the d-facts such that we are able to form beliefs that are 
responsive to those facts. 
 
Though these strategies have the advantage of being neutral with respect to the mechanisms that 
underlie moral justification and moral knowledge, I’ve argued that they are nonetheless 
unsuccessful. This prompted a closer look at premise 2 of the argument:  
2. There is no explicable mechanism to explain how human beings could have epistemic 
access to non-natural moral facts such that our beliefs are responsive to those facts. 
 
                                                          
44 According to the conception given in the text, the truth of a moral principle is grounded in its instances—i.e. 
suffering is bad is a true moral principle in virtue of the distribution of the suffering properties and the badness 
properties. On an alternative conception, the moral principles play a metaphysical role in the instantiation of moral 
properties—i.e. the instantiation of badness depends on the interaction between the instantiation of suffering and 
the truth of the moral principle suffering is bad. On such a view, the instantiation of a moral property is only 
partially grounded in causally efficacious properties. So if the defender of moral perception favored such a view 
she would have to defend something weaker than Weak CC.   
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I argued that the proponent of AEI is well-placed to reject premise 2, since for her, perceptual 
experience provides a perfectly explicable mechanism45 to provide human beings with epistemic 
access to non-natural moral facts. The proponent of the impossibility argument accepts that 
perception provides epistemic access to many empirical facts, so unless she can give us special 
reason to doubt that this occurs in the moral case, the skeptical argument fails.  
 As we saw, the moral skeptic might reject perceptual access in the moral case by 
claiming that a perceptual moral epistemology falls afoul of the consensus in the philosophy of 
perception that perception is an essentially causal process. Non-natural moral properties are 
causally inefficacious, so they are not perceivable, even in principle.  
 We have now seen that this attempt to single out moral properties using the causal 
constraint on perception is not so simple. The perception of causally inefficacious properties is 
compatible with the causal constraint on perception, properly construed, as long as those 
properties are related to causally efficacious properties in the right sort of way. Given some 
plausible causal constraints on perception, non-natural properties will be perceivable after all. 
Epistemic access to moral properties is possible, contra premise 2, if we endorse A Posteriori 
Ethical Intuitionism.  
11. A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and the Extreme Unlikelihood Argument 
 If, as I’ve argued, the Impossibility Argument fails, then epistemic access to the moral 
properties is possible. Turn now to the second formulation of the debunking argument. The 
skeptic may grant that justified moral beliefs are in principle possible, but that it remains 
extremely unlikely that we have them, given the fact that it would be a massive coincidence if 
                                                          
45 This isn’t to say that no further details of how this mechanism works need filling in. An adequate account of 
moral perception must also show itself to be otherwise empirically, metaphysically, and epistemologically 
plausible. This arguably can’t be done without a complete explanation of the mechanism(s) of moral perception.  
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our moral belief-forming faculties actually tracked moral facts. This is the Extreme Unlikelihood 
Argument (EUA): 
1. There is a huge range of logically possible stance-independent moral truths 
(and systems of truths).  
 
2. Our actual moral judgments are not caused by the moral facts. 
 
Therefore, 
 
3. It is extremely unlikely that a significant subset of our moral beliefs are true, 
and those that are true are true as a result of luck in a way that undermines their 
justification. 
 
The non-naturalist has three possibilities for responding to EUA. She can reject premise 
1, reject premise 2, or, since the argument is not deductively valid, reject the move from 
1 and 2 to the conclusion. Premise 1 is overwhelmingly plausible.46 Premise 2 is also 
widely accepted by non-naturalists. 
 However, the discussion above suggests a strategy for resisting the inference 
from the premises to the conclusion. According to A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism, our 
moral experiences are caused, in part, by the properties which ground the moral facts. 
As long as our moral experiences are caused by the property-arrangements that ground 
the moral properties, there will be a non-accidental connection between our moral 
experiences and the moral facts. Such non-accidentality would seem to undermine the 
                                                          
46 One strategy for rejecting something like premise 1 is to argue that some substantive first-order moral facts are 
conceptual truths. This is suggested by Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014) and, on some readings, Audi (2008). I argue 
elsewhere that this sort of view just pushes the epistemological problem back a step.  
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claim of extreme unlikeliness in any particular case, and so would undermine the 
debunker’s conclusion of EUA.  
12. A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and the No Reason Argument 
 “Ok”, the skeptic might say in light of the reasoning above, “if there’s a non-
accidental connection between our moral experiences and the natural facts that at least 
partially ground the moral facts, then the debunker would be in trouble. But we have 
no reason to think any such connection holds. So we’ve got no reason to think that any 
of our moral experiences are tracking the moral facts.” I think this is a perfectly natural 
way to respond to the above discussion of the Extreme Unlikelihood Argument. And it 
also provides a helpful segue, since it appears to be a restatement of the third 
debunking argument, the No Reason Argument: 
1. If you have no good reason to think that a given belief-forming process 
generates true beliefs, you cannot rationally maintain beliefs formed on the basis 
of such a process. 
 
2. We have no good reason to think that moral belief-forming processes generate 
true beliefs.  
 
Therefore, 
 
3. We cannot rationally maintain our moral beliefs (i.e. they are unjustified).  
 
The No Reason Argument is prima facie plausible. The non-naturalist might put pressure 
on premise 2 by claiming that we do have good reason to think that our moral belief-
forming processes generate true beliefs. After all, many of our moral beliefs are true, 
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and they are a result of our moral belief-forming processes.47 But this kind of response, 
as Street points out, is question-begging, since it assumes the truth of our moral beliefs, 
the very things which are presently in doubt. If the non-naturalist wants to reject 
premise 2, she’s going to have to appeal to some independent reason for trusting her 
moral belief-forming faculties, lest her rejection be question-begging. It’s hard to see 
how the non-naturalist can achieve this task.  
 However, the non-naturalist need not seek for independent verification for her 
moral beliefs, because, as Katia Vavova has pointed out, premise 1 of the No Reason 
Argument is false. As she puts it: 
[Premise 1] seems compelling because it raises a familiar sort of skeptical 
challenge. But it also collapses the debunker’s challenge into that more ambitious 
one for which no empirical premise is necessary and which undermines much 
more than evaluative realism…Unless we are skeptics, we should grant that 
sensory perception is a perfectly good belief forming method. Ceteris paribus, if 
you perceive that p, you are rational in concluding that p. Do we have good 
reason to think that perception would lead us to true beliefs about our 
surroundings? Not if ‘good’ reason is understood as an appropriately 
independent reason: for if we set aside all that is in question, we must set aside 
all beliefs gained by perception. This includes all scientific beliefs, like the belief 
that evolutionary theory is true.48 
 
Either premise 1 of the No Reason Argument is a bad epistemic principle, or a near 
global skepticism is true. If the former, then the argument fails to debunk moral beliefs. 
If the latter, then we have a lot more to be worried about than vindicating morality.  
                                                          
47 The most explicit versions of this response can be found in Dworkin (2011) and Setiya (2012), but something like 
this move appears to be part and parcel of the third factor responses to debunking arguments (e.g. Enoch (2010), 
Wielenberg (2010)).  
48 Vavova (2014).  
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 Since Vavova’s rejection of premise 1 is otherwise epistemologically neutral, it’s 
available to a wide variety of views about non-naturalist epistemology. But even here, I 
think that a view like A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism has a slight advantage. For the 
proponent of AEI, moral experiences are considered a special instance of the more 
general theory of perceptual justification. If moral experiences are properly 
characterized as perceptual experiences, they will prima facie inherit some of the 
epistemological credentials of other perceptual experiences. In other words, the would-
be debunker owes the proponent of AEI a story about why we should be especially 
suspicious of perceptual experiences of a moral sort despite the fact that perception is, 
in other cases, a justification-conferring process. This isn’t to claim that grounds for 
suspicion couldn’t be given. Rather, it is just to claim that they must, and until they 
have, the proponent of AEI should be (slightly) less nervous than proponents of a priori 
moral epistemologies which—along with a priori justification more generally—have 
come under fire, both historically and at present. 
13. Taking Stock 
 Epistemological objections to non-naturalism have been around for some time, 
and they will surely continue to be. The standard approach that non-naturalists have 
taken to these sorts of concerns has been to argue that the epistemological principles 
that these arguments rely on are mistaken. The advantage of these approaches is that 
they are otherwise compatible with a wide variety of positive conceptions of the 
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mechanisms of moral epistemology. However, I have argued that the two most popular 
strategies—partners in guilt and third factor responses—are unsuccessful. Given the 
failing of these moral epistemology theory-neutral attempts at responding to debunking 
and epistemic access arguments, in this paper I have taken a different tack: I have 
suggested that endorsing A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism (AEI) provides the non-
naturalist with the resources to rebut what I take to be the three most powerful versions 
of epistemological arguments against anti-skeptical non-naturalism.  
 According to the first argument, the Impossibility Argument, epistemic access to 
the non-natural properties is impossible, since it is inexplicable how we could bear 
some positive epistemic relation to them. I claimed that the proponent of AEI has a 
surprisingly straightforward answer to this argument: Perceptual experience provides 
us with access to the moral properties. It may have seemed as though this response was 
a non-starter, given the causal nature of perception and the non-causal nature of non-
natural properties. However, I argued that, once properly understood, the causal 
constraint on perception is compatible with the perception of non-natural properties, 
even if those properties are causally inefficacious.  
 Once this response to the Impossibility Argument is secured, responding to the 
second argument, the Extreme Unlikelihood Argument, is straightforward. If we 
perceive the non-natural properties, then moral perceptual experiences bear a non-
accidental connection to the non-natural properties. This non-accidentality undermines 
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the claim that moral beliefs formed on the basis of moral experience are extremely 
unlikely to be true.  
 At this point, the skeptic balks. At this point in the dialectic, we’d established the 
following conditional: If we perceive the non-natural properties (and such a thing is at 
least possible), then there is some non-accidental connection between our moral 
experiences and the non-natural properties. But the skeptic, we saw, now asks: Why 
should we think the antecedent of that conditional is met? Bare possibility doesn’t 
establish actuality, after all. The skeptic says that if we have no good reason to trust our 
moral belief-forming faculty, then any prima facie justification we might have had is 
undercut. This is the third epistemological argument against non-naturalism that I 
considered, the No Reason Argument. However, as Vavova (2014) points out, the 
epistemic principle that this argument relies on is faulty, and if true, would entail a near 
global skepticism. In whatever sense that we don’t know that our moral experiences are 
reliable, we can say the same thing about perceptual experiences more generally—any 
evidence that they are reliable will be question-begging against the skeptic. The No 
Reason Argument fails.  
 A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism might be right. In other words, we may have 
moral perceptual experiences, and these experiences may reliably track non-natural 
properties. If both of these things hold, then we have justified moral beliefs, and, 
arguably, moral knowledge which is grounded in moral perceptual experience. It 
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seems, then, that the moral skeptic’s attempt to debunk or undercut anti-skeptical non-
naturalism has failed. At the same time, non-naturalists should own up to the kernel of 
truth in the skeptic’s thinking. Since we can’t assess the status of our moral beliefs from 
any standpoint wholly independent from our moral belief-forming faculties, we can’t 
confidently claim that we have any moral knowledge at all. In other words, we might 
know, but we can’t know that we know. This is true of many domains of inquiry, but 
given the importance of morality, non-naturalists should take this epistemic humility to 
heart.  
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